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Abstract
This dissertation examines the extent to which proximity to markets
- as measured by market potential, the trade cost-weighted sum of
surrounding regions' GDP - can explain late-nineteenth century Eu-
rope's regional per capita income dierentials. The research questions
are: (1) was the spatial distribution of regional income random; (2)
how helpful are traditional explanations - coal and institutions - of
regional income; (3) how helpful is market potential when controlling
for traditional explanations; and (4) did market potential have an ef-
fect on other determinants of income? This dissertation nds that:
(1) the distribution of regional per capita income increasingly concen-
trated in the northwest; that there was little tendency to income con-
vergence; and regional inequalities were higher within than between
countries; (2) while a measure of regional institutions is correlated
with income, simple distance-to-coal and a cost-to-coal measures are
not; (3) market potential has a signicant eect on income; foreign
market potential more so than domestic; and increasing core relative
to peripheral market potential results in perpherial income losses; and
(4) changes in literacy rates, a proxy for human capital, responded to
changes in market potential. In conclusion, a new economic geog-
raphy framework with market potential at its core ts the historical
experience well. Certain regions performed better than others gener-
ally because they had cheaper access to markets. At the start of the
period, trade costs were high, and so economic activity - long con-
centrated in Britain - was spread out more or less evenly across the
Continent. By the end of the period, when trade costs dropped dra-
matically, economic activity concentrated in the northwest of Europe
at the cost of the periphery.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
This dissertation has its roots in the observation that the distribution of European
regional income today is not dissimilar from the distribution that existed 140
years ago. Figure 1.1 plots the distribution of European regional GDP per capita
relative to its cross-sectional mean from 1870 to 2010.1 While the right tail of the
distribution has grown in length, indicating a growing gap from the mean to the
very rich regions, the general shape of European regional inequality has remained
comparable over the period. A bi-modal distribution that took form in 1910 has
remained present until in 2000 and 2010. Indeed, looking at the simple coecient
of variation on the absolute GDP per capita levels underlying 1.1 we go from 0.29
in 1870 to 0.31 in 1910 and to 0.30 in 2010. While recent papers from the OECD
and articles in the Economist indicate that regional inequality has become the
topic du jour, economic historians long ago wrote about Europe's highly unequal
distribution of production within and between countries in the ninteenth century
(Fredriksen, 2012; Pollard, 1973; The Economist, 2011).
Is something interesting just because it is old? Leaving aside the eects of
regional income inequality, looking at historical inequalities shows us that contem-
1The EU-15 countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
My sample of countries: Austria-Hungary, Britain (including Ireland), France, Germany, Italy,
Spain, and Sweden. There are obvious problems with national border changes and sample
inconsistencies, but this a simple illustrative exercise.
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Figure 1.1: Long-run European regional GDP per capita distributions
Notes: Figures are expressed as percentage of cross-sectional mean. The post-1910 countries
are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The 1870-1910
countries: Austria-Hungary, Britain (including Ireland), France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
and Sweden. The pre-1910 currency unit is the 1990 Geary-Khamis dollar; post-1910,
purchasing-power parity national currencies. For sources of 1870-1910 data, see Chapter
3; and European Commission (2011) for post-1910 data.
porary explanations - often based on relatively recent European Union structural
policies or exogenous shocks - can be ahistorical and so miss the true cause of
inequality.
Initially, mainstream economists and policymakers based their arguments for
European regional integration on classical trade and growth theory. They argued
that a low level of competitiveness - an absolute disadvantage - does not prevent
regions from enjoying the wider gains from trade that are based on comparative
advantage. Balassa (1961) theorised that the expansion of the European Common
Market would lead to overall productivity gains. Aitken (1973) and Wang and
Winters (1992) provided empirical support for this theory. Growth theorists pre-
dicted capital market integration would lead to convergence because of decreasing
returns to scale to capital: regions with low capital stocks and per capita incomes
should have higher marginal products and returns to capital. This, argued Barro
and Sala-i Martin (2004), is what explains (slow) per capita income convergence
in late twentieth century Europe, when core capital owed into the periphery.
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Almost 60 years after the European common market was established, and 140
years after our earliest measures of regional income, we are, however, still living
with high regional per capita inequalities. A helpful explanation of this inequality
must account for its persistence and for the fact that ever-deeper economic inte-
gration has not produced the results predicted by classical theory. If achieved,
such an explanation might also provide an antidote to presentist accounts of Eu-
ropean economic inequalities, increasingly seen as the root of the current crisis,
as having been primarily caused by the European Union and monetary union
(Ferguson, 2012).
1.2 Theoretical background
In his pioneering new economic geography (NEG) work, Geography and Trade,
Krugman (1991, p. 95) asked, `What will happen to [poorer] regions as Europe
becomes more closely integrated?' Classical growth and trade theorists presumed
that with improved access of low-wage peripheral regions to high-wage core re-
gions, industry will be incentivised to move to the periphery. This happened to
some extent, but it was not a necessary eect. Krugman and Venables (1990)
showed that improved access to markets can be detrimental to peripheral industry.
Regional integration and peripheral industry
Suppose that an industry can locate in one or both of two regions: a central
region where wages and hence production costs are high, but it has good access
to markets, and a peripheral region where wages are low, but market access is
poor. It is easy to think that a reduction in trade costs - transport costs plus
taris - would move industry from the central to peripheral region, but in reality
something quite dierent is likely to happen.
A reduction in trade costs can have two simultaneous eects. First, it allows
production to locate where it is cheapest. Second, it allows the concentration of
production in one region, enabling economies of scale to be realised. Crucially,
this agglomeration might make sense at the region with higher wages, but with
better market access.
Table 1.1, from Krugman (1991), oers a practical example of this. Suppose a
3
Table 1.1: Hypothetical eects of lower trade costs
Shipping costs
Production costs High Medium Low
Produce in Belgium 10 3 1.5 0
Produce in Spain 8 8 4 0
Produce in both 12 0 0 0
Notes: Taken from Krugman (1991, p. 96).
good can be produced in one or both of Belgium, the central location, and Spain,
the peripheral location. For simplicity, Krugman (1991) takes total sales as given,
ignoring any elasticity of demand. That is, producers choose the location that
minimises the sum of production and trade costs. While it is cheaper to produce
that good in Spain than in Belgium, since Spanish wages are lower, it is cheaper
still to produce the good in either location than in both because of economies
of scale. On the other hand, producing in both locations would minimise trade
costs, and producing in Belgium would involve lower trade costs than producing
in Spain.
Table 1.1 shows three cases of trade costs: - high, intermediate, and low (or
zero). If costs are high then production will occur in both countries, but if they
are low it will occur in low-wage Spain. A 50 per cent reduction in costs from
the high case of 3 to 1.5 causes production to move from low-wage Spain to high-
wage Belgium. This is because in the intermediate trade cost case, costs are
low enough to incentivise agglomeration, but still too high for market access to
outweigh production costs (wages in this example) as determinant of industrial
location. The implication is that the relationship between trade costs and Span-
ish production is U-shaped rather than monotonic. Across some range of costs,
`integration actually leads production to move perversely from the point of view
of comparative costs' (Krugman, 1991, p. 97).
Which part of the U-shape?
Krugman (1991, p. 97) hypothesised `that we are now on the good part of the
U, not the bad: that railroads and steamships led to deindustrialization of the
periphery, but that 1992 will actually favour peripheral manufacturing.' Thinking
about economic activity more broadly, Krugman's hopes have not be fullled.
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That is, regional income inequalities remain high and the map of regional income
has not changed susbtantially, going by our historical measures and descriptions
(Landes, 1969; Pollard, 1973, 1981; Wrigley, 1961).
Cost reductions from \railroads" and \steamships" did indeed facilitate the
concentration of production in the northwest of Europe. Figure 1.2 shows, on
the left, a familiar picture of declining ton-mile freight rates - average of coal and
grain - in global ocean shipping and European railway transport. On the right
of the gure, a breakdown of transporting the same \good" from London, the
European core, to Kosice (in what is now Slovakia), the eastern periphery, shows
an overall drop in trade costs of 38 per cent. It also shows how the arrival of
railways obliterated road and waterway transport, shortening the length of the
transport network from 1,551 miles in 1870 to 1,389 miles in 1910.1 The issue,
however, is that more dramatic trade cost reductions since - the EU free trade
area and monetary union, no less - have failed to move it back.
Figure 1.2: Transport cost declines from 1870 to 1910
Notes: Left panel shows terminal (docking) plus variable (per ton-mile) costs of coal-grain
freight. Underlying data are in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars, and 1870 is set to 100. The
railway data are from Schulze (2007b) and the shipping data from Kaukiainen (2006). Right
panel shows the cost of transporting a ton of coal-grain from London to Kosice (Austria-
Hungary), broken down into ve components. The data re in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars.
See Chapter 4 for more details on sources and calculations.
Through forward and backward linkages, a region that accumulated physical
1See Chapter 4 for all the sources and explanations of these data. The network is my own
GIS of roads, waterways, railways, shipping lines, ports, and regional cities. The costs are in
1990 Geary-Khamis dollars, and average the freight rates of coal and grain, as representative
goods.
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and human capital will have a higher - rather than lower - rate of return on
investment than a region where physical and human capital are scarce. If the
rate of capital accumulation depends on the rate of return, then an `unequalizing
spiral' will ensue, where Europe becomes dierentiated into richer and poorer
regions (Krugman, 1991, p. 94).
These increasing returns do not only feed o themselves and low trade costs:
they depend on a `demand externality' (Krugman, 1991, p. 20). Industry will lo-
cate where the market is largest, and the market is largest where industry locates.
If this cicularity is strong enough, then historical patterns of economic activity can
persist over long horizons. Interestingly, the idea of the market as a determinant
of industrial location is as old as Marshall (1920). Economists did not take much
notice of it, but some geographers in the mid-twentieth century did, before it was
forgotten again for another three decades. Looking at retailers, Harris (1954)
measured the pull of markets - \market potential" - through distance-weighted
regional populations, as a proxy for market size weighted by trade costs. His idea
has been revived in NEG, and plays a central role in my dissertation (Crafts,
2005a; Hanson, 2005; Head and Meyer, 2004; Martnez-Galarraga, 2014). It cap-
tures in a simple fashion the idea that producers want to minimise the sum of
production and trade costs, and maximise their market size.
1.3 Market Potential: Theory and Mechanism
Recent theoretical work in new economic geography explains spatial agglomer-
ation as a function of product-market linkages between regions. As mentioned
above, the market potential function in Harris (1954) is a precursor to this recent
work. His function equates the potential demand for goods and services pro-
duced in a region with that region's proximity to consumer markets. Following
the notation in Hanson (2005):
MPj =
X
k"K
Yke
 djk
(1.1)
where MPj is the market potential for region j, Yk is income in region k,
and djk is the distance between j and k. Early work asserted the existence of
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equation 1.1 with little theoretical foundation. More recently, researchers have
derived a structural relationship similar in form to 1.1 from general-equilibrium
spatial models.
It is useful to start with the basic framework of Krugman (1991), and ex-
tend it along the lines of Helpman (1998) which provides a tractable form for
empirical work. The dierence between the two comes down to Helpman (1998)
replacing the agricultural sector in Krugman (1991) with a housing sector thus
creating a nontraded good, and more realistic distribution of production. All
consumers have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences over two bundles of goods,
traded manufacturing goods and housing services,
U = CmC
1 
h (1.2)
 is the share of expenditure on manufactured goods, Ch is the quantity of
housing services consumed and Cm is a composite of symmetric manufacturing
good varieties given by
Cm =
"
nX
i
c
 1

i
# 
 1
(1.3)
where  is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of product varieities
and n is the number of product varieties. The production of each manufactured
variety has increasing returns, so that
Lim = a+ bxi (1.4)
where a and b are constants, Lim is labour used in the production of variety
i and xi is the quantity of i produced. When in equilibrium, each variety of
manufactured good is produced by a single monopolistically competitive rm
and the foreign onboard price (f.o.b.) price for each variety is a constant markup
over its marginal cost, which in turn depends on the wage, w.
Labourers, L, are perfectly mobile between J regions. The housing stock in
region j is normally assumed to be xed at Hj. Housing stock ownership is then
assumed to be symmetric across individuals so that each labourer owns 1=L of
the housing stock in each one of the J regions. With iceberg trasnport costs in
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trading goods between regions, the cost, insurance, freight (c.i.f.) price of good i
produced by region j and sold in region k is
Pijk = Pije
djk (1.5)
where Pijk is the f.o.b. price of good i produced in region j,  is the unit
transport costs and djk is the distance between j and k. The solution of this
model, given in Helpman (1998) and Fujita et al. (1999a), is well known. Under
certain parameters, the manufacturing sector spatially concentrates. Firms have
an incentive to locate in a region with employment to serve a large regional
consumer market at low trade costs while saving on xed production costs. The
costs associated with location in a large market are higher wages, resulting from
high housing costs, in turn the result of regional congestion.
As shown in Hanson (2005), it is helpful to derive the demand for traded goods
produced in region j to show the intuition behind the market potential function.
Let Cijk be the quantity of good i so that region k buy from region j. Given
constant elasticity substitution (CES) over traded goods, the symmetry of traded
goods in both preferences and technology, along with the equilibrium condition
on the constant markup pf prices on top of marginal cost (Pij =

 1bwj), total
sales of manufactured goods by region j are dened as
X
k
X
i
PijkCijk = nj
X
k
Yk


   1bwje
djk
1 
T  1k (1.6)
where Tk is the CES price index for manufactured goods available in region k.
When prots are zero, sales of manufactured goods in region j equal wages paid
to labour in region j. The wage cost in region j, therefore, equals wjnja. We
can now follow Hanson (2005) to arrive at a modied market potential function,
dened as
wj = 
"X
k
Yke
 ( 1)djkT  1k
# 1
1 
(1.7)
where  is a function of xed parameters. Wages in a region increase in the
the income of surrounding regions, decrease in trade costs to these regions as well
8
as increase the price of competing traded goods in these regions.
Following from this, the price index for traded goods in region j can be written
as
Tj =
"X
k
nk


   1bwke
djk
1 # 11 
(1.8)
Equation 1.8 denes the market equilibrium for traded goods. Their price
index is higher where a larger fraction of goods is imported from distant regions.
There are three additional equilibrium conditions to equations 1.7 and 1.8.
First, real wages are equalised across regions so that
wj
P 1 j sT

j
=
wk
P 1 k sT

k
;8j 6= k (1.9)
where Pj is the housing price in j. The second additional equilibrium condition
is regional income equals income derived from labour and housing,
Yj = njwja +
1  

nja
L
X
k
nkwka;8j: (1.10)
The nal additional equilibrium condition is that housing payments equal
housing expenditure,
PjHj = (1  )Yj; 8j: (1.11)
By now it is clear how the above extension of Krugman (1991) resembles a
spatial labour-demand function: nominal wages increase in consumer income in
surrounding regions, and decrease in trade costs between these regions. This is
why even Krugman's initial framework focused on the mobility of labour rather
than capital in driving agglomeration and regional divergence. When workers
move from a peripheral to core region, drawn by initial levels of manufacturing
in the core, they spend their income in their new host region, thus increasing
demand there, but decreasing demand in their region of origin. As Combes et al.
(2008, p. 131) write, with emphasis,
the migration of workers, because it sparks the combined move of pro-
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duction and consumption capacities, modies the relative size of mar-
kets, thus generating new agglomeration forces.
The migration of workers, as stated in the model, also increases congestion costs
in the core region. This implies that the migration decision is based on the core-
periphery nominal wage dierential as well the cost of living dierential; in short,
the real wage dierential. If wages tend to increase in regions with greater market
potential, then we should expect this to trigger migratory movement. The extent
of this movement depends on the degree of workers's spatial mobility.
This not to say that the rm re-location channel is irrelevant. While high
market potential makes a region more attractive to rms as well as individuals,
it attracts rms through higher prots, but individuals through higher wages.
In practice, the estimating equations look similar as wages are invariably prox-
ied using per capita GDP levels, which can also be used to measure economic
productivity more generally (Breinlich, 2006; Combes et al., 2008; Redding and
Venables, 2004; ?). Indeed, the historical literature indicates that distinguishing
between the two mechanisms might be dicult. First, before the industrial and
transport revolutions that took hold of Europe in the mid- to late-nineteenth
century, ?, p. 201 tells us that
the gaps between dierent parts of Europe were much smaller than
they were to become later and some industrial activity not unlike that
in Inner Europe was to be found almost everywhere.
After the Industrial Revolution and after trade costs declined, ?, p. 11 writes
that
the industrial regions colonize their agricultural neighbours [and take]
from them some of their most active and adaptable labour, and they
encourage them to specialise in the supply of agricultural produces,
sometimes at the expense of some preexisting industry, running the
risk thereby that this specialisation would permanently divert the col-
onized areas from becoming industrial themselves.
In short, there was a simultaneous migration of workers and rms towards the
new industrial regions, particularly Germany. In the 1911 to 1915 period alone,
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Germany received 434,489 immigrants (Wilcox and Fercenzi, 1929a, p. 239). Ital-
ian emigration to other European countries went from 75,065 in 1878 to 313,032
in 1913 (Wilcox and Fercenzi, 1929b, p. 124). As for rms, Bairoch (1997, p.
116-7) echoes ? in writing of the period,
There began a massive sales ow of manufactured articles toward what
was gradually becoming the Third World, with the notable appearance
of one of its characteristics: the more or less complete and rapid
disappearance of all its industries. As a counterpart to these sales of
manufactured articles, a massive ow of untreated products (tropical
goods and raw materials) went to the West, which had more and more
means to absorb them.
Disentangling precisely which mechanism was at work, or which mechanism
was more inuential than the other, is beyond what the available data allow for.
My main dependent variable is per capita GDP, as I go on to explain in the
coming chapters, which has an interpretation as a broader measure of industrial
activity. My empirical strategy throughout this dissertation is simply to examine
whether a simple new economic geography model can explain Europe's changing
spatial distribution of regional income in the 1870 to 1910 period.
1.4 Research questions
NEG theory has nothing to say about initial conditions apart from `history mat-
ters' (Krugman, 1991, p. 20). Some times in can be pure accident. Dalton,
Georgia emerged as America's \carpet capital" after a teenaged Catherine Evans
discovered a better way of tufting bedspreads that was then mechanised (Krug-
man, 1991, p. 20). In other cases it can be due to xed inputs. The north of
England emerged as an industrial region after technological innovations that en-
abled and required the use of coal. What is important to me are not the initial
conditions - the debate on that is large, long-running and I am ill-equipped to
enter it - but `the cumulative process that allowed such accidents to have such
large and long-lasting eects' (Krugman, 1991, p. 62). I look for evidence that
these processes were at work in late-nineteenth century Europe.
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While it would be ideal to go further back in time than 1870, the data sim-
ply do not allow for this. The conventional pre-WWI ending avoids the border
changes after the War that make this analysis intractable, and marks the limit of
what a single research student can do in four years. In any case, the 1870 to 1910
period - the \highwater mark" of the \rst globalisation" - in Europe - a collection
of dierent states and regions - provides a good opportunity to understand the
distribution of economic activity within and between countries (Daudin et al.,
2010; Epstein et al., 2003; O'Rourke and Williamson, 1999).
My approach to this broader theme is to ask the following sub-questions, each
one informed by the historical context: (1) was the spatial distribution of regional
economic activity random; (2) how helpful are traditional, non-NEG explanations
of regional income; (3) how helpful is a market potential explanation when con-
trolling for traditional explanations; and (4) did market potential have an eect
on other determinants of income? The answers to these questions together ad-
dress the main concern of my dissertation: is the spatial distribution of European
regional income a result of NEG forces? If I succeed in providing a satisfactory
answer, then future research can draw a link from here to current patterns of
European economic activity.
In answering these questions, I nd that: (1) the distribution of European
regional per capita income increasingly concentrated in the northwest, there was
little tendency to income convergence, and regional inequalities were higher within
than between countries; (2) while a measure of regional de facto institutions
is correlated with income, simple distance-to-coal and a cost-to-coal measures
are not; (3) market potential has a signicant eect on income, foreign market
potential more so than domestic, and increasing core relative to peripheral market
potential results in perpherial income losses; and (4) changes in literacy rates,
a proxy for human capital that was also spatially concentrated, responded to
changes in market potential.
In conclusion, an NEG framework ts the historical experience well. Certain
regions performed better than others generally because they had cheaper access
to markets. At the start of the period, trade costs were high, and so economic
activity - long concentrated in Britain - was spread out more or less evenly across
the Continent. By the end of the period, when trade costs dropped dramatically,
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economic activity concentrated in the northwest of Europe, being better placed to
serve the larger markets there, to serve more distant markets at lower trade costs,
and reap the gains from agglomeration. The point at which trade costs drop so
much that economic activity is free to locate anywhere - as it would be equally
cheap to serve any market - had not been reached by this point. The resulting
pattern was the consolidated \Golden Triangle" that persists until today.1
1.5 Methods and data
Empirical tests are organised around explaining my dissertation's main dependent
variable, regional real GDP per capita. In this period of European industriali-
sation, productivity growth was important, but economic growth was primarily
driven by re-allocating resources out of agriculture and into industry (Broadberry
et al., 2010). Income (or GDP per capita), however, captures variation in eco-
nomic activity and progress beyond industrial employment shares or industrial
value-added alone - London's high-income economy, for example, was driven by
services. Income is also more easily comparable across time and place, avoid-
ing issues that come with changing employment categories over time or dierent
sectoral denitions across countries. Lastly, the Geary-Khamis dollar unit I use
throughout this dissertation is perhaps the most widely used income unit in the
economic history literature, making comparisons with other work much simpler.
Analysing the role of market potential, the main independent variable of in-
terest, required the construction of a detailed trade network, using a geographical
information system (GIS). The network was built up from railway, roads, water-
ways, and shipping lines, and ports and regional nodes. I routed through the
network using Dijkstra's lowest-cost search algorithm (Yan, 2014). This required
data on transport costs, transhipment costs, and taris. As a cross-check on this
construction of market potential, I estimated an alternative version of market
potential, using international bilateral trade ows (?). Controlling for competing
explanations of income required the estimation of a novel measure of regional in-
stitutions, based on regional literacy data and the ideas in Acemoglu et al. (2005),
1The geographical region roughly delimited by London, Paris, and Berlin. The term was
rst used by geographers, as in Hall (1993), but quickly entered popular discourse (Buck, 2006).
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and of proximity to coal deposits, based on the writings of a number of historians
(Fernihough and O'Rourke, 2014; Pollard, 1981; Wrigley, 2010).
The principal methodology I employed in this dissertation is the quantitative
analysis of a panel of 199 regions from Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Spain, and Sweden over the benchmark years 1870, 1900, and 1910.
Coverage is wide, as regions are from all corners of the continent, as well as deep,
given the countries accounted for 93 per cent of European GDP during the pe-
riod (Bolt and Van Zanden, 2013). This regional panel approach has a number
of advantages. The rst and most obvious is greater historical accuracy. If we
are interested in the spatial distribution of income, then a smaller geographical
scale (compared to the standard national unit), is more historically accurate. In-
dustrialisation, or economic development more generally, varies between as well
as within countries. A regional panel contains this information. Nations, on the
other hand, aggregate industrial and agricultural regions, and ignore spatial clus-
ters of economic activity. Second, a regional panel allows us to narrow in on the
variation that mattered for economic development. A national unit, aggregat-
ing internal dierences in economic activity, prioritises noise over signal. This
matters in a causal study where we ask the fundamental question, why did some
places achieve higher income levels than others? Lastly, a panel is comparative -
spatially and temporally - in nature. Disjointed regional economic histories are
of the same use as disjointed national economic histories: they contribute to the
accumulation of evidence. Taking nations or regions as standalone units, how-
ever, is saying that they do not form part of a wider economy, and it also makes
generalisations less reliable. My panel draws on a large body of work by country
specialists, allowing me to extract comparative and generalisable insights.1
Broadly speaking, the quantitative techniques are designed around two themes.
The rst is to approach a causal explanation of European regional income. While
I used exploratory techniques to dene patterns and trends, I then use a series
1The literature now provides estimates for Austria-Hungary, Britain, Italy, Sweden, and
Spain (Crafts, 2005b; Eno et al., 2010; Felice, 2009; Roses et al., 2010; Schulze, 2007b). Most
of these estimates, for the post-1900 period, have been incorporated into he European Science
Foundation-funded project, the Historical Economic Geography of Europe 1900-2000, coordi-
nated by Joan Roses and Nikolaus Wolf. In this dissertation, I provide estimates for France
and Germany. Elswhere I provide estimates for China and India (Caruana Galizia, 2013; Caru-
ana Galizia and Ma, 2014).
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of instrunmental variable (IV) regression analyses to test causal explanations put
forward by the literature, and the market potential explanation. As a study
of economic history covering a broad topic, I did not have the luxury of con-
trolled labratory or even \natural" experiments (Diamond and Robinson, 2010).
IV analyses have their critics, but they allow us to get as close to a causal story
as possible, given the data and historical constraints (Chang, 2010). The sec-
ond underlying theme is spatial analysis: a dimension often implicitly ignored
in the literature. An a-spatial analysis is, for example, to ignore Europe's clear
clusters of income or its core-periphery income structure. To take this into ac-
count, I make extensive use of a GIS. Some variables, for example a distance or
cost to coal deposit, are constructed using GIS. More complex calculations, like
the lowest-cost route algorithms underlying the market potential variable, would
have been impossible without GIS. In his latest presidential address of the 2013
Economic History Association annual conference, Atack (2013, p. 332) took the
opportunity to discuss the use of GIS in economic history. Speaking of his on-
going work on American railways in the nineteenth century, he concluded, `it is
not too soon to claim that historical GIS transportation databases will change
our interpretation of American economic history.' The GIS dataset here is large
in scale and scope, and this dissertation can only be a rst pass at exploiting its
full potential.
1.6 Chapter outline
This dissertation is composed of four linked analytical chapters (Chapters 3, 4, 5,
and 6). The following contextual chapter (Chapter 2) and the concluding chapter
(Chapter 7) bring the four analytical chapters together in addressing the bigger
question of regional income dierentials. The appendices (Appendix A, B and C)
contain additional notes and tests on the data.
Chapter 2: Context: Historiographical Background
Recent NEG-work in economic history has provided us with a generalisable ex-
planation of European development - the limitation with older historical work
like Pollard (1981) - but is restricted to national studies, as in Roses et al. (2010)
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- the advance of of that same historical work. We have taken two steps forward,
and one step back to William N. Parker's question, on `why European history is
not the history of a continent' (Rhode, 2008, p. 192). The U-shape of spatial
economic development uncovered by Combes et al. (2011) for France, for exam-
ple, and posited generally by NEG theory, did not only exist within France, but
was occurring across European national borders. NEG can thus explain not just
individual within-country patterns, as recent authors have, but also the broader
European patterns of regional industrialisation and income. This is where my
dissertation comes in. I collect all available data, ll in the gaps, and explain the
resulting dataset using NEG.
Chapter 3: Explicandum: the Distribution of European Regional In-
come
Was the spatial and temporal distribution of late-nineteenth century European
income random? I estimate the regional incomes of France and Germany, and
standardise them along with all the other estimates from the literature. I then
conduct a number of exploratory empirical exercises on the income data, detecting
non-random spatial patterns, or clusters, and how they change over time. I nd
that income inequality was higher within than between countries; that contrary
to the historiography, there is no discernible trend of income convergence; that
the income distribution went from normal in 1870 to bi-modal in 1910; and that
the spatial distribution went from high income clusters in Britain and northern
France with fragmented clusters elsewhere, to the consolidated \Golden Triangle"
that persists until today.
Chapter 4: Traditional Explanations: Coal and Institutions
How helpful are traditional explanations of late-nineteenth century European re-
gional income? In this chapter, I explore the extent to which regional income
dierentials were due to either institutions or natural endowments, specically
coal. After estimating a novel measure of regional institutional eciency, I nd
that coal access - as measured by distance and cost to the nearest deposit - was
not an important determinant of income levels. Regional institutional eciency
has a strong positive eect on income levels, when controlling for coal access, and
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country and year xed eects. At least for the late-nineteenth century period,
this calls into question a long line of work of \coal-men" from Pounds and Parker
(1957) to Wrigley (2010). It also lends support, in a regionally-modied form, to
the conceptual arguments in Acemoglu et al. (2005).
Chapter 5: An Alternative Explanation: Market Potential
In this chapter, I provide an alternative explanation of regional income; one that
can account for the spatial and temporal distribution of regional income and ts
with the broader historical context of falling barriers to trade. First, I examine
the neo-mercantilist arguments put forward in the historiography (Pollard, 1981).
I then describe my measures of market potential and the sources used, giving fur-
ther details in Appendix C. I then set out my empirical strategy, which is geared
towards uncovering baseline eects of market potential on income, dierences
between foreign and domestic market potential, and whether the relationship is
uniform across regions. The nal section concludes with a discussion of the is-
sues raised. The general ndings of this chapter are: (1) market potential has an
economically meaningful and statistically signicant eect on income levels; (2)
foreign markets have a larger eect on income levels than domestic markets; (3)
increasing core market potential relative to peripheral market potential results in
an absolute decline in peripheral per capita income levels and a decline in periph-
eral share's of total GDP; and (4) the relationship between market potential and
per capita income is not uniform. Residuals suggest the inuence of increasing
returns, and a smaller role for factor endowments and locational fundamentals.
Chapter 6: Addendum: Market Potential and Human Capital
Did market potential have a direct eect on other determinants of income, namely
human capital? My hypothesis here is that, generally, regions far from the north-
western European core had low stocks of human capital, as measured by literacy,
but as economic distance, as measured by market potential, between the core and
periphery dropped over the late-nineteenth century, the periphery's incentives to
invest in human capital increased. This produced an international convergence in
literacy (Cipolla, 1969; Crafts, 1997). National law that made primary enrolment
compulsory is an alternative explanation for this convergence but, as I show in
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this chapter, variation in literacy was higher within than between countries. Fur-
ther, regional literacy rates were spatially correlated. These features in the data
are consistent with my hypothesis: market potential, itself spatially correlated,
varied by region causing the incentives for human capital investment to also vary
by region. The emphasis here is on market potential providing an incentive on
which agents can decide to act: it reects the demand for, rather than supply
of (as with national law), human capital. I show that changes in literacy rates
were responsive to changes in market potential, as people sought to capitalise
on higher returns to education. To the extent that technological and industrial
progress depended on a region's human capital, the implications of these results
are that market potential shaped a region's ability to industrialise in other ways
than through the trade cost channel.
Chapter 7: Conclusion
In this chapter, I conclude the dissertation by reviewing the main ndings of
each analytical chapter. I summarise these ndings in light of the literature,
asking, how has this dissertation changed our understanding of European eco-
nomic history? I re-assert the usefulness of a regional approach, and of explicitly
considering the spatial dimension of economic activity. I then cautiously relate
the historical context to current topical debates on European regional income
inequality.
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Chapter 2
Context: Historiographical
Background
2.1 Introduction
The literature provides a number of dierent ways of thinking about Europe in
the late-nineteenth century (circa 1870 to 1913). Table 2.1 summarises some in-
uential ones. Dierent categorisations can be the result of dierent methods or
dierent research aims. Hobsbawm (1987) and Hobson (1902), for example, were
both interested in Europe's unprecedented colonial expansion and the \global
imperialism" that it created. O'Rourke and Williamson (1999) and Williamson
(1998) dene the period as one of unprecedented economic globalisation, when
commodity prices converged rapidly thanks to improvements in transport tech-
nology and, in the latter case, created a protectionist policy backlash. Daudin
et al. (2010) make the same argument, with a clearer focus on Europe. The
authors see economic rather than colonial forces as the dening feature of the
time. Also focusing directly on Europe, Pollard (1981) writes in a similar vein
about the policy backlash, when newly-unied European states hiked tari rates
on agricultural goods and manufactures in response to an inux of cheap North
American commodities. Kaplan (1957), writing from a political history perspec-
tive, sees late-nineteenth century Europe as having been in a functioning and
informal \balance of power" until the very-late nineteenth century, when national
political interests - Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, in particular - took
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precedence. While there may have been a breakdown in trade and political rela-
tions, Bordo (1981) reminds us that this period was that of the \Classical Gold
Standard." During this time, the majority of gold standard members adhered to
xed-rate convertibility and international capital ows reached levels that were
not seen again until the end of the twentieth century.
This was, in short, an exciting period as the literature makes clear. While
many of the themes will emerge in my analytical chapters, of all these \eras", the
two most relevant for my purposes are those from Mokyr (1998) and Foreman-
Peck (1999): the \Second Industrial Revolution" and the \Zenith of European
Power."
Table 2.1: Historiographical eras in late-nineteenth century Europe
Era Source
Age of Empire Hobsbawm (1987)
Age of Neo-Mercantilism Pollard (1981)
Classical Gold Standard Era Bordo (1981)
European Balance/Alliances Kaplan (1957)
First Globalization O'Rourke and Williamson (1999)
Globalization Backlash Williamson (1998)
High water mark of 19th century globalization Daudin et al. (2010)
La Belle Epoque Esteves (2011)
New Imperialism Hobson (1902)
Second Industrial Revolution Mokyr (1998)
Zenith of European Power Foreman-Peck (1999)
Starting at the end of the nineteenth century, industrialisation took a new
form. As Mokyr (1998, p.2) writes, the period `witnessed the growth in some
industries of huge economies of scale...Some vast concerns emerged, far larger
than anything seen before. This change occurred because of ever more important
economies of scale in manufacturing.' This rst important feature is follwed by a
second: these `vast concerns', as Mokyr (1998, p.2) put it, emerged in Continental
Europe, especially Germany. No longer was modern industrialisation limited to
Britain. While it spread across Europe in varying degrees, the change was enough,
Foreman-Peck (1999) argues, to take Europe to its economic \zenith." These
changes have expectedly attracted a lot of attention in the historiography, much
of it of course preceding Mokyr (1998) and Foreman-Peck (1999).
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2.2 Historiographical background
One of the rst \explanations" for Europe's economic history during this pe-
riod was simply description - and not always accurate, as Foreman-Peck (1995)
writes. In the \leader-follower" scheme, Britain industrialised rst, which raised
its productivity in manufacturing and its per capita income levels above Euro-
pean levels. Then, in varying degrees, European countries are argued to have
adopted Britain's productive technology and economic organisation. The pace at
which they did this, the scheme goes on, determines the extent of their income
lag behind Britain. Rostow (1960) provided the GDP gures, a novelty, and one
of the scheme's keywords: `discontinuity', which described the movement from
one of his stages of growth to another. Gerschenkron (1962), focusing on indus-
trial production instead, wrote of economic `backwardness' in peripheral Europe,
giving the scheme its next keyword. Landes (1969) and Pollard (1973) wrote of
the `diusion' of industrialisation across Europe (Pollard, 1973, 1981). Following
this scheme, explanations of income dierentials would be the determinants of
the speed of adoption of the leader's technology. The authors assumed that new
technology is adopted only if more capital is available, and so European economic
history was one of dierential rates of capital accumulation. Gerschenkron (1962),
for example, spent a lot of time on the role of banks and states in overcoming
underinvestment. This was seemingly validated by the Solow-Swan growth mod-
els of the 1950s and 1960s, which attempted to explain economic development
through, mainly, capital accumulation (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956).
This rst wave was undermined by the production of quantitative evidence -
ironically, given this was Rostow's aim - which was occurring in parallel. Rostow's
\discontinuities" and \take-os" in European economic development proved to be
hard to pin down. Gerschenkron's higher shares of production-goods in the output
of backward economies, and the importance of investment banks, did not show
up in the data underlying the comprehensive book of Milward and Saul (1973).
Nor did the theory hold up well to newer economic ideas (Sylla and Toniolo,
1992). The jump in capital accumulation was not necessitated by manufacturing,
but railways. In Britain, railways accounted for a much higher proportion of the
economy's capital stock until the interwar years (Feinstein and Pollard, 1988).
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So-called \alternative" work, starting in the 1970s, showed that the \leader"
was not so great after all, eroding the credibility of the rst wave. O'Brien and
Keyder (1978) showed that France did not lag as far behind as Britain, as others
argued (Landes, 1969). Further, it avoided some of the welfare costs that came
with Britain's urbanisation for industrial development. Crafts (1984) showed
that Britain's reliance on coal was, in fact, unusual throughout Europe's indus-
trialisation. He argued that while coal shaped the possibilities of an economy's
industrialisation, human capital could act as a substitute input. This is what
happened in coal-poor, highly literate, and fast-growth Sweden (Cameron, 1985;
Sandberg, 1979). Morris and Adelman (1988) provided what is perhaps the most
\alternative" approach: a principal component analysis of 35 macro-economic
variables measured for 23 - not just European - countries. Their components tell
them that there existed ve development paths: two industrial, two agricultural,
and one balanced. As North (1989, p. 90) wrote in his review of the book, `the
theories that are the building blocks, the inconventional statistical techniques
they employ, and the quality of the data they use all make the study vulnerable
to...criticism.' Foreman-Peck (1995, p. 444) calls their `selection of indicators is
somewhat restricted and arbitray.'
Another group of researchers avoided quantitative methods. As with tradi-
tional economic history, they focused on the role of institutions, broadly con-
ceived. Their geographical concern, however, was not exclusively European.
Chandler (1990) wrote about British and German business organisation, with
a focus on how it competed with and learned from the United States. Kennedy
(1986) argued that the structure of London's capital market distorted Britain's
economic development at large. North (1981), and to some extent Olson (1982),
used the Western European experience to create a theory of institutions that
proved to be useful in current research (for example, Acemoglu et al. (2005)).
Jones (1981) wrote about the rise of Europe - the `European Miracle' - in a
global comparative perspective. Indeed, institutions are central to most general
economic histories that feature Europe. Rosenberg and Birdzell (1987) argued
that Western Europe's economic success was a function of its loosening political
and religious controls, and that economically-useful innovation is a result of com-
petition among politically independent units. Jones's explanation is based on the
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universal propensity to accumulate wealth, and that in the West, governments
did not get in the way of this - through wars, invasions, taxation, or regulation -
too much.
This wave of institutional work oers compelling, but not rigorous, accounts of
European development. Chandler's industry-level analysis of British and German
rms fails to deal with the fact that Ford, until the 1920s, was a family-run
company - something Chandler (1990) blames for business ineciencies in Europe.
Olson's inuential theory of distributional coalitions is also liable to criticism
when it comes to nineteenth century Europe. In his account, coalition within
national economies become stronger over time in the absence of shocks. As they
grow stronger, they re-distribute income to themselves, slowing national economic
development as a result. The formation of Germany's customs union in 1834, the
Zollverein, may have acted as a powerful economic shock, but the unication of
Italy, as Foreman-Peck (1995, p. 445) points out, `does not appear to have worked
a similar miracle.' France went through several institutional upheavals while
Britain's constitutional change took comparatively less to eect. Still, France's
income per capita, even under the most optimistic scenario in O'Brien and Keyder
(1978), never reached Britain's. Spain went through 58 governments and 83
ministers of nance between 1868 and 1915, but these shocks were in no way
positive inuences on Spanish economic development (Platt, 1984, p. 107).
A strand of research to have come o this institutional work is based on the
theme of \path dependence." In short, the idea that a unique event or shock
- say, a policy or institution - moves an economy into another equilibrium, in
which it remains until the event of another shock. The narrow implication here
is that development is a function of specic events in previous periods, leaving
no room for general explanations of initial economic development other than
\history matters" (Nunn, 2014). An early example from the historiography of
this work was the traditional explanation of nineteenth-century French economic
development, as in Caron (1979). It was argued that the French Revolution led
to what would be an adverse re-distribution of land. A resultant more egalitarian
income distribution, and political represention among agriculturists, led to savings
patterns and industrial policy that was detrimental to industrialisation, compared
with Britain. Levy-Leboyer and Bourguignon (1990), however, cast doubt on the
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contingency of the French Revolution. Their econometric analysis showed that,
in fact, agriculture was much more dynamic than industry, contributing most of
French growth between 1825 and 1859.
Having accumulated enough quantiative data, starting in the late-1980s, re-
search followed Baumol (1986) and Abramovitz (1986) in trying to show a general
tendency to convergence since 1870 of GNP per capita among industrial countries.
The underlying thesis was that backward economies have higher growth poten-
tial from unrealised re-allocation of labour from agriculture into industry, and by
being able to adopt existing frontier technologies. DeLong (1989), however, ex-
tended Baumol's original sample to include economies like Chile and Argentina -
high incomes in the nineteenth century, but poor development thereafter - nding
little evidence of income convergence. Barro (1991), focusing on the post-1960,
did nd evidence of per capita income convergence, and in later work with Sala-i-
Martin, gave it a more rigorous theoretical foundation (Sala-i-Martin, X., 1997).
This neo-classical model, rooted in Solow (1956), held that convergence was a
function of markets being free to allocate factors of production to where they
were most needed: poor countries. This implied a negative correlation between
initial income and future growth. Their reasoning behind the strong post-1960
convergence is that it captures the trade and nancial liberalisation that fol-
lowed Bretton Woods. The economic history literature tells us, however that the
1870 to 1914 period was an era of rapid globalisation, particularly in the goods
and capital markets. Daudin et al. (2010) called in the \highwater mark" of nine-
teenth century globalisation, O'Rourke and Williamson (1999) and O'Rourke and
Williamson (1997) found fast commodity price and real wage convergence, and
Bordo (1981) called the \classical gold standard" era, when capital mobility was
high.
North and Thomas (1973), in their institutional account of the rise of the
West, expressed frustration with the original Solow (1956) model, claiming that
factor accumultion is not a cause of growth, but is growth itself. The criticism
applies to the more recent work, and has recently been taken up by empirical
economists - also institutionalists. Moving away from all-encompassing deni-
tions, recent work emphasises clearly dened property rights and low risks of
state-led expropriation drive economic performance (Acemoglu and Dell, 2010;
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Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2001). There is a lot of empir-
ical weight behind this formulation of institutions, but it can criticised on the
grounds that institutions can be de facto and these are rarely measurable, and
that institutions are endogenous to economic activity (Chang, 2010). Another
potentially serious criticism comes from Redding and Strum (2008), who argue
that property-rights institutions are national and so cannot account for subna-
tional income dierentials. Not dealing with subnational income dierentials in
a rigorous way is not only an issue in this branch of the literature. It has, in fact,
been a feature for much - not all - of the historiography until recently.
2.3 The modiable unit area problem
In 1991, the economic historian William N. Parker asked, `Why isn't European
history the history of a continent? Why do we keep all such heavy emphasis on
national histories?' (Rhode, 2008, p. 192). While, for example, Cipolla's Fontana
Economic History of Europe covers specic places and engages in comparative as-
sessments, the underlying assumption is that economic change is best explained
by looking at nations (Cipolla, 1976). Even Landes (1969), one of the rst eco-
nomic historians to break the nation's stranglehold in his Unbound Prometheus,
took in other work for the Cambridge Economic History of Europe the British
model as a national yardstick with which to measure Continental progress (Lan-
des, 1965). This is not to say that national units are always problematic, but they
do lack a spatial perspective that is necessary to understand European economic
development during this period.
The implications of using individual nations are considerable. First, using
a single country case-study, we cannot be sure that the insights it provides are
generalisable. Second, dierent levels of spatial aggregation can lead to dierent,
possibly incorrect, conclusions - the modiable area unit problem (Opensahw,
1984). The second is more serious than the rst, since the purpose of case studies
is the accumulation of evidence. Researchers are aware of the trade-o between
internal and external validity, and do not draw general conclusions based on,
in eect, one observation. The importance of the second point is highlighted
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by the fact that many authors, from Gerschenkron (1962) to Acemoglu et al.
(2005), using national units of analysis, concluded that national policies were
instrumental in economic development. As forcefully argued by Pollard (1973, p.
636-7), however, `the spread of industrialization' was scattered across nineteenth
century Europe `with little reference to political boundaries.'
Pollard, rst with a 1973 article in the Economic History Review and then
with his 1981 book Peaceful Conquest, made the case for disaggregating nations
into subnational regions, and for looking at Europe as a whole. Of course, the
modiable area unit problem means one can always argue for a dierent scale,
but subnational regions - like the Rhineland or Piedmont - are a compromise be-
tween the ever smaller regions and ever more precision, and data constraints. As
Aldcroft (1994, p. 3) wrote, Pollard `was one of the few writers to acknowledge
the extent of \pan-Europeanism" in the development of the European continent.'
Unlike the writers who came before him or his contemporaries, Pollard analysed
regions of modernisation which were connected to one another by \transmission
paths", but were surrounded by underdeveloped, agricultural regions. In short,
he argued that nations were not particularly helpful since in the nineteenth cen-
tury all or most European nations were composed of industrial, agricultural, and
stagnant regions. National incomes grew when countries had more of the rst
than second and third components.
However, Pollard (1981) ultimately remained traditional in using the British
model as a benchmark, which the Continent emulated - \diusion", as I men-
tioned earlier, being the keyword. In his scheme, explanations for modern re-
gions' successes range from the location coalelds to idiosyncratic events, like
wars or government policies. Like much of the \old economic history", it is rich
in detail and ideas, but weak in analytical rigour. Further, the last third of Pol-
lard (1981) consists of conventional country-by-country studies, detailing devel-
opments within countries with frameworks specic to each one. Pollard justies
this dual treatment - rst regions, then nations - by arguing that states were, after
1870, the drivers of economic change, while earlier the development was regional
and spontaneous. Problematically, however, regional development continued to
characterise European development after 1870 more deeply than before. The
rapid industrialisation of Germany's Ruhr area in the late-nineteenth century is
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clear testament to this. So, even if we accept that states were the main drivers
of economic change post-1870, how do we explain the state's dierential eects
within the same countries? While Pollard (1981) recognises regional clusters of
industry within and across nations, he fails to account for them in a satisfactory
way. Ten years later, we got a theoretical framework that can pick up where
Pollard (1981) left o.
2.4 The new economic geography
Krugman (1991) provided an alternative to Hecksher-Ohlin trade theory in form-
ing NEG (see also Fujita et al. (1999b); Krugman (1991, 1993); Krugman and
Venables (1995)). The typical NEG framework depends on the interaction be-
tween market size, economies of scale, and trade costs. The three interact to form
a U-shaped curve, relating trade costs (inclusive of transport costs) on one axis
to industrial location and real wages on the other. As there are economies of
scale in industry, there is an incentive for production to concentrate in one region
and reap those benets. If trade costs were very high, shipping manufactures
between markets will be expensive and so production will be scattered among the
core and periphery. However, if trade costs are at an intermediate level, it would
be too expensive for the periphery to produce for the larger core markets, but
cheap for the industrial core to produce for the small peripheral market. If trade
costs were very low, then production would again be scattered among the core
and periphery since costs to market would not gure in location choices. This is
what produces the U-shaped pattern.
The implications for regional economic activity are that high trade costs rst
lead to falling incomes in the periphery, as industry moves to the core, before
leading to rising incomes when trade costs fall, as industry moves back to the pe-
riphery. Further, since the move of industry to the core market increases the size
of that market, there are increasing returns to concentration. Marshall (1920),
who is the source of these ideas, outlines another two reasons for increasing re-
turns. There is also a concentration of useful knowledge that can be implemented
in production (think Silicon Valley today), and there will be a concomitant con-
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centration of suppliers to industry.
NEG has proved empirically successful in explaining contemporary interna-
tional dierences in per capita income, European regional dierences, and dif-
ferences between US counties (Hanson, 2005; Redding and Venables, 2004; ?).
The key variable in these studies is market potential, which is ignored in most
historian's accounts of European regional development (Berend, 2013; Pollard,
1981). That is, the level of economic activity in a region is aected by its po-
tential access to demand markets; the size of demand markets is usually proxied
with GDP, the numerator, and access, the denominator, is determined by trade
costs (mainly taris and transport costs, but some times cultural variables like
language). As the numerator increases relative to its denominator, that region
becomes a more attractive location for industrial production. While economic his-
torians are usually too data-constrained to measure Marshall's second and third
reasons, NEG has still enabled them to succsessfully explain patterns of economic
activity within countries using market potential.
Why isn't the whole of Europe industrialised?1
Roses (2003) is an early example of the application of NEG in the economic history
literature. Looking at Spain between 1797 and 1910, he shows that as transport
costs decreased and internal barriers to domestic trade were eliminated, Spanish
industry became increasingly concentrated in a few north-eastern regions, Cat-
alonia and the Basque Country. Roses (2003), however, also nds an important
role for relative factor endowments, concluding that dierences in industrialisa-
tion between Spanish regions were totally accounted for by increasing returns
and comparative advantages. Very much in the same vein, Wolf (2007) shows
that after Polish reunication in 1918, when internal taris were removed and
infrastructure improved, Polish industry re-located based on both comparative
advantage - in skilled labour - as well as access to markets. Henning et al. (2011),
looking at Sweden between 1860 and 2009, nds the same patterns playing out,
but gives more weight to markets during the earlier years of Sweden's industrial-
1This is adapted from Roses (2003), a study on Spanish industrialisation, titled `Why isn't
the whole of Spain industrialized?: a new economic geography and early industrialization, 1797-
1910'.
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isation.
Crafts (2005a) and Schulze (2007b) both shy away from a formal empirical
analysis, but reveal the importance of market potential in determining patterns of
economic activity. Looking a Britain between 1871 and 1931, Crafts shows that
the North, Scotland, and Wales were much more economically peripheral before
WWI than in 1985. The main reason, he argues, for their relative GDP decline
was changing transport costs that came with the demise of coastal shipping and
the rise of road haulage. Schulze (2007b, p. 1), looking at late-nineteenth century
Austria-Hungary, shows that being economically peripheral was associated with
having lower GDP per capita levels, but that 'there was no uniform relationship
between changes in regions' relative GDP position and their market potential.'
Crafts and Mulatu (2006) provide a more formal empirical analysis for nine-
teenth century Britain, in line with Roses (2003) and Wolf (2007). Broadly speak-
ing, the authors show that spatial patterns of industry during this period were
persistent, with regional specialisation changing little. Their econometric anal-
ysis shows that relative factor endowments mattered more than market access,
although market access did matter for industries with large plant size. In conclu-
sion, they show that transport costs had a negligible eect on industrial location
during a period when proximity to coal mattered most. This result is unsur-
prising. First, their data start in 1841 by when Britain's industrial pattern, as
they concede, had long consolidated. Second, British industry, as argued earlier
in this review, was unusual in its concentration around coal deposits. Indeed,
Wrigley (2010) tried generalising the British experience across Europe, but Spain
and Austria-Hunagry, for example, both had a number of coal deposits that ei-
ther went unexploited or were far from industrial centres. The case of British
industrialisation rarely ts Europe's (Pollard, 1981).
In another interesting example, Combes et al. (2011) show that over 1860
to 2000, the patterns of economic activity within France formed the U-shape
hypothesised by NEG. That is, their data on departmental value-added per capita
conrms the U-shaped evolution of spatial concentration of manufacturing and
services. Further, they nd that for the 1860 to 1930 period, market potential
was the main determinant of location patterns. In the 1930 to 2000 period,
when economic activity became more advanced, human capital became the main
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determinant.
2.5 Conclusion
Recent NEG-work in economic history has provided us with a generalisable ex-
planation of European development, which is lacking in the broad-sweep histori-
ography (for example, Pollard (1981)), but NEG work has so far been restricted
to national studies (for example, Roses (2003)). We have taken two steps for-
ward, and one step back to William N. Parker's question, quoted earlier, on why
European history `is not the history of a continent.' The U-shape of spatial eco-
nomic development uncovered by Combes et al. (2011) for France, and posited
generally by NEG theory, did not only exist within France, but was occurring
across European national borders.
The consolidation of the European \Golden Triangle" marks the point on the
European U-curve where trade costs were at the intermediate point, making it
too expensive for the periphery to produce for core markets, but cheap enough for
the core to produce for peripheral markets, further concentrating industry in the
core and hence enlarging its market. This typology also ts with the description
of continental industrialisation in Mokyr (1998, p. 2) as the culimination of
`economies of scale in manufacturing' - a concept central to NEG. That at the
start of the period regional economic activity was more scattered around Europe
in what Pollard (1981, p. 123) called `provincial markets' also lends support
to these ideas. It was the point on the U-curve at which trade costs were much
higher, causing producers to locate between the core and periphery since shipping
to markets was expensive. The dramatic transport cost reductions, that more
than made up for increases in taris, over the late-nineteenth century are what
moved regions along the U-curve (O'Rourke, 1997).
NEG can thus explain not just individual within-country patterns, as recent
authors have, but also the broader European patterns of regional industrialisation
and income. This is where my dissertation comes in. I collect all available data,
ll in the gaps, and explain the resulting dataset using NEG. The end-product,
hopefully readers will agree, is a coherent account of Europe's late-nineteenth
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century regional economic development.
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Chapter 3
Explicandum: the Distribution of
European Regional Income
3.1 Introduction
Was the distribution of European regional income random? Asking this question
is the rst step towards an understanding of the causes of European regional
development.
Economic historians tend to characterise this period favourably. In his dis-
cussion of factor price convergence among the OECD club, Williamson (1996)
characterised the 1870 to 1913 period as one of fast growth, globalisation, and
convergence. Similarly, Maddison (1995, p. 59,87) characterised it as a `relatively
peaceful and prosperous era' where `per capita growth accelerated in all regions
and in most countries.' These generalisations are helpful in setting the broader
context of growth, but obscure too much of the variety of economic experiences
within and between countries. Growth was particularly slow in Britain, for ex-
ample, which is what allowed other countries to converge on it. By contrast, the
newly unied Germany was growing fast, but then it contained stark internal
dierences. While Saxony and the Rhineland were powering ahead, East and
West Prussia were left behind, comparable in their income levels to the far-ung
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regions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Establishing the geographical distribution of income over time is not just about
greater historical accuracy. It is a necessary rst step towards a causal explana-
tion. Looking at regions, we can narrow down variation to precise patterns and
locations, and then ask why economic activity was found where it was. This ex-
cludes all the potential confounding variation that might come with, say, looking
at a single time-series or using larger geographical units of analysis. Looking at
the timing of economic development, we can then nd common temporal patterns
or shocks, and ask why they happened when they did.
The rest of this admittedly dry chapter is organised as follows. In the following
section, I develop a technique to estimate the regional incomes of Germany and
France, which are missing from the literature. I then standardise the estimates,
and test them for robustness. The subsequent section features what are essentially
descriptive exercises on the data. I look at the regional income distributions across
the sample and how they change over time. The nal section concludes with a
discussion of patterns and trends, relating them to the literature.
3.2 Scope and Data
GDP per capita is my measure of income. While this was the age of European
industrialisation, income captures variation in economic activity and progress be-
yond industrial employment shares alone. Even then, in this period, variation
in income was highly correlated with that in industrial employment (Broadberry
et al., 2010). Income also makes for a measure of economic activity that is com-
parable across time and place. There are often issues with comparing sectoral
employment shares across countries and over time, as categories and industries
change, that do not feature as much in international income comparisons. Fur-
ther, the Geary-Khamis dollars unit I use throughout my dissertation is perhaps
the most widely used in the literature, making comparisons with research much
simpler.
The income data I use are from the work of a number of country specialists
who over the past 10 years have produced a urry of research on regional GDP per
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capita. Most of these estimates, for the post-1900 period, have been incorporated
into the European Science Foundation-funded project, the Historical Economic
Geography of Europe, 1900-2000, coordinated by Joan Roses (of Roses et al.
(2010)) and Nikolaus Wolf (of Wolf (2007)). The literature now provides regional
income estimates for Austria-Hungary (22 regions); Britain (12); Italy (18); Spain
(17); and Sweden (24) (Crafts, 2005b; Eno et al., 2010; Felice, 2009; Roses
et al., 2010; Schulze, 2007b, 2011).1 The research done on other countries does
not feature enough data within my period to merit inclusion. The Badia-Miro
et al. (2012) estimates for Portugal start in 1890, while Buyst (2009) on Belgium
starts in 1896. These countries, along with France and Germany whose incomes I
estimate in the following section, make up 93 per cent of European GDP over 1870
to 1910 according to the latest Maddison data base (Bolt and Van Zanden, 2013).2
Coverage is also reliable in a geographical sense. Regions are not concentrated
in particular area of Europe, but are spread from the centre to every corner.
This reduces the potential for sample selection bias, since we know that some
determinants of income are correlated with geographical variables (Sachs et al.,
1999).
After discussing my income estimation method for France and Germany in the
following sub-section, I review them along with all the other income estimates.
The task here is to ensure the consistency of currencies, prices, borders, and
method.
3.2.1 French and German Regional Income Estimation
Given their size and importance, it is perhaps surprising that regional income
estimates for France and Germany during this period are scarce. Using this frag-
mentary evidence, I develop a novel income estimation model, where income is
specied as a function of shifts in sectoral employment structure. Its concep-
1There has also been a lot of recent work on Asian and Latin America regional income
estimation for the period: China, India, and Mexico have all been covered (Aguilar-Retureta,
2014; Caruana Galizia, 2013; Caruana Galizia and Ma, 2014).
2Bolt and Van Zanden (2013) is the latest update of the Maddison (2007) version of the
data. By `Europe', I refer to Maddison's Western Europe category plus his Eastern Europe
one.
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tual basis is uncontroversial, its data requirements are low, and it withstands
robustness checks.
Higher income levels in one economy compared to another can indicate two
things. First, they can indicate higher labour productivity due to higher capital
and labour ratios or better technology. Second, they can indicate a more ecient
allocation of labour among economic activities. It is, I maintain throughout
this section, the latter that really counts. European economic history has shown
that countries that remained heavily committed to agriculture remained relatively
poor, while those that reallocated labour to the industrial and services sectors
became relatively wealthy. In fact, Broadberry et al. (2010) observe a negative
relationship between the level of per capita incomes and the share of the labour
force in agriculture for a sample of 14 European countries between 1870 and 1913.
Relationships between sectoral distributions of labour and incomes are hardly
news. Studies on the subject have a long history, going back to, for example
Fabricant (1942) and Good and Ma (1998). Another strand of research has used
correlates of GDP to produce estimates for international samples (Chenery and
Syrquin, 1975; Crafts, 1984).
More recently, in the economic history literature, the relationship has been ex-
ploited to derive income estimates for a number of European countries, starting
with Geary and Stark (2002), which put forward a short-cut method for esti-
mating regional GDP based on sectoral employment and wages. The method
uses national GDP estimates, breaking them down according to regional employ-
ment structure and corresponding regional-sectoral wages. This is the estimation
method underlying most of sample drawn from the literature. However, as Wolf
(2010) writes of Germany, such specic data are hard to come by. The approx-
imations required (say, using national wages or city wages to represent regions)
make it not much more rigourous than the method I present here. Furthermore,
my method is particularly relevant for France because, as O'Brien and Keyder
(1978, p. 98) point out, French backwardness was a `failure to realise re-allocation
of labour from agriculture to industry.'
As we do have census book data on regional population and sectoral employ-
ment for both countries, as well as a single regional cross-section of income (from
Frank (1994) for Germany and Combes et al. (2011) for France), an empirical
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implementation of the concept that structural change determines income level
would be
lnGDPi = + 1 lnPi + 2 ln
Ai
LFi
+ 3 ln
Ii
LFi
+ 4 ln
Si
LFi
+ "i
(3.1)
where subscript i indexes regions,  is a constant term, and " is a random
error term. The dependent variable is regional GDP, and independent variables
are population (P ), agricultural (A), industrial (I), and services (S) share of the
labour force (LF ) all at the regional-level. Taking logarithms on both sides, this
model will produce the elasticities at which GDP responds to structural shifts
and population change. As in Crafts (1984), I include P to control for regional
size eects that would not be captured by sectoral labour force shares alone.
Necessarily, I had to drop one of the terms of the right of the model. This was
because of multicolinearity issues: the three sectors, which would sum to the total
labour force, are a linear combination of each other. I dropped A
LF
: a backward
stepwise regression procedure showed it to be statistically insignicant for both
countries. The rened implementation is as follows
lnGDPi = + 1 lnPi + 2 ln
Ii
LFi
+ 3 ln
Si
LFi
+ "i (3.2)
where all variables are previously dened. I expect the signs on the coecients
to be positive and signicant. Population growth boosts aggregate demand and
allows for the division of labour. Industry was the main driver of growth in in-
come, so growth in the industrial labour force should be associated with increasing
income levels. The service sector is composed of high value-added sub-sectors,
such as the legal profession, as well as low value-added ones like the army, navy,
and domestic and catering subsectors. While positive, I expect its magnitude
to be smaller than the coecient on industry. Applying the estimated elastici-
ties 1:::3 in a linear transformation to the independent variable from one year to
the next allowed me to project GDP from 1860 (benchmark of available regional
GDP cross-section) to 1911 for France and, following the same process, from 1907
(benchmark of available regional GDP cross-section) back to 1871 for Germany.
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I explain the procedure in more detail in the following sections.
Data
German census books provide sectoral employment by Land (or state; the regional
unit I use) for the benchmark years 1871, 1882, 1895, and 1907 (Deutsch Statis-
tischen Bureau, 1871, 1882, 1895, 1910, 1912). Frank (1994, p. XXX) provides
a per capita GDP cross-section for 1907/13 in constant 1913 marks by district
(subdivision of Lander). French census books provide sectoral employment by de-
partment (the regional unit I use) for the benchmark years 1872, 1886, 1901, and
1911 (Statistique de la France, 1872, 1886, 1901, 1911). Combes et al. (2011, p.
22) provide sectoral value-added cross-sections for 1860 in current francs. These
data alone, following some adjustments that I explain in detail below, allow me
to exploit the structural change-GDP relationship.
Germany The rst step was dening a region or Land. I multiplied the district
GDP per capita series in Frank (1994) by population by district (taken from the
censuses), to produce total GDP by district. I then aggregated these districts
into Lander according to what the Lander administrative boundaries of the time
were. Frank's series misses a few free states and minor principalities. I either
left these as standalone units, as with Brunswick and Hamburg, or else put them
into the nearest Land, as with Lubeck in Schleswig-Holstein. I aggregated in this
way as the method is not detailed enough to deal with rapid shifts or uctuations
in employment structure that you so often get with very small regions, as the
result of temporary internal migrations or boundary changes. Some Lander, and
their districts, are altogether missing from Frank's series, like Alsace-Lorraine.
I included these in the present series, and to get their GDP levels, since Frank
does not provide them, I scaled GDP as a function of population, according
to the sample average. Scaling according to population is in fact reliable as
population showed a consistent and strong positive correlation with income across
all benchmark years in all Lander. Furthermore, the sum of GDP of this new
Lander series (including my additions) is only around 5 per cent higher than the
widely used national level GDP for 1907/13 from Homan (1965) . Still, to ensure
accuracy in the empirical stage, I scaled this new series according to the Homan
data average for 1907/13, yielding a Land cross-section of GDP for 1907/13 in
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constant 1913 marks.
Frank's GDP per capita series for the remaining years (1882, 1895) proved
to be too unreliable for use here.1 By Frank's own admission, the estimates are
clearly too high.2The GDP levels for these years were derived by keeping wages
constant at their 1913 level, and simply multiplying them by their corresponding
employment gures for the remaining three years. This overstates output. When
I multiplied Frank's district GDP per capita estimates by district population,
the resulting total GDP estimates summed to a gure far higher than existing
national GDP estimates (Homan, 1965; Maddison, 2007). This can be seen in
table 3.1, which compares Homan's estimates for national GDP, and national
GDP estimates derived by multiplying Frank's GDP per capita estimates by
population, and then summing.
Table 3.1: Reliability of Frank's income gures for years other than 1907/13.
1882 1895
Frank (derived) 26,136,719,191 32,812,766,867
Homan 18,441,000,000 27,621,000,000
Dierence % 41.2 18.8
Source: own calculations, based on census books, Frank (1994), and Homan (1965).
The next step was collecting and aggregating sectoral employment data for
the corresponding Lander. For the years 1907, 1895, and 1882 this was sim-
ple. The census books list six-sectors: (1) agriculture (including shing, forestry
and related industries), (2) industry (including manufacturing like textiles and
chemicals), (3) trade and commerce (including transport and communication),
(4) professional workers and the civil service (including lawyers and government
bureaucrats), (5) army and navy, and a (6) residuary category of \other occupa-
tions." Conventionally, I grouped sectors (3) to (6), to produce a single services
sector in the contemporary sense (Broadberry et al., 2010). The year 1871 proved
a little trickier. The book for this year listed seven-sectors: (1) agriculture, (2)
industry, (3) trade and commerce, (4) wage labourers (including workers like
farmhands), (4) army and navy, (5) professional workers and the civil service, (6)
1Frank provides estimates for 1849 and 1939 as well, but besides also being unreliable, these
gures are beyond my period . He provides no gures for 1871.
2See Frank (1994, p. XXX).
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the same residuary sector of \other occupations", and (7) a sector listing what
should be translated as unemployed persons. Following Schulze (2007a, p. 212),
the rst necessary adjustment was grouping (1) and (4). The sum of persons in
(1) makes clear that census enumerators disaggregated the agricultural labour
force into permanent workers, and the daily wage labourers listed in (4). Sector
(7) was altogether dropped: there is no comparable data of unemployed persons
for the other years. The proportion of unemployed as part of the national labour
force was six per cent. The last adjustment was grouping (3), (4), (5), and (6), to
produce a service sector comparable to the one found in later benchmark years.
These adjustments and groupings yield intuitive results, as table 3.2 shows.
Expectedly, agriculture shows a very large drop in its share of the labour force,
from 50 to 37-per-cent, while industry and services are making rapid gains. Ser-
vices grew by 40-per cent.
Table 3.2: National sectoral percentage shares in national labour force.
Year Agriculture Industry Services
1907 37 42 21
1895 40 40 20
1882 47 36 17
1871 50 35 15
Source: own calculations, based on census books.
France Here the process is more straightforward. Combes et al. (2011) provide
cross-sections of gross value-added (GVA) in current francs for the agricultural,
industrial, and services sectors for 1860. These series are largely drawn from
the painstaking work of Toutain (1981, 1987), who has spent a number of years
building up very detailed production estimates of the French economy. I summed
the three sectoral cross-sections to produce a single GVA series for 1860. Combes
et al. (2011) also present value-added series for 1895, but leave out a services
series due to data unavailability. This made the calculation of total GVA series
for that year impossible.
The arguments that GVA is incomparable to GDP are unconvincing here. The
relationship between the two is dened as GVA+(taxes on products - subsidies on
products)=GDP. The reason why Toutain (1981) used value-added to build up
departmental estimates is that the total aggregates of product taxes and subsidies
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are only available on the national economy level. Applying taxes and subsidies
would not aect cross-sectional dierences, as taxes are mostly, if not all, national.
It does not, during this period, substantially aect the estimates in absolute terms
either: summing the national 1860 GVA cross-section closely matched Toutain's
GDP (or product interieur brut) for that year. From here on I shall refer to the
series as GDP to avoid confusion. Conveniently, Toutain (1987) also provides a
GDP deator with a 1905/13 base year, which I used to deate the GDP series
after estimation.
Combes et al. (2011) provide data on population and sectoral employment for
1860. I took these data for the remaining benchmark years from the census books
(Statistique de la France, 1872, 1886, 1901, 1911). The books covered agriculture
(professions agricoles) and industry (professions industrielles) as two broad cate-
gories over all benchmark years. As they contained all the standard sub-divisions
(for example, forestry under agriculture and chemicals under industry), I stuck
with these aggregations. Services were slightly more complicated. Until the turn
of the century, services were split into the following: transports, commerce (retail
and wholesale trade), professions liberales (lawyers and doctors), force publique
(army and navy), and administration publique (civil service). These categories
together form what we nowadays think of as the services sector. I aggregated
them under the latter. After the turn of the century, the categories were as fol-
lows: professions commerciales (same as commerce), professions liberales (same
as before), service domestique (domestic workers such as maids), services publics
administratifs (civil services and public employees), and personnes non classes
suivant la position (a residual services category that includes the army and navy,
as well as professions like merchant seamen). These categories are in essence dif-
ferent groupings of the previous categories, and so I aggregated them under the
services sector. In all the sectors in all the census books, I ignored the eld that
records unemployed persons numbers (sans emploi), as I did with Germany. I
also ignored a eld that recorded all the dependants of workers in each sector,
that is, the families and whoever else might be living o the workers' wages (fam-
ilie des precedents. Parents a tous degres et autres vivant avec les precedents).
Both of these elds inate the labour force of department with persons who are
not economically active.
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While census enumeration strategies were constant across departments, they
were not constant across years. For example, in some years, labourers' dependents
were counted along with labourers, but counted separately in other years. What-
ever the case, the same strategy held across all departments within the same year.
That is, census data are reliable in the cross-section, but not in the time-series.
Marchand and Thelot (1991) correct this time-inconsistency for national-level
data. For example, to estimate the \true" agricultural labour force, the authors
extrapolated the number of workers from the rural working-age population as
a constant ratio of the agricultural labour force. This ratio survived a battery
of statistical tests, and they used similar methods to arrive at new numbers for
industrial and services employment, as well as population. Their work is widely
accepted as the standard reference for this sort of data. To apply their correc-
tion to departments, I expressed census departmental gures as proportions of
census national gures, and then multiplied these proportions by the Marchand
and Thelot (1991) national gures. This straightforward ratio scaling thus pre-
serves the original cross-sectional dierences (found in the census books), and
makes the cross-sections comparable over time (by taking into account Marchand
and Thelot's statistical corrections). The importance of correcting and scaling
in this way diminishes as census books near the second half of the 20th century.
Already for 1930, for example, the dierence between the census national totals
and Marchand and Thelot's are only: 0.72 per cent (population), -5.80 per cent
(agriculture), 2.78 per cent (industry), 8.22 per cent(services). In later census
books the dierences become unsubstantial.
It is important to point out here that I excluded Corsica from the analysis,
as Combes et al. (2011) do not cover it. Generally, it is not normally included
in studies on France, as technically speaking it is a collectivite territoriale rather
than a department. Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin were annexed by Germany between
1871 and 1918, which is why I drop them after 1860. A small part of Haut-Rhin
remained French, as Territoire Belfort. I grouped this relatively small piece of
land under Haut-Saone, its nearest neighbour. Combes et al. (2011) group Meur-
the and Moselle into contemporary Meurthe  et Moselle for 1860. From 1871
to 1918, both of these regions were annexed by Germany. About a fth of Moselle
- the iron rich part, regrettably - and about two-thirds of Meurthe were left be-
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hind. I maintained the contemporary Meurthe   et  Moselle grouping as in
Combes et al. (2011).
Empirical results
The results of model 3.2 are displayed in table 3.3. It is reassuring that the
model produced very similar results for both countries even though the cross-
section years are dierent and the sample size for Germany is much smaller. This
indicates that model is applicable across samples (countries). Secondly, if we are
to accept this (so far limited) applicability, it indicates that the sizes of elasticities
do not change radically over the couple of decades I cover. There is a dierence
of 0.2 between the industrial elasticites ( I
LF
), which is expected given German
industry was among the most productive industry on the continent at the time.
Table 3.3: Regional GDP estimation model
France, 1860 Germany, 1907
P 1.046*** 1.038***
(0.050) (0.026)
I
LF 0.325*** 0.527***
(0.053) (0.057)
S
LF 0.151** 0.156**
(0.063) (0.067)
Constant 6.405*** 6.662***
(0.706) (0.387)
R^2 0.92 0.98
F-Stat. 332.1*** 672.6***
N 87 23
Notes: Statistical signicance: *** 1 per cent, ** 5 per cent. Standard errors in brackets.
A Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity failed to reject the null hypothesis of constant
variance, with a 2 value of 2.7 and a probability value of 0.101 for Germany, and a 2
value of 0.33 and a probability value of 0.566 for France.
In both countries, the sizes and signicance of the elasticities are intuitive.
Population was growing fast during this period, and showed a strong positive
correlation with income, as in previous historical studies Williamson (1998). The
mechanisms behind are likely to be population growth both boosting aggregate
demand and allowing for the division of labour. Chenery and Syrquin (1975,
p. 17) argue that the mechanisms captured by the elasticity are likely to be
economies of scale and transport costs. The elasticities on industrial employment
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and commercial employment shares are also positive. The industrial elasticity
indicates a substantial eect on income, which is also expected during this time
of industrialisation. The size of the services elasticity is much lower, at least
in part, because the sector includes unproductive sub-sectors such as domestic
services and the army.
The model shows high explanatory power, but with an R^2 of 0.98, the result
for Germany looks suspicious. The usual reason for this is multicolinearity, but as
table 3.4 shows, there is no correlation among the independent variables. France's
R^2 of 0.92 is high, but not high enough to indicate any statistical issues.
Table 3.4: Correlation matrix of German-model independent variables.
P ( ILF ) (
S
LF )
P 1
I
LF 0.235 (0.281) 1
S
LF -0.335 (0.118) 0.051 (0.818) 1
Notes: p-values in brackets.
It is worth discussing an early paper by Orsagh (1968) here. The paper uses
a similar top-down method to the one I propose here, to provide regional GDP
estimates for Germany between 1882 and 1963. There are, however, a number of
dierences. First, Orsagh leaves all three sectoral terms in his regression equation.
While the sectoral terms are expressed as proportions of the national - rather than
regional - labour force, this is still a serious mis-specication error. The sectoral
terms are correlated. I produced a correlation matrix (table 3.5) of the variables
as dened by Orsagh and the correlation coecients are strong and signicant.
As we cannot ascertain the correct GDP elasticity of each sectoral term because
of this multicolinearity, we cannot reliably project GDP. Secondly, Orsagh does
not include a \size" control in his specication (I used population), but concedes
that it is necessary to go beyond shares of employment alone. He resorts to a
complicated counter-factual exercise on the elasticities. The exercise, though, is
pointless: the elasticities have already been derived from an equation that leaves
out a\size"control and so they are likely to suer from an over or under-estimation
bias.
As the model worked equally well on a sample size of 87 (France) as well as one
of 23 (Germany), I expect that these new estimates are open to three main criti-
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Table 3.5: Correlation matrix of Orsagh's independent variables.
Services Industry Agriculture
Serives 1
Industry 0.878 (0.000) 1
Agriculture 0.565 (0.004) 0.538 (0.008) 1
p-values are in brackets.
Source: own calculations, based on Orsagh (1968).
cisms, though I am sure readers will think of a few more. First, I am venturing too
far out of the range of evidence and the GDP estimates themselves can be either
too high or too low. Second, using elasticities estimated from a cross-sectional
model to create a panel dataset (one with a time dimension) is unreliable, and
keeping productivity elasticities xed over time is unreliable. Lastly, the model
can be criticised for having limited applicability, that is, we need a replication test.
Testing levels
That the specic GDP levels I present here are simply too high or low is perhaps
the most fundamental criticism that can be leveled. Besides going on intuition,
and the estimates do work intuitively (generally, agricultural regions have lower
incomes and industrial regions have the highest incomes), the only possible check
is to see whether the sum of projected regional GDP estimates add up to a widely
used and carefully calculated national GDP estimate.
Table 3.6 shows the sum of my Lander GDP estimates and the corresponding
national estimates from Homan (1965). It is important to point out here that
the Homan gure for 1907 is actually an average for the years 1913 to 1907, as
Frank used such an average to construct his 1907/13 marks per capita by district
cross-section used for this paper's estimates.
Table 3.6: German projected and observed national GDP levels.
1871 1882 1895
Homan 14,653,000,000 18,441,000,000 27,621,000,000
Own 15,899,601,418 19,907,875,916 29,687,580,840
Dierence % 8.51 7.95 7.48
Source: own calculations and Homan (1965). gures are in 1913 marks.
It is clear that there is no substantial dierence at the national level: the
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biggest deviation from Homan's estimates is for 1871 at 8.51 per cent, which
is encouraging. In their seminal \short-cut" regional income estimations for the
UK and Ireland, Geary and Stark report that their \best" specication estimates
deviate from ocial estimates by a maximum of 7.5 per cent for one region.
Table 3.7 displays the results of the same exercise for France. Toutain (1987)
provides a national GDP series in 1905/13 francs, as well as the GDP deator
that I used deate my own estimates. In the case of France, the deviations are all
still below 10-per cent, making them tolerable deviations by national accounting
standards.
Table 3.7: French projected and observed national GDP levels.
1872 1886 1901 1911
Toutain 24,603,300,000 27,984,300,000 36,090,300,000 42,159,700,000
Own 25,171,854,313 30,505,442,294 33,606,543,691 36,605,587,402
Dierence % 2.31 9.01 -2.03 -9.33
Source: own calculations and Toutain (1987). Figures in 1905/13 francs.
This test, of course, does not tell us much about the distribution of national
GDP among regions. It is impossible to check that because no similar regional
GDP estimates exist. The test does show, however, that the regional estimates
are well within the frame of a national total and so are unlikely to be far o from
their \true" regional values.
Testing parameter reliability
Are elasticities derived from a cross-sectional model useful when it comes to pro-
jecting backwards and forwards in time? The assumption here is that the elastic-
ities will be the same, or very similar, in both the cross-section and at dierent
points in time. To test this, I used the elasticities to re-create the widely-used
annual national GDP time-series in Homan (1965) for Germany, and in Toutain
(1987) for France. The same method of projection is employed: I apply the
elasticities to national level data on population and employment. If the model's
elasticities are reliable in the cross-section, they should also be reasonably reliable
in a time series. This test also reveals whether it is reliable to keep the elasticities
xed, that is to assume constant productivity, over the period.1
1Why not use a time-series model on Homan or Toutain's data and apply those coecients
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Figure 3.1: Estimated versus observed national time series for France and Germany
Notes: Own calculations based on Toutain (1987), Marchand and Thelot (1991), and Ho-
man (1965). All data are in real terms. \Own" refers to the estimates; \Toutain" refers
to the \observed" GDP series for France from Toutain (1987); and Homan refers to the
\observed GDP series for Germany from Homan (1965). Germany: starting year is 1875
and ending year, from which the projections were made, is 1913. The time-series is annual.
France: starting year, from which the projections were made, is 1861 and ending year is
1911. The benchmark years are: 1861, 1866, 1872, 1876, 1881, 1886, 1891, 1896, 1901,
1906, 1911.
Figure 3.1 displays the results for both countries. For Germany, there is
a gap between 1875 and 1871 in the series in Homan (1965). In projecting
backwards, I therefore stopped at 1875. Data on population and employment is
also taken from Homan (1965). For France, I took data on national population
and employment from Marchand and Thelot (1991), and data on national GDP
from Toutain. Marchand and Thelot are only able to provide employment data
for 11 benchmark years between the period, so the exercise is limited to those 11
years. It is impossible to re-create an annual time-series as with Germany, but
the point of the exercise can still be executed. The starting year is 1861 and the
end year is 1911.
The average deviation between the projected and the Homan series is 0.67
per cent. The correlation coecient is 0.998, signicant at one per cent. The
average deviation between the French projected series and the Toutain series is
6.15 per cent. The correlation coecient is 0.942, signicant at one per cent.
to the cross-section? Due to unsurprising problems of autocorrelation, the time-series model
was impossible to estimate. Even when correcting using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure, the
model produced spurious, unreliable results that did not withstand robustness tests.
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While gure 3.1 shows that the method at times under and over-estimates na-
tional GDP levels, it manages to replicate GDP levels within tolerable standards.
These results show that the elasticities used here are reliable in capturing the time
dimension, and so the cross-sectional model is useful in projecting GDP estimates
backwards in time. This supports the assumption of stable sectoral productivity
over the period.
Replicating existing regional income estimates
Here I use the method to replicate Sweden and Austria-Hungary's regional GDP
levels, using the data underlying Eno et al. (2010), and Schulze (2007b) (Austria)
and Schulze (2011) (Hungary). The countries are a useful choice for three reasons.
First, they are composed of 24 and 22 regions respectively, which make for a
smaller number of observations than France but a similar one to Germany, and
larger still than other countries in the literature. For example, Britain is composed
of 12 regions and Italy of 15 regions (Crafts, 2005b; Felice, 2009). Second, Eno
et al. (2010) estimated regional GDP levels using the Geary-Stark method, which
is the most popular \top-down" estimation method in the literature Geary and
Stark (2002). Schulze used a \top-down"approach for the Hungarian regions, but
a \bottom-up" one for the Austrian regions. This makes for a useful comparison
of methods. Third, the authors estimate regional GDP cross-sections for every
decade in the period I am analysing here.
Sticking to the same approach, I ran model 3.2 on the 1860 cross-section
of Swedish regional GDP in 1910/12 kronor and on the 1910 cross-section of
Austro-Hungarian regional GDP in 1990 dollars, and then used these elasticities
to project regional GDP levels for every decade up until 1910 for Sweden and back
to 1870 for Austria-Hungary. The choice of the estimation benchmark year does
not change the results. I am working with an early-nineteenth century (Sweden)
and late-nineteenth century (Austria-Hungary) to show the technique's exibility.
The model results for this experiment are in table 3.8. For Sweden, the sizes
of the elasticities are very similar to those for France and Germany, presented in
table 3.3. For Austria-Hungary, the size of the population coecient is smaller,
but the coecients on industrial and services employment are in the same orders
of magnitude as in the estimations of the other countries. Across all countries, the
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hierarchy of coecients, with the largest size going to population, then industry,
and lastly services, is the same. Sweden's R^2, at 0.85, is slightly lower than
France's 0.92, and Austria-Hungary's is a large 0.98, similar to Germany's. These
are of course all high gures, and the overall similarity of the model's results
for these countries lends support to the technique's wider applicability. There
is, however, one dierence. Sweden's services elasticity has a p-value of 0.207.
Given that this elasticity was also the\weakest" - but still signicant - for Austria-
Hungary, France and Germany, this result for Sweden is unsurprising. Perhaps it
is telling us something about the construction of the services sector variable; that
it mixes too much of the high value-added with the low. This is the rst time my
method has been applied to secondary data, so it is dicult to judge whether this
one p-value invalidates the method or is just a \Swedish uke" - it is more likely
to be the latter, given the coecient comes out as statistical signicant for the
other three countries. One way to nd out if it makes regional GDP estimation
unreliable, seeing as we have the (Eno et al., 2010) constructed estimates, is to
go ahead with the estimation procedure.
Table 3.8: GDP estimation model replication test
Sweden, 1860 Austria-Hungary, 1910
P 0.901*** 0.446***
(0.095) (0.072)
I
LF 0.321** 0.444***
(0.174) (0.036)
S
LF 0.241 0.089**
(0.185) (0.039)
Constant 7.78*** 8.930***
(1.203) (0.461)
R^2 0.85 0.98
F-stat. 43.97*** 457.3***
Breusch-Pagan 0.09 0.62
N 24 22
Notes: Statistical signicance: *** one per cent, ** ve per cent. Standard errors in brack-
ets. A Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity failed to reject the null hypothesis of con-
stant variance, with a 2 value of 0.09 and a probability value of 0.8 for Sweden; 0.62 and
0.43 for Austria-Hungary.
Table 3.9 shows the ratios of my estimates to those of Eno et al. (2010).
The cross-sectional average ratios are as follows: 0.91 (1870); 0.99 (1880); 1.02
(1890); 0.89 (1900); and 0.81 (1910). While there are regional ratios that are far
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from these averages, the general result is a reassuring one. Most ratios are close
to 1. As can also be seen in table 3.9, we see similarly positive results on the
national aggregate level. The ratios of my national aggregates (sum of all regional
estimates) to those of (Eno et al., 2010) are as follows: 0.95 (1870); 1.03 (1880);
1.07(1890); 0.96 (1900); and 0.90 (1910). These dierences on the national level
are similarly small to the those reported for France and Germany in table 3.6.
Table 3.9: Ratios of own regional GDP to Eno et al.
Region 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910
Stockholms lan 1.27 1.24 1.27 1.37 1.34
Uppsala lan 1.16 1.36 1.45 1.19 1.00
Sodermanlands lan 1.11 1.17 1.15 1.13 0.95
Ostergtlands lan 1.15 1.27 1.13 1.04 0.89
Jonkopings lan 0.96 0.82 0.97 0.93 0.76
Kronobergs lan 0.77 0.73 0.72 0.68 0.55
Kalmar lan 0.97 1.02 0.89 0.71 0.61
Gotlands lan 0.79 0.90 0.55 0.51 0.39
Blekinge lan 0.94 0.82 0.81 0.68 0.63
Kristianstads lan 1.09 1.17 1.04 0.91 0.77
Malmohus lan 0.87 0.89 0.98 0.95 0.84
Hallands lan 0.89 1.03 1.25 0.93 0.86
Goteborgoch Bohus lan 0.97 1.29 1.45 1.22 1.29
Alvsborgs lan 0.94 1.05 1.14 0.91 0.86
Skaraborgs lan 0.86 0.89 0.98 0.75 0.65
Varmlands lan 0.96 1.06 1.05 0.97 0.89
Orebro lan 0.78 1.04 1.04 0.90 0.86
Vastmanlands lan 1.01 1.06 1.13 0.88 0.91
Dalarnas lan 0.56 0.69 0.67 0.64 0.54
Gavleborgs lan 0.86 0.97 1.06 0.94 0.87
Vasternorrlands lan 0.96 1.07 1.21 0.98 1.02
Jamtlands lan 0.84 0.82 1.05 0.92 0.82
Vasterbottens lan 0.70 0.84 0.77 0.59 0.57
Norrbottens lan 0.51 0.62 0.61 0.55 0.59
Sweden 0.95 1.03 1.07 0.96 0.90
Table 3.10 shows the ratios of my estimates to those of Schulze (2007b). The
cross-sectional average ratios are as follows: 1.29 (1870); 1.28 (1880); 1.17 (1890);
1.06 (1900); and 1 (1910). While there are regional ratios that are far from these
averages, the general result is a reassuring one. Most ratios are close to 1. As can
also be seen in table 3.9, we see similarly positive results on the national aggregate
level. The ratios of my national aggregates (sum of all regional estimates) to those
of (Eno et al., 2010) are as follows: 1.3 (1870); 1.27 (1880); 1.16 (1890); 1.06
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(1900); and 0.99 (1910). These dierences on the national level are similarly small
to the those reported for France and Germany in table 3.6, but the gap widens
with the distance from the estimation year in this case.
Table 3.10: Ratios of own regional GDP to Schulze
Region 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910
Bohemia 1.43 1.34 1.27 1.14 1.04
Bukovina 1.13 1.25 1.13 1.04 1.01
Carinthia 1.33 1.42 1.31 1.05 1.02
Carniola 1.50 1.51 1.37 1.13 1.09
Croatia-Slavonia 1.29 1.37 1.31 1.14 1.12
Dalmatia 1.16 1.11 1.18 1.21 1.07
Danube Left Bank 1.28 1.33 1.16 1.15 1.10
Danube Right Bank 1.40 1.39 1.12 1.07 0.99
Danube-Tisza Basin 1.38 1.33 1.15 1.16 1.09
Galicia 1.13 1.12 1.07 1.00 0.94
Littoral 1.39 1.41 1.37 1.18 1.08
Lower Austria 1.18 1.14 1.08 0.93 0.88
Moravia 1.48 1.39 1.31 1.12 1.06
Salzburg 1.06 1.07 1.03 0.88 0.84
Silesia 1.69 1.62 1.48 1.35 1.21
Styria 1.20 1.17 1.07 0.92 0.91
Tisza Left Bank 1.22 1.12 0.98 0.97 0.91
Tisza Right Bank 1.29 1.30 1.08 1.06 0.98
Tisza-Maros Basin 1.25 1.20 1.00 1.02 0.95
Transylvaina 1.15 1.13 0.98 0.99 0.95
Tyrol/Voralbg. 1.28 1.23 1.27 1.03 0.98
Upper Austria 1.20 1.15 1.03 0.92 0.87
Austria-Hungary 1.30 1.27 1.16 1.06 0.99
As this method is meant to approximate regional income rankings, rather than
provide precise point estimates of income for each region, what really matters
is here are the correlations between the original and replicated series. Leaving
aside the starting year of 1860, the two Swedish national series are correlated at
0.99 as are the Austro-Hungarian ones. The average deviation of the estimated
Swedish series from the observed is 7.31 per cent; 15 per cent for Austria-Hungary,
which is slightly above the usual 10 per cent threshold for national accounts.
More importantly, the technique managed to preserve cross-sectional dierences,
which is, again, its main purpose. The Spearman rank correlations between my
estimated Swedish cross-sections and those of the authors are all signicant at
the 1 per cent level: 0.92 (1870); 0.94 (1880); 0.89 (1890); 0.89 (1900); and 0.90
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(1910). For Austria-Hungary, the coecients are also all signicant at the 1 per
cent level: 0.99 (1870); 0.98 (1880); 0.98 (1890); 0.99 (1900); and 0.98 (1910).
This replication test highlights the robustness and applicability of the tech-
nique. Using a single cross-section of regional GDP from 1860 for Sweden and
1910 for Austria-Hungary, along with regional employment shares and population
levels, the technique has replicated the authors' estimates, within a reasonable
degree of accuracy. The authors themselves arrived at their estimates using the
Geary and Stark procedure as well as a \bottom-up" approach in the case of
Schulze (2007b). Even Geary and Stark's \top-down" procedure requires more
data: national GDP, regional sectoral employment, regional population, and,
most problematically (as they are hardest to nd) and distinct from this tech-
nique, regional sectoral wages and value-added Geary and Stark (2002). More-
over, in the case of Sweden it yielded robust results despite the services coecient
p-value of 0.207. Whether this means that such a level of statistical signicance is
tolerable for this method or that this Swedish case is a\uke" is up to future work
to decide. It is only by applying the method to a number of dierent countries
that we can get a really solid idea of what the bounds of the coecients and their
signicance should look like.
Finally, Appendix A includes a comparison of my French and German re-
gional GDP estimates to those kindly supplied by Nikolaus Wolf, which were not
available to me at the time of writing. The comparison shows, despite dierent
estimation methods, that both sets of estimates are similar.
3.2.2 Standardisation
Table 3.11 summarises my regional GDP dataset. The sample consists of 199
regions from seven countries. The benchmark years do not match perfectly, but
are never too far o one another to make general cross-sectional comparisons dif-
cult. Some estimates come in real terms, making their conversion to a standard
unit straightforward. For the others, deation is required before conversion.
Deation of nominal estimates
Ideally, I would have regional price data with which to deate regional GDP es-
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Table 3.11: Regional income dataset.
Country Years Method Currency Regions
France 1911, 1901, 1886, 1872 TD Francs 85
Germany 1907, 1895, 1882, 1871 TD 1913 Marks 23
Spain 1910, 1900, 1860 TD Pesetas 17
Britain 1911, 1901, 1891, 1881, 1871 TD Pounds 12
Italy 1911, 1901, 1891, 1881, 1871 TD 2001 Euros 16
Austria-Hungary 1910, 1900, 1890, 1880, 1870 BU/TD 1990 Dollars 22
Sweden 1910, 1900, 1890, 1880, 1870, 1860 TD 1910/12 Kronor 24
Notes: `Years' column shows benchmark years at which GDP data are available; `Method' is
GDP estimation method, where `TD' is top-down and `BU' is bottom-up. Britain includes
Ireland. For sources, see references in text.
timates. There are two problems with this. First, collecting regional price and
quantity data for my sample would be a slightly unrealistic endeavour, even if we
are sure that the data exist to begin with. Second, there is a more fundamental
methodological concern. Apart from the estimates in Schulze (2007b), most esti-
mates are derived using the top-down Geary-Stark method, which scales regional
estimates to a given national total. Applying regional price indices would inval-
idate the scale of regional estimates. Furthermore, authors often proxy regional
wages using neighbours' wage levels or national averages, making the use of a
regionally-specic price index inconsistent.
These points aside, I am unaware of any evidence that would have us believe
regional price variation within European countries during this period was so great
that it substantially aected cross-sectional regional GDP dierences. As Felice
(2009, p. 4) writes,
... looking at some specic price data, house rents, some basic foods,
in Giusti (1914) and Maic (various years)1 respectively, in a few
towns, it seems plausible that in the years previous to World War I
consumer price levels were not so dierent across the Italian regions,
for sure not clearly higher in the North.
Felice mentions the North because it was much wealthier than the South of
Italy. Its relative wealth was not, as Felice indicates, the result of relatively lower
1This refers to the numerous publications of the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and
Commerce. For example, Ministero di Agricoltura (1887)
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prices. It was the result of there being more industry in the north. Felice's argu-
ment is backed up by the sporadic data we have on regional prices. Between 1870
and 1877, the coecient of variation on wheat prices between Brescia, Padua,
and Rome was an average of 0.06 (Jacks, 2005). Looking beyond Italy, wheat
price variation across Sweden between 1870 and 1914 is slightly higher at 0.07
(Jorberg, 1973). Flour price data covering 12 British cities in 1872 show variation
was 0.06 (Ward and Devereux, 2003). While these are all the data we have to
go on, they do indicate that regional price variation was on average low; at least
not high enough to re-order the rankings of relative regional GDP levels, which is
the potential issue. Given these constraints, I deated the regional estimates for
Spain (to 1958 pesetas) and Britain (to 1913 pounds), using the GDP deators
in Smits et al. (2009) dataset, and those for France (to 19005/13 francs) using
the deator in Toutain (1987).
Conversion to standard unit
Using the latest version of the widely used Maddison data base (Bolt and Van Zan-
den, 2013), I converted my sample of now real GDP estimates into 1990 Geary-
Khamis dollars ($GK). Maddison's data are the `best estimates' of this kind
available for the period, and make comparisons of my work with the rest of
the literature much simpler (Prados de la Escosura, 2000, p. 2). For consis-
tency, I always derived the conversion rate as the period starting year Maddi-
son national GDP per capita divided by the starting year national GDP per
capita. For example, for Italy, which had a starting year of 1871, CRItaly =
GDPpcMaddison1871=GDPpcF elice1871. I then used this same conversion rate
(CR) to convert all real regional GDP per capita cross-sections.
As dierent countries have slightly dierent starting years, does this variability
aect conversion rates and ultimately rankings of relative income? I re-converted
regional GDP per capita estimates for all regions for 1870, 1900, and 1910, using
dierent exchange rate benchmark years - a midpoint (1900) and endpoint (1910)
- rather than the country starting year, which hovers around 1870. The Spearman
rank correlations are displayed in table 3.12.
The near-perfect correlations show that the choice of exchange rate benchmark
year is of little consequence in the grand scheme of things. This small degree of
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Table 3.12: Spearman correlations of exchange rate benchmarks 1900 and [1910]
1870 1900 1910
1870 0.986 [0.987]
1900 0.979 [0.980]
1910 0.973 [0.974]
Notes: All coecients are signicant at 1 per cent. Coecients in square brackets are for
1910; those not in brackets are for 1900. They show the rank correlation between regional
GDP per capita cross-sections standardised using the method outlined earlier (with country
starting years) and cross-sections converted using 1900 and 1910 benchmarks.
measurement error is tolerable, and is unlikely to aect general patterns when it
comes to the following empirical analysis.
Border Changes
Before carrying this out, I checked whether the territorial borders in my sample
matched up with those in Bolt and Van Zanden (2013). There are no border
changes for Italy, Spain, and Sweden during the period, and the units match
those in Maddison (2001). France lost some territory to Germany, most notably
Alsace-Lorraine, during the Franco-Prussian War, but this happened in 1871. So,
using 1860 as a starting year for $GK conversions was safe: for that year, there
were no changes and my data matched that in Maddison (2001, p. 27). It is
pertinent to point out here that Maddison based his French estimates on Toutain
(1987). My estimates for Germany start in 1871, by when the Germans had
acquired Alsace-Lorraine and some other parts of France. Maddison (1995, p.
131) adjusts his data for these changes, and as there were no other changes until
1918, there are no other changes that aect my estimates. I should also point out
here that Maddison based his German gures on Homan (1965).
While there were no border changes for Britain during the period, its conver-
sion required some more adjustments. As Ireland was not part of Britain proper
during this period, Crafts (2005b, p. 59) does not list Ireland in his table (Table
4) of regional GDP per capita for Britain. Crafts (2005b, p. 56) does, however,
list total GDP for Ireland in another table (Table 3). I calculated Irish GDP per
capita using population data from (Bolt and Van Zanden, 2013) and the data in
Table 3 of Crafts (2005b). After applying the deator from Smits et al. (2009), I
derived an CR for Ireland from Geary and Stark (2002), which provides an 1871
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$GK GDP per capita gure for Ireland alone, and one for the rest of Britain from
Maddison (2007). I did not use Maddison's \UK" gure for both as it excludes
Ireland, and he provides no Irish-only gure for 1871.
Dierent estimation methods
One last potential concern is the mixture of top-down and bottom-up estimation
strategies used in the sample. Does the use of dierent regional GDP estimation
methods introduce a systematic bias? This would matter if, say, regional GDP
estimates derived using the Geary-Stark top-down method were persistently lower
or higher than those derived using a national accounting approach. This is un-
likely. Admittedly, short-cut methods are less accurate, but as Geary and Stark
(2002), Eno et al. (2010), and Buyst (2009)'s checks show, the margin of error is
tolerable according to national accounting standards. Comparing their estimates
to ocial ones from 1971, Geary and Stark (2002, p. 11) conclude that `the likely
error in the estimates of GDP generated using [their] method...are plus or minus
10 per cent of the correct total.' Checking against ocial gures for 2000 and
2007, Eno et al. (2010, p. 16-7) nd an even smaller error of 5 and 4 per cent
of total GDP respectively. Furthermore, they show that the error is distributed
randomly across regions - dierences exceed 10 per cent in three regions in 2000,
for example. The correlation coecient between regional errors in 2000 and 2007
is a mere 0.08, suggesting that measurement errors for individual regions are not
the product of a systematic bias. In sum, the error is random and its margin
tolerable.
My own technique diers from the Geary-Stark method so I subjected it to
additional robustness tests in the previous section to ensure that it also does not
introduce an estimation bias. As the tests show, much like the Geary-Stark error
magnitudes, the sum of my regional GDP estimates as deviations from given
national estimates range from 3.74 to 6.75 per cent for Germany; and for France
the range is -8.39 to 9.27 per cent. I also use my method to estimate Eno et al.
and Schulze's regional numbers for Sweden. The dierences are very small, with
the replicated and given national level series correlated at 0.99, and cross-sectional
Spearman correlations ranging from 0.89 to 0.99.
Perhaps more basically, the potential inuence of such a systematic error, even
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if it existed, would be small. It is only Schulze's estimates for Austria - and the
mining and iron industry for Hungary (a small part of a small economy) - that
were derived using a bottom-up approach. Austrian regions form seven per cent
of the total sample. Further, table 3.10 shows no clear dierence between the
replication results for Austrian and Hungarian regions.
Following all the adjustments, table 3.13 summarises the regional per capita
income data.
Table 3.13: Regional GDP per capita.
Year Mean Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation
1870 1,778 4,282 606 526
1900 2,425 5,877 771 694
1910 2,874 8,109 873 891
Sample 2,543 8,109 606 1,065
Notes: Regional GDP per capita in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
Figure 3.2 shows what needs to be explained. During the 1870 period, industrial-
isation had peaked in Britain and was spread in quite equal measure around the
rest of Europe. The leaders were rst Britain and then France, as O'Brien and
Keyder (1978) wrote. The historical literature, however, does not give us an idea
of the extent of internal per capita income inequality. Central France, for exam-
ple, bears more in common with Sweden than it does with northern France. That
is, a large part of the country - a \leader" - is as poor as Europe's periphery. The
literature does not tell us how these patterns changed over time either. We can
be more systematic about this and calculate a Theil index for the whole sample
at each year.1
Following Combes et al. (2011), I decompose the Theil index into within-
country (Tw) and between-country (Tb) components:
T = Tw + Tb: (3.3)
1As market potential data are only available for 1870, 1900, and 1910, for the remainder of
my dissertation these will be my benchmark years.
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Figure 3.2: Regional GDP per capita in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars.
Notes: See text for underlying data; maps are own.
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The Tw captures the weighted average of Theil indices within region r, Tr:
Tw =
RX
r=1
Ar
A
Tr (3.4)
where R is the number of regions, and Ar =
PDr
d=1Ad the level of income in
country r, which includes Dr regions. The Theil index for country r is given by
the same expression as T , but applied to the regions belonging to country r:
Tr =
DrX
d=1
Ad
Ar
ln
Ad
Ar=Dr
: (3.5)
The Tb term corresponds to the between-country Theil index:
Tb =
RX
r=1
Ar
A
ln
Ar=Dr
A=D
: (3.6)
Table 3.14 shows the index values obtained for GDP per capita. The last row
shows the percentage dierence between the within- (Tw) and between-country
(Tb) values.
Table 3.14: Theil indices for income.
1870 1900 1910
Tw 0.0375 0.0406 0.0412
Tb 0.0330 0.0278 0.0298
% Dierence 14 46 38
Notes: All per capita income data are in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars. Tw refers to inequality
in regional GDP per capita within countries. Tb refers to inequalities between countries.
The indices show that GDP per capita inequalities within countries are much
higher than inequalities between countries. Indeed, Bourguignon and Morrisson
(2002) nd that world income inequality between 1820 and 1929 was mainly ac-
counted for by within country inequalities; but that between country inequalities
came to dominate in the mid-twentieth century. The present GDP per capita data
show that the dierence between the within and between inequality components
grew over time, having peaked in 1900. While inequalities between countries
narrowed over the period, which would explain the literature's convergence nd-
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ings, inequalities within countries grew (Williamson, 1996). These within-country
dierentials run contrary to the standard assumptions in Solowian growth the-
ory that physical capital, its main variable, is freely mobile within countries. We
know that labour was highly, and freely, mobile within countries, but quantitative
analyses of internal regional emigration rates have `failed to nd any systematic
relationship between emigration rates and economic conditions' (Baines, 1994, p.
42). High within-country inequalities also pose a problem to the newer empirical
tradition in economics, which nds, based on national units of observation, that
institutions trump all other explanations of income dierentials (Acemoglu et al.,
2005). These within-country inequalities show us that the popular focus on in-
stitutions is either misguided or that institutions operate very dierently within
the same national environment.1
A traditional (neo-classical) empirical prediction in comparative income stud-
ies is that of convergence, as production factors ow to where they are needed
most. For a group of economies, -convergence implies that over time incomes
relative to the sample mean will decline (Barro and Sala-i Martin, 2004). That
is, dispersion in income drops. This concept is most often measured as the coe-
cient of variation on income (Williamson, 1995). Table 3.15 shows the coecient
of variation on GDP per capita by country and year for my sample. In panel A,
the coecients are unweighted. They show generally high levels on inequality - a
value of zero would represent perfect equality - which is to be expected after the
Theil indices in table 3.14. Another notable feature is that only three countries -
Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Sweden - experienced a decline in their regional
inequality from 1870 to 1910. In the remaining four countries, which comprise
the bulk of the sample, inequality increased; quite dramatically in the case of
Italy. In panel B, I weighted regional GDP per capita values by regional popula-
tion shares in the total sample population. Milanovic (2007) and Kenny (2005),
among others, both show us how weighting by population can change the picture.
Kenny (2005) explains its relevance by rhetorically asking whether it would, in
today's world, make sense to assign equal weight to European countries as to In-
dia and China, which account for a large share of the world's population and saw
dramatic growth in the late-twentieth century. The results paint an even less opti-
1In the following chapter, I expand these conceptual arguments and empirically test them.
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mistic picture of income convergence: only Spain experiences a decline in income
dispersion and, even then, a fairly modest one of eight per cent. Italy's increase
in income dispersion is now less pronounced, and Austria-Hungary registers a
marginal increase in dispersion. Sweden, famed for its income equality past and
present, sees a large increase in income dispersion over the period (Henning et al.,
2011). The largest increase comes from France, where the population-weighted
coecient of variation went up by 36 per cent from 1870 to 1910. Rather than
the dramatic convergence discussed in the literature, these numbers point towards
persistent income inequality (Epstein et al., 2003; Williamson, 1996).
Table 3.15: Coecients of variation by country and year
Panel A 1870 1900 1910 Change (%)
Austria-Hungary 0.346 0.329 0.310 -10
Germany 0.211 0.194 0.186 -12
Spain 0.300 0.427 0.377 25
France 0.302 0.314 0.344 14
Britain 0.210 0.246 0.281 34
Italy 0.167 0.241 0.266 59
Sweden 0.248 0.209 0.146 -41
Panel B
Austria-Hungary 0.978 0.969 0.984 1
Germany 0.753 0.757 0.822 9
Spain 1.063 0.919 0.981 -8
France 0.961 1.243 1.304 36
Britain 0.492 0.606 0.629 28
Italy 0.622 0.674 0.681 9
Sweden 0.529 0.624 0.673 27
Notes: Panel A contains the unweighted data; Panel B contains the population-weighted
data. All per capita income data are in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars. `Change' is percentage
change in coecient from 1870 to 1910. Coecient of variation is the standard deviation
over the mean for each country at each year. A value of zero indicates perfect equality.
To explore these trends further, in gure 3.3, I show a box-plot of logged re-
gional GDP per capita levels. We can see that as the median income is increasing,
the tendency is, again, towards stratication or slight divergence. These results
are more in line with Epstein et al. (2003), which shows that for an OECD sample
of countries, the interquartile range of income actually increased between 1873
and 1893, and stabilised by 1913. By 1910, the distance between the median and
and the upper-qaurtile closed, implying that the per capita income distribution
was shifting to the right, but still leaving a large number of regions behind.
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Figure 3.3: Box plot of regional income
Notes: Per capita income in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars: 1870 (left), 1900 (middle), and
1910 (right). See text for underlying sources.
I included a box plot that excludes French regions, which in table 3.15 showed
the most dramatic increase in weighted dispersion. France also accounts for a
large share of my sample. The plot shows the same pattern as that of the full
sample: increasing median income along with increasing inter-quartile distance.
Still, to deal with the concern that French regions make up too large a share of
the sample, Appendix A re-runs all the exploratory exercies in this chapter for a
larger aggregation of French regions. The new aggregation brings the number of
French regions down to its 19 NUTS-2 regions. In short, I nd no dierence in
measures of sample-wide within- and between- country inequality, no changes to
the general dispersion of regional income or to divergence rates, no changes to
the distribution of regional income over time, and no changes to a global measure
of spatial autocorrelation. For these reasons, the remainder of my dissertation
proceeds with the use of departments.
Young et al. (2008) shows that it is possible for economies to exhibit -
convergence - a negative correlation between initial income levels and growth
rates - even if income dispersion - -convergence - is high. An initially narrow
distribution of income relative to the distribution of growth paths can give -
convergence, but -divergence. Figure 3.4 shows the standard representation of
the -convergence relationship: per capita income growth regressed on log ini-
tial per capita income level. A negative relationship indicates convergence and
vice-versa. In the unweighted version, we can see a slow annual rate of income
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convergence - 0.61 per cent - but one that is highly statistically signicant, with
a t-statistic of -6.66. At this rate of convergence, it would take 128 years for re-
gions to ll half the initial gap of income inequalities; not something people would
have been holding their breath for.1 In the population-weighted version, we can
see a dramatic reversal of the relationship. The coecient is positive and highly
signicant, with a much a larger t-statistic of 16.55. It implies a very slow rate of
divergence of 0.03 per cent per year. This version supports the previous results
of persistent income dispersion in table 3.15. The unweighted version, even if we
accept it, oers very weak evidence of convergence.
Figure 3.4: -convergence of pooled sample
Notes: Y-axis is the log dierence between GDP per capita in t and t  1; x-axis is the log
GDP per capita level in t. Population weights are regional shares in sample total population
at each year.
One issue with these measures of income dynamics is that they obscure intra-
distribution movement. Following Epstein et al. (2003) we can get a better idea
of income mobility by computing transition probabilities for the regions between
each year. To do this, I placed regions in quartiles at each cross-section, 1870,
1900 and 1910. I then counted regions' transitions from one quartile to another
between 1870 and 1900 and between 1900 and 1910. These count transitions are
displayed in the matrices in table 3.16.
They show the movements of individual regions across income states between
the years. For example, between 1870 and 1900, 10 regions went from the lowest
quartile to the second quartile, while 14 regions went from the second quartile to
1Following Abreu et al. (2005), the convergence rate for panel model is  ln(1+)=T , where
T is the number of years in the period. Half-life is calculated as ln(2)=ln(1 + =T ).
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Table 3.16: Regional income count transition matrix.
1870-1900 1900-1910
p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75
p25 37 10 3 43 6 1
p50 10 26 14 6 28 16
p75 3 14 82 1 16 82
Notes: All income per capita data are in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars. Figures are simple
counts of transitions. p25 refers to the 25th percentile; p50 is the median; and p75 is the
75th percentile.
the top quartile. Equally interesting is that a number of regions fell back during
this period: 10 regions went from the second to rst quartile, and three from the
top to rst quartile. The diagonal cells represent the regions that did not move
states, and they make up 74 per cent of the sample. During the much shorter
1900 to 1910 period, 77 per cent of regions did not move income states. Only six
regions made it from the rst to second quartile. More made it from the second to
top quartile - 16 regions - but overall mobility was constrained. These ndings for
regional economies do not t with the broader historical literature, but do match
the analysis in Epstein et al. (2003, p. 84), who write: `despite the strong case
made in the historical literature for the signicance of the forces of convergence
between 1870 and 1913, the empirical distributions suggest that mobility was less
common between those two dates than between 1913 and 1950 or 1950 and 1992.'
Still, more regions were moving up the income scale than were falling back.
We can examine the changing shape of these distributions through a graphical
shape of an Epanechnikov kernel density estimator, as in Epstein et al. (2003).
The advantage of this representation is that it is smoother than a simple his-
togram, allowing us to discern trends over time. Figure 3.5 shows the kernel
estimates for 1870, 1900, and 1910. The nal year is clearly the peak. Regional
per capita income levels moved from a relatively even distribution to an increas-
ingly peaked and skewed distribution. It is also possible to see an almost bi-modal
distribution emerge by 1910, with a much lower secondary peak farther to the
left of the distribution. This observation, along with the limited mobility and
stratication seen in table 3.16, nds more in common with Quah's concepts of
convergence clubs and twin peaks of rich and poor economies (Quah, 1996). In-
terestingly, it also resonates with contemporary debates of a \two-speed"Europe,
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with low growth and high unemployment in the periphery and the reverse in
the core (de Grauwe, 2012). I have again included a separate plot that excludes
French regions. This results in a slighlty lower mean income in 1870 - France
was at this point the second most successful economy - and a clearer bi-modal
distribution of income in the following two years.
Figure 3.5: Kernel density plots of regional income
Notes: Per capita income in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars.See text for underlying data. Es-
timated using Epanechnikov kernels.
Epstein et al. (2003) caution against placing too much weight on the transition
matrices and kernel density plots, as they may be aected by short-term shocks
or the atypical years. This is a fair point, but taking spaced-out benchmark years
as I do here reduces this risk. A more important interpretative issue is that these
exercises are a-spatial. Development does not only spread over time, but across
space. It is harder to express this more eloquently than Losch (1939), a founder
of location theory:
[I]f everything occurred at the same time, there would be no develop-
ment. If everything existed in the same place, there would no partic-
ularity. Only space makes possible the particular, which then unfolds
in time.
Understanding the geographical spread of development allows us to ask why cer-
tain areas developed while others did not. We can then look at the characteristics
of these areas to arrive at a causal explanation. As a rst step, I calculate Local
64
Moran's I statistics of spatial association for the regions. Anselin (1995) denes
it as:
Ii =
xi  X
S2i
nX
j=1;j 6=i
wi;j(xj  X) (3.7)
where in my case xi is the GDP per capita of region i, X is the cross-sectional
mean of regional GDP per capita, wi; j is an squared inverse distance spatial
weight between regions i and j, where Euclidean distance is measured between
regional nodes1 , and:
S2i =
Pn
j=1;j 6=i(xj  X)2
n  1  X
2 (3.8)
where n is the total number of regions. The index identies spatial clusters
of regions with similar per capita income levels. It also identies spatial outliers,
that is, high (low) income regions located near low (high) regions. The index
can be tested for statistical signicance, by calculating a z -score, as in Anselin
(1995). Statistically signicant positive index values indicate that a regiona has
neighbouring regions with similarly high or low income levels. Negative values
indicate a region has income levels dissimilar to those of its neighbours - it is an
outlier. Figure 3.6 shows the results. Only regional index values signicant at 5
per cent are displayed, rejecting the null that the spatial distribution of income
is random, that is, there is no clustering of income.
The patterns are, perhaps, unsurprising. High income regions are clustered in
the north of Europe: primarily in Britain (excluding Ireland), and the north of
France. So high are British regional incomes relative to the rest of the sample,
that the whole country is, in eect, a high income cluster. The parts of France
closest to Britain also make up a high income cluster, but then they are co-located
with some low income regions, forming a few low-high income clusters. Southern
Italy and most of Austria-Hungary make a broad low income cluster. Moving
into the middle of the period, in 1900, a new high income cluster emerges in
1The conceptual basis for this matrix is straightforward. It avoids an arbitrary xed distance
band or threshold, and assumes that all regions are associated, but the farther away regions
are, the weaker is the association. As it is squared distance, the slope is sharper, so association
drops o quicker and only a region's closer neighbours will be substantially associated with it.
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Figure 3.6: Local Moran's I of regional income
Notes: Underlying data are GDP per capita in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars.`HH' refers to
a high income cluster; `LL' to a low income cluster; and `LH' to a low-high cluster, that is,
outliers. All other regional indices (in white here) indicate a random distribution of income.
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western Germany. Other clusters of high income emerge in the south of France,
but wealth is still largely concentrated in the north. Less happily, central Italy
has now joined the low income cluster made up of the south of the country, and
extending all the way into Austria-Hungary. These spatial patterns corroborate
the emerging bi-modal distributions of per capita income in gure 3.5. At the
close of the period, France's high income regions were entirely clustered in the
north, running from the coast down to the German border. The high income
cluster in Germany has spread outwards, and new ones formed slightly farther
aeld in the centre and north of the country. What has formed by 1910 is clearly
the \Golden Triangle:" the developed core of Europe, roughly delimited by Paris,
London, Amsterdam, and Frankfurt, which is still the most prosperous European
macro-region today. Writing almost 50 years ago, Landes (1965, p. 456) claimed
that `By 1870 the industrial map of Europe was substantially what it is today.'
If industry was driving these income clusters, then Landes was o by some 40
years. Western German industry was not yet \on the map" by 1870.
Broadly speaking, gure 3.6 shows us that while the core's of income clusters
display persistence over time, they also shed and gain regions in a process of
consolidation. Pollard (1981, p. 112) makes the point that regions as a unit
of signicance in European industrialisation have a `historic dimension.' That
is, clusters and concentrations of income were preceded by, and correlated with,
older `conglomerations'. The initial conditions for the rst clusters can be xed
resources like coal or simply historical accident, as argued by Krugman (1991).
Indeed, the appeal of coal based explanations of European industrialisation is
that high-income clusters were often found around deposits (northern Britain and
northeastern France), but then so were low-income clusters (in southern Spain or
eastern Hungary).
Even if we do accept these explanations, it still leaves us with the fact that
some regions dropped in and out of clusters. How do we, for example, explain
the regions on the French western coast that were part of a high-income cluster
in 1870, but not by 1910? What do we make of the central German regions that
did not feature in a cluster up until 1900, but joined a high-income one in 1910?
The economic structure of a region changes in relation to that of its surrounding
regions. Heywood (1995), for example, argued that regional inequalities in France
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were lower at the start than at the end of the nineteenth century, when railway
expansion formed a national market as opposed to an even distribution of regional
ones. Improved links among regions mean industry has no reason to distribute
itself evenly so as to reach scattered markets. The implication, however, is that
peripheral regions, with their own provincial industrial centres, become exposed
to increasing competition from more advanced regions, with their bigger markets.
In Pollard (1981, p.115), we see the example of Dijon in the Cote-d'Or region of
France. The initial phase of French railway expansion beneted local brewers by
extending their regional markets, but by the end of it these producers suered
from the even more eective producers of beer in the east, close to the industrial
core.
3.4 Discussion
The general patterns uncovered in this chapter are as follows: (1) per capita
income inequality was higher within countries than between them; (2) there is no
clear trend of regional per capita income convergence, but one of stratication;
(3) while more regions were moving up rather than falling down the income scale,
most regions were static; (4) the overall regional per capita income distribution
went from a normal to a bi-modal distribution; (5) the spatial distribution went
from high income clusters in Britain and northern France, and fragmented clusters
elsewhere, to the consolidated \Golden Triangle." The geographical periphery
(Iberian peninsula, central and southern Italy, Sweden, and Austria-Hungary)
was the economic periphery.
Taking each in turn, the rst point may be unsurprising to an earlier gener-
ation of historians. Pollard (1973) argued that the nation is not an appropriate
unit of analysis in explaining the spread and emergence of industrialisation dur-
ing this period. We cannot really understand economic development on this level
because industrialisation does not, as much of the literature and models imply,
hop from one country to another. The literature is full of explanations as to why
Britain was more successful than France or why Britain was \rst," but these
explanations do not account for the dramatic regional variation in development
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within countries (Allen, 2009; O'Brien and Keyder, 1978). In his prescient paper,
Pollard (1973, p. 636-7) writes,
On a map of Europe in which industrialization was coloured, say,
red, it would by no means be the case that an area corresponding to a
country within its boundary would turn uniformly pale pink, dark pink,
and so on to deepest crimson. On the contrary, industrialization would
appear as red dots, surrounded by areas of lighter red diminishing to
white, and with the spread of industrialization these dots would scatter
across the map with little reference to political boundaries.
This may seem fairly obvious once stated, but it is still not how a lot of the
relevant research is done. Some 40 years after Pollard's paper, most researchers
still use the nation as their unit of analysis. Often data do not allow anything
else, but the implications of using nations are considerable. Acemoglu et al.
(2001), in an well-cited paper, take nations and national institutions as their
observational unit to arrive at the empirical nding that institutions trump all
other explanations for relative economic performance. It is national institutions,
they argue, that provide the legal and social framework necessary for a freely-
functioning free enterprise environment. However, as Pollard writes, European
development proceeded with little reference to political boundaries. So how is it
that political or institutional explanations of development have been so dominant
for so long (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Gerschenkron, 1962; North andWeingast,
1989)? Further to this point, how can national institutions explain intra-national
dierences in economic performance?
This is not to say that national institutions are irrelevant. Gerschenkron
(1962) used nations as his units of analysis, and perhaps much of the literature's
current dependency on the national unit stems from his seminal work. As Sylla
and Toniolo (1992) argue in reference to his work, nations historically tend to have
common languages, laws, customs, public institutions, currencies, bureaucracies,
economic and social policies, and the elites who aect all these characteristics.
According to the authors, `these variables have a profound inuence on the in-
dustrialisation process and vary much more between nations than within them'
(Sylla and Toniolo, 1992, p. 15). This is a fair point, but it is easy to disagree
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with it on factual and conceptual grounds. First, in a Europe where nations were
only just forming, languages, customs and many other the other variables crossed
national borders or varied within them (Schulze and Wolf, 2012). In an unocial
sense, is Alsace German or French, for example? How do we dene Swiss cantons;
are the French areas more similar to France than to their German neighbours?
Indeed, what is interesting about gure 3.6 is that high and low income clusters
seem to form among regions within countries. That is, income is not delimited by
national borders. Second, if we do accept that national institutions and policies
mattered, then we must consider the possibility that these variables operated dif-
ferently in dierent settings, even within the same country. Sometimes this could
be due to a dierence between national de jure and regional de facto institutions
(Acemoglu and Dell, 2010). Third, this example makes clear that institutional
explanations are not a priori spatial in nature: there is nothing in them that
leads us to expect a spatial concentration of \good" institutions, and hence of
income. Weak southern Italian institutions lived side by side with their northern
neighbours. This is problematic, given the broader spatial structure of European
regional income that existed in the nineteenth century - and still exists today.
Either way, using nations obscures much of what is interesting about Europe's
economic development.
The next two points concern per capita income mobility and stratication.
The economic history literature covering this period has been largely inuenced
by the ndings in Williamson (1996) and O'Rourke and Williamson (1999). Both
papers argue that open economy forces, mainly mass migration and trade, made
for fast real wage convergence in the pre-1914 period - an era of rapid globali-
sation. They also review later eras, nding that when open economy forces are
hindered, so too are rates of convergence. As Williamson (1996, p. 277) boldly
put it, `history oers an unambiguous positive correlation between globalisation
and convergence.' Unfortunately, the evidence I presented here does not give us
such great cause for optimism. Regional per capita income levels showed no obvi-
ous trend of convergence, and while the median income was rising, most regions
remained rmly placed in the hierarchy, as can be seen in table 3.16. My analysis
nds much more in common with Epstein et al. (2003, p. 95), who write that `the
data we have analysed do not suggest that the regime prevalent before 1914 was
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consistent with strong convergence.' The authors nd, instead, a low degree of
distributional mobility, and forces of persistence and stratication. Rather than
\unambiguous" convergence then, we see here a dierent kind of distribution.
Much like Quah (1996) writing on income distributional dynamics, the pattern
I have uncovered here is one of stratication. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show clearly the
development of what Quah (1996) would call \convergence clubs" - the income
distribution polarising into twin peaks of rich and poor. The economic history
literature cited above misses this characteristic of the distribution, and is perhaps
why it concludes in favour of convergence. As Quah (1996, p. 16) writes,
...because in [the] traditional approach, the researcher only estimates
a cross-section regression, he [sic.] sees only the behaviour of the
(conditional) representative economy. He will never detect the multi-
peakedness that arises in the cross-country distribution.
The implication is that causal explanations based on empirics that miss an im-
portant characteristic of the data are likely to be misleading. If the main drivers
of per capita income were global economic forces, as Williamson (1996) claims,
then why did they aect dierent parts of Europe so dierently? The nding that
this twin-peak distribution also has a clear spatial regime - that stratication was
also occurring spatially; something that would be hard to detect using national
units - raises additional questions, which brings us to the last general point.
Understanding the spatial patterns observed here is central to understand-
ing Europe's economic development. Allen (2009), for example, does not simply
try to explain the Industrial Revolution, but tries to explain why it was British.
Similarly, we can ask here, what was it about the north of France and west of
Germany that allowed them to developed? Of course, the reverse is equally in-
teresting: why did Europe's geographical periphery, the Iberian peninsula, south
of Italy, and Austria-Hungary, fail to develop? In the language of Quah (1996),
we need to explain this twin-peak distribution. Bringing in the spatial dimension
is more likely to produce a reliable explanation. Spatial patterns, though, should
always be interpreted with care, as we can see with a brief example from the
literature.
Pollard (1981, p. xv) shows a map of Europe with the location of coalelds
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and industry in 1875. The idea is to display the spatial correlation between the
two and, indeed, at rst glance there appears to be a reasonable one. Relying
on the spatial aspect alone, then, we might conclude that coal was a necessary
condition for the development of industry: that income clubs formed around coal
deposits. However, as Pollard (1981, p. 121) goes on to discuss, the timing
of development diered across space. In Britain, the expansion of coal-mining
preceded as well as accompanied industrialisation. On the Continent, he writes,
`coal rarely came rst, and it was apparently favourable cost ratios of non-coal
methods, such as using water-power for spinning mills...which frequently held
back some of the major continental centres...' Pollard (1981, p. 121) concludes
the matter by writing `Thus coal as a determinant developed late.'
What this example shows us is the importance of considering both the ge-
ographical and the temporal. Now that I have established the general income
patterns, the following chapters extend these themes. The following chapter em-
pirically deals with coal and institutions.
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Chapter 4
Traditional Explanations: Coal
and Institutions
4.1 Introduction
How helpful are traditional explanations of late-nineteenth century European re-
gional income? This chapter explores the extent to which regional income dier-
entials were due to either institutions or coal endowments. The latter picks up
on the work of a number of historians who have emphasised the role of coal in
industrialisation (Cameron, 1985; Deane, 1965; Fernihough and O'Rourke, 2014;
Pollard, 1981; Pounds and Parker, 1957; Wrigley, 2010). The former explanation
is related to the new empirical work on institutions as determinants of income,
spearheaded by Acemoglu et al. (2001) but with roots going back to North and
Thomas (1973).
To the extent that development depends on coal, or any other unequally
distributed natural resource, opportunities for development are not going to be
equally available to all regions. In this line of reasoning, coal deposits provide
an explanation of spatial income inequality. It has been argued for example that
French eorts at industrialisation were hindered by the lack of easily-accessible
coal (Heywood, 1995). Writing more generally, Parker (1961, p. 160) claimed,
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`Resources, mineral, agricultural, and transport, were largely responsible for the
direction and speed of nineteenth century development among western coun-
tries.' There are, however, reasons to be sceptical of coal-based explanations.
The strength of a coal explanation deteriorates in a comparative analysis. In
contrast to France, for example, Japan did not nd limited coal and other raw
material supplies to be a major obstacle to development (Kenwood and Lougheed,
1982). Crafts (1984) showed that Britain's reliance on coal in industrialisation
was unusual, compared to other countries.
North and Thomas (1973) famously argued that the development of \ecient
organization" in Western Europe accounts for the rise of the West. By \ecient
organization" the authors mean institutions that ensure property rights, which
create incentives that bring private rates of return close to the social rate of re-
turn. Property rights are taken to be embedded in institutions and, the authors
argue, allow people to realise economies of scale, improve factor market eciency,
and encourage investment and innovation. Some thirty years later, these ideas
started receiving serious empirical treatment. Emphasising clearly dened prop-
erty rights and low risks of state-led expropriation, recent work nds support for
the idea that\institutions"drive economic performance (Acemoglu and Dell, 2010;
Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2001). This empirical literature is
for the most part based on national units of observation, since these institutions
are typically national. This is where my regional (subnational) units of analysis
are particularly useful: they oer an a priori challenge to the institutional ex-
planations of income dierentials, since we know from the preceding chapter that
within-country inequality was higher than between-country inequality.
This chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, I review the coal
explanation and construct a more accurate measure of coal access based on a
comprehensive GIS. In the subsequent section, I estimate a measure of regional
\institutions," to be able to empirically test the institutional explanation. The
empirical section brings these two explanations together in a\horse-race" speci-
cation, where I also construct an instrumental variable to address the endogeneity
of institutions. I conclude this chapter with a discussion of the conceptual and
empirical limits of these explanations.
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4.2 Coal
Two weeks after I nished a draft of this chapter, Fernihough and O'Rourke (2014)
released the most comprehensive treatment of coal in European industrialisation
to date. The authors, who nd that proximity to coalelds explains a large share
of city growth in the late-nineteenth century, make clear an important distinction
in the debate. Looking at variation over time, one strand of the argument has
it that exploiting coal deposits explains Europe's subsequent development - the
`growth hypothesis' (Deane, 1965; Wrigley, 2010). Looking at spatial variation,
the other strand of the argument has it that the location of economic activity was
determined by the location of coal deposits - the `location hypothesis' (Fernihough
and O'Rourke, 2014; Mathias, 1983; Pollard, 1981; Wrigley, 2010).
In terms of the growth hypothesis, Wrigley (2010, p. 23) argues that switching
to coal was a `necessary condition for the industrial revolution', but an insucient
one. Industrialisation, he argues, was by denition a move away from an organic
economy, where energy could only be drawn from labour, animals, wood, water
and wind. These sources of energy placed a tight constraint on development:
`Iron, for instance, has many physical properties that make it of the greatest
value to man but as long as the production of 10,000 tons of iron involved the
felling of 100,000 acres of woodland, it was inevitable that it was used only where
a few hundred- weight or at most a few tons of iron would suce for the task
in hand' (Wrigley, 1988, p. 80). Coal production and its related technologies,
when they came, thus freed swathes of land and masses of labour from inecient
energy production and use.
According to the second strand of the debate, regions needed easy access to
coal if they were to industrialise. Mathias (1983) sums up the debate: `The
logistics of energy inputs based upon coal, translated against available transport
in a pre-railway age, precluded any major industrial complex in heavy industry
from developing except where coal and ore were plentiful and adjacent to one
another or to water carriage.' Wrigley (1961) calculated substantial cost savings
for coal use close to coal mining. Pollard (1981) relates the location of Continental
European industry to the location of coalelds: northern France, the Ruhr, and
Belgium. Most authors concede that transport cost declines starting in the late-
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nineteenth century weakened the need to be located near a coaleld (Wright,
1990).
Fernihough and O'Rourke (2014) nd that proximity to coalelds explains
European city growth, a proxy for economic growth, supporting the location hy-
pothesis. Further, they nd that proximity to coal really matters when coal
technologies were introduced, supporting the growth hypothesis. Their results
are robust to a number of controls, an instrunmental variable specication, and
dierent specications. What can I add to this debate? As with Fernihough and
O'Rourke (2014, p. 6), my interest is not in whether coal was needed to start
industrialisation - my period is too late for that - but whether, once industrialisa-
tion was in progress, access to coal `mattered a lot or a little' for development. In
practical terms, I have data on actual regional GDP rather than a proxy, which
Fernihough and O'Rourke (2014) lament are missing, and I have new data on
coal transport costs as well as simple geodesic distances.
4.2.1 Re-creating Europe's transport network
Since the broader coal explanation rests ultimately on acces to coal, we need to
measure \access" as accurately as possible. Most empirical studies use simple
geodesic distances, but being physically far from coal does not necessarily imply
that access was bad or vice versa. While Pollard (1981, p. 121) is emphatic on
the location hypothesis, he does write that industrial regions `only survived if
they had reasonable access by water to a supply of good coal [emphasis added].'
As Kenwood and Lougheed (1982, p. 112) put it,
...investment in cheap transport is often more important than the
possession of high-grade minerals for a region's successful industrial-
ization, since it makes possible either the opening-up of local resource
supplies or the importation of resources from elsewhere.
Using a GIS of railways, waterways, steamship lines, and roads, I re-created Eu-
rope's late-nineteenth century transport network to measure regions' cheapest
possible access to coal. I also collected coal freight rates for this network, which
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means that the resulting variable on coal access is time-variant.
Sea transport
Shipping and port data came from RRG Spatial Planning and Geoinformation at
the University of Dortmund which collects and provides European geographical
data and digitised maps (RRG, 2012). I used their shipping routes and seaports
map. It originally included some 1,820 ports and some 2,110 routes between
those ports. I eliminated ports that did not exist during the period or that were
irrelevant like shing ports or marinas, going by Bartholomew's historical map,
Europe and Near East - General Commercial Chart- Suez Canal (Bartholomew,
1907). I kept routes the same as there is no reason why these would have changed.
Ultimately, some 1,210 ports and 1,030 routes remained.
I took ocean coal freight rates from Kaukiainen (2006, p. 54), which is the
standard source for this type of work. Kaukiainen conventionally breaks down
freight rates into terminal costs - the cost paid at the end of a journey or at
transhipment - and variable costs - the costs per ton-mile for coal.
Railways
Railway data came from the Historical GIS of Europe project (HGISE) at the
University of Lleida (University of Lleida, 2012). HGISE's database provides
information on railways every decade between 1870 and 2000. Corresponding to
the GDP and transport costs data, I took data for the years 1870, 1900, and 1910.
As the HGISE team explain, European railway data could not be extracted from
a single source. Sources that were digitised and standardised include historical
maps from Cambridge University and the Cartographic Institute of Catalonia,
Thomas Cook publications, specialised magazines and online sources like the
Histoire Chronologiques des Chemins de Fer Europeens.
Railway coal freight costs come from a variety of sources. The U.S. Bureau
of Railway Economics (1915) provides comparative freight rate data for a large
number of dierent-length routes in dierent countries and for dierent goods. I
decomposed these costs into terminal and variable components, to use the vari-
able cost data in Noyes (1905) and Cain (1980) to extrapolate back across the
remaining benchmark years, following the procedure in Schulze (2007b). This
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yielded railway coal freight data for Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany,
Italy, Spain, Sweden, and Russia.
Waterways
Navigable river and canal data (henceforth, waterways) are also from (University
of Lleida, 2012). Europe's map of waterways did not, according to the (University
of Lleida, 2012) dataset, change substantially between 1870 and 1910. Indeed,
Moulton (1914, p. 264) provides gures showing that the total length of Ger-
many's waterway network was the same length in 1885 as it was in 1905, while
France's declined by 2.5 per cent. Hadeld (1968, p. 208) shows that the length
of England and Wales' canal system plateaud in 1850. Sources that were digitised
and standardised include historical maps from the Cartographic Institute of Cat-
alonia, Thomas Cook publications, specialised magazines and online sources like
the Voies navigables d'Europe and Histoire et Patrimoine des Rivieres et Canaux.
Given, as the HGISE team explain, waterway maps are very rare, it is per-
haps unsurprising that waterway freight rates are rarer still. I collected what was
available in Moulton's epic, Waterways Versus Railroads (Moulton, 1914). The
author provides waterway coal freight rates for France, Germany and Britain in
1905 (Moulton, 1914, pp. 291, 217-8, 212). The rates include tolls and haulage
fees, but the author does not provide terminal costs. The best way of getting
around this was to assume that the ratio of terminal to variable costs in sea
transport was the same as that in waterway trasnport. For the remainder of my
sample, I used the average of these three countries. Since the map of waterways
does not change over my period, and since coal freight rates for waterways are
unavailable for years other than 1905, the waterway network is xed. While this
is not ideal, it is better than leaving out the waterway network altogether, es-
pecially since recent work has argued for its importance (Klemann and Schenk,
2013).
Roads
The base road map is again from (University of Lleida, 2012). One diculty in
analysing historical road maps is that it is rare to nd common criteria being used
to identify dierent road categories in dierent countries. This is a problem that
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persists even to today with European Union road maps. It is therefore necessary
to use the same source when comparing road densities in dierent countries. The
HGISE team used General Dufours maps published between 1835 and 1872, which
enabled them to make meaningful comparisons of public highways over time. The
map I use here is for 1872. Much like the waterway network, the team found little
substantial change in Europe's public highway network between 1870 and 1910.
Unfortunately, no maps for Sweden were found. To ll in this gap, I used the
ArcGIS \Grouping Analysis" tool to create a minimum spanning tree overland
network for Sweden. While this \idealises" Sweden's road network, it is the most
objective way of handling the gap.
There is a dearth of quantitative historical data road transport. The only
road coal freight rate I found is from Van Vleck's study of Britain's internal coal
freight road network (Van Vleck, 1997). The author provides a single ton-mile
estimate for 1914. For a terminal rate, I assumed the ratio of road terminal to
variable rates is the same as that of railway transport. We are unlikely to have
anything better than this for some time, but it is arguably better than assuming
away the road network, as often happens (Armstrong, 1987).
Figure 4.1: Europe's transport network
Notes: Regional nodes and map for 1900 are not shown to oer some clarity. For sources,
see text.
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Figure 4.1 shows the network in 1870 and in 1910. I left out regional nodes,
used in the network routing I explain in the following section, to make the map
easier to read. The idea here is to show the detail and extent of the network, and
the ability of a GIS to integrate dierent datasets.
Network routing from Nodes to Coal to Deposits
The rst step in calculating the cheapest routes between regions and coal deposits
is dening points of connection. Since distance can only be measured from point
to point - rather than from and to regional polygons - I attributed a node to
every region. The criterion for choosing nodes was economic rather than political
importance. It was more often than not that regional (or provincial) capitals were
the most economically important, say, Vienna with Lower Austria. For coastal
regions, these nodes often corresponded with the RRG (2012) map of ports.
Coal deposits - both anthracite and lignite, as in Fernihough and O'Rourke
(2014) - are from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) (USGS, 2013).
Coal forms when organic matter is rst pressurised into peat, which turns into
lignite, then into sub-bituminous coal, after that bituminous coal, and nally
anthracite. The last in the order is the most valuable form of coal, since it has
compressed over the longest period the most organic matter. It has a heating value
of 13,000 to 15,000 Btu/lb (British thermal unit per pound) versus lignite's 4,000
to 8,300 Btu/lb (American Society for Testing and Materials, Subcommittee:
D05.18, 1998). According to Fernihough and O'Rourke (2014), both were used
in Europe's industrialisation eorts.
These data cover all coal deposits, and not just the ones known at the time or
mines that were in operation. If the coal explanation holds that coal was required
for development, then we would be testing a dierent (endogenous) explanation if
we were to delete coal deposits that were not known. Indeed, there is something
to be said of regions that did not use or discover coal deposits in their territory.
Fernihough and O'Rourke (2014) use coalelds, but ultimately instrument it with
proximity to rock strata from the Carboniferous era - in eect, coal deposits.
Another issue with these data is that the location of deposits as measure using
centroids: a point place on the geographical centre of each deposit. This means
a region may be close to the border of one deposit, but still far from its centroid.
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As a cross-check on both the centroid and on the\knowability"of coal deposits,
I digitised the 'Outline Map of Europe's Principal Coalelds, 1910' from Ralph
et al. (1910, p. 259). Crucially, the map is from 1910 and shows coalelds rather
than deposits, so these were known and exploited sources of coal at the time. I
digitised the coalelds as polygons rather than points to get around the centroid
issue.
Figure 4.2: Digitising a 1910 coaleld map.
Notes: Map on left is a 1910 map of European coalelds from Ralph et al. (1910); map on
right is the digitised version showing distance from each regional node and NUTS-2 borders.
I then measured the distance from each regional node to the nearest coaleld
broder. Figure 4.2 shows the original and digitised map, with regional distances
and regional borders highlighted in the digitised version. The summary statistics
of these two measures shown in table 4.1. The simple distance to deposit measure
has a 16 per cent higher mean value. The dierence between their standard
deviations is equally comparable, at 17 per cent. The coaleld distance measure
has a minimum value of 0km since some nodes are directly on coalelds. For
the coal deposit measure, the minimum is 1km. The dierence between their
maximum values is four per cent. Finally, their skewness statistics, at 2.95 and
3.01, show that they follow a very similar distribution.
Are the simple distance to coal deposit centroid (km) and distance to nearest
coaleld border (km) correlated? Their Pearson correlation is 0.752, signicant
at one per cent. Their Spearman rank correlation is 0.673, signicant at one
per cent. Regressing the coaleld distance on the coal deposit centroid distance
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Table 4.1: Distance to Coal Deposit Centroid and Coaleld Border (kms).
N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skew
Coal Distance 597 182 161 1 1,423 2.95
Coal F ield 597 157 195 0 1,478 3.01
Notes: Coal Distance is the distance to coal deposit centroid variable, and Coal F ield is
the distance to coaleld border variable.
across all 199 regions, I get a coecient of 0.911, signicant at one per cent, and
a constant term of -8.80, which is insignicant. This parametric test indicates no
dierences in levels (insignicant constant term) and an almost one-for-one cor-
relation (signicant coecient of 0.911). The R2 is 0.57, indicating a respectable
overall correlation.
Given the correlation between the simple distance to centroid and coaleld
border, it is unlikely that using the latter in the transport calculations would
have produced meaningfully dierent results. Further, in Appendix B I show
that neither measure has an eect on regional per capita income, which is what
ultimately matters, when controlling for regional institutions.
The second step is connecting the lines of transport with the nodes, using
GIS topology tools. To allow transport from one node to another, it must be
possible to continuously travel along railways, waterways, roads and shipping
lines, through ports, and other nodes. Shipping lines naturally connected directly
to ports, so there was no need for adjustment there. Railways did not always
connect directly onto nodes or ports. This made it necessary to use a buer zone
around nodes: Any railway that enters that buer zone is assumed to connect
to the node. The buer was dened with a radius of 40-miles. This choice is
based on the following logic. Non-rail land-transport during the period occurred
most commonly by horse-drawn carriage. Economic actors are unlikely to ship
goods that would have taken longer than a day to make it from the rail station to
the regional node, as overnight stays greatly increase costs. So, the question is,
how far can the average horse pull the average carriage in an eight-hour day? As
horses are unable to gallop, canter or trot for eight straight hours, the horse will
walk. The average walking speed for a horse is around three to ve to 10 miles-
per-hour. That means, in eight-hours, it can travel between 40 and 80-miles, so
the lower-bound estimate was taken, since the horse will be drawing a carriage
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(Weinstein and Adam, 2008).
The third step is dening connections along the network. It would be un-
realistic to allow routes to switch freely from rail to waterway and ship or vice
versa. There are obvious transhipment costs. Unfortunately, at the time of writ-
ing, no detailed data on the location of rail stations or on direct and regionally
specic transhipment costs were available. This made two safe assumptions nec-
essary. First, transhipment was possible whenever a railway connected to a port
or vice versa, and possible whenever two railways met at a node. This is sound,
as ports were more often than not served directly by rail or had potential to
nearby railway stations, and railways crossing at a regional node usually marked
the location of stations. Second, as transhipment cost data were unavailable, the
terminal cost data discussed above were used in its place. The two are likely to
be similar in size, but more to the point, countries' terminal costs were likely to
have been proportionate to their transhipment costs. It is dicult to imagine
a scenario where London's transhipment cost is ve-times its terminal cost, but
that Italian Ancona's is only twice as high. Therefore what matters is that there
is consistence taking the same measures for the same things across countries and
time. For consistency with the GDP data and as required for panel model work,
I converted all variable and freight rates into 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars using
the exchange rates at Global Financial Data (2014), and the purchasing-power
rates implicit in Maddison (2007).
Finally, the GIS allows for transport over two-dimensional space. The network
at this stage allows routing along railways, waterways, roads and shipping lines,
but travel remains costless. This step was just a matter of applying the variable
costs (costs per ton-mile of coal) to the appropriate railways and shipping lines,
and the terminal or transhipment costs to the appropriate ports and connections.
For transhipments, I applied the terminal cost associated with the current mode
of transport; for example, when switching from railways to another mode, I ap-
plied the railways terminal cost. With all the costs in place, I used the ArcGIS
\Network Analyst" tool, which uses Dijkstra's graph search algorithm to solve
for the cheapest routes between regional nodes and coal deposits. The algorithm
solves for the single-source shortest/lowest-cost route between a group of nodes.
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Figure 4.3: Dijkstra's graph search algorithm
Notes: Circled letters represent nodes. Connecting lines are arcs. Figures represent length
of arcs. The shortest routes (both of equal length) are highlighted in green and red.
For an illustration, see gure 4.3.1 It is a network where arcs (lines) are la-
belled with their lengths (costs). We can use Dijkstra's algorithm to nd the
shortest route from the origin node 0 to the destination node T . The origin is
labelled 0, since it is 0 units from the origin. For each arc connecting the origin
node, we calculate the candidate distance to neighbouring nodes. The candidate
distance is the distance to, in this step, the origin node plus the length of the arc.
So, between 0 and A, it is two (= 0 + 2); between 0 and B it is ve (= 0 + 5);
and between 0 and C it is four (= 0 + 4). We choose the shortest arc - 0   A -
and add it to our set. This process is repeated moving through the nodes, until
we reach T . In gure 4.3, there are two equally short routes: 0 A B  D  T
and 0 A B E D T both \cost" 13 units. This is, of course, a very simple
version of the algorithm. In my dataset, the nodes are my 199 regional cities,
and my arcs are the combination of railways, waterways, roads, and sea routes.
Further, it is not simply the cost along the arc, but the terminal costs that matter.
Results
Figure 4.4 shows the pooled correlation between the resulting estimates of min-
imum transport costs to coal deposits (Coal Transport) and GDP per capita,
and the pooled correlated with the latter and a geodesic distance to coal deposits
(Coal Distance) measure. All variables are logged.
1See Yan (2014) for am introduction of Dijkstra's algorithm and its importance.
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Figure 4.4: Coal and income correlations
Notes: Values on y-axis are log GDP per capita. Coal Transport is the cost in dollars of
transporting a tonne of coal from a region's nearest deposit. CoalDistance is the geodesic
distance in kilometers to the nearest deposit. Includes full sample. For sources, see text.
While neither provide a good t, the R2 for the Coal Transport correlation
at 0.04 is greater than that for Coal Distance at 0.004. Both coecients are
statistically signicant: Coal Transport at one per cent and Coal Distance at
10 per cent. The estimate on the former implies that for every standard deviation
increase in a region's cost of transporting coal from the nearest deposit to its
node, its regional income drops by 0.203 standard deviations, compared to -
0.073 standard deviation eect for Coal Distance. These eects translate into,
respectively, seven and three per cent of the sample mean per capita income. In
sum, a more accurate measure of coal access shows us that the eect of proximity
to coal on income may be larger than the standard geodesic measure. Figure
4.5, which overlays coal deposits on the GDP per capita map, shows that this
should not come as a surprise. The simple spatial correlation between income and
coal only works in Britain, central Germany, and northeastern France. The coal
deposits in southeastern France, Spain, and Hungary seem to have done little for
per capita incomes. While both the geodesic and transport-cost measure support
the coal explanation, gures 4.5 and 4.4 highlight the importance of measuring
access to coal accurately.
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Figure 4.5: Coal and income map
Notes: Coal deposits, from USGS (2013), mark the geographical centres of exploitable de-
posits. The GDP per capita data is the same as that in Chapter 3.
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4.3 Institutions
According to North and Thomas (1973), it is dierences in institutions that ex-
plain dierences in development. Acemoglu et al. (2005), currently the leading
proponents of the institutional view, argue that economic institutions are what
matter for economic outcomes. These institutions collectively refer to the `struc-
ture of property rights and the presence and perfection of markets' (Acemoglu
et al., 2005, p. 389). Put simply, economic institutions matter because they shape
the structure of economic incentives in society. These ideas have now received
a lot of empirical support - one well-cited instalment in the debate is called `In-
stitutions Rule: the Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in
Economic Development' (Rodrik et al., 2004). As successful as they have been,
however, institutional explanations suer from a number of issues.
First, the term\institutions"is often all encompassing. As Voigt (2013) writes,
it has been used to refer to newspapers, supermarkets and even phone booths.
There needs to be clarity on whether we are working with institutional structures
(federal states, say) or organisations (say, the Church). Second, we need to be
clear on whether it is de jure or de facto institutions that matter or that we
are measuring. While, for example, Italy's institutions were, de jure, the same
after unication, we know that there were - and still are - de facto institutional
dierences within Italy (Baneld, 1958; Dimico et al., 2012). Third, and perhaps
most importantly, it is plausible that institutions are endogenous to economic
activity - that economic development leads to good institutions. This is a serious
concern, and I come to it in the empirical strategy section after constructing my
institutional measure in the coming subsection.
4.3.1 Measuring institutions
Measuring the concepts underlying \institutional" explanations is fraught with
controversy, especially when using subnational regional units of observation. I
take as my starting point the idea that de facto subnational institutions exist
and are important determinants of economic performance (Acemoglu and Dell,
2010). This runs contrary to the institutional critique that altogether denies a
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role for institutions because the explanation does not t with the fact of subna-
tional income dierentials documented in the previous chapter. The argument
goes, institutions are national and so cannot account for subnational dierentials
(Redding and Strum, 2008). This straw-man critique ignores the existence of
de facto regional institutions shown for example in Acemoglu and Dell (2010),
insisting that only de jure national ones exist. In spite of this, the presence of
these regional institutions is something political scientists and historians have
long-recognised (Baneld, 1958; Fukayama, 2001; Pollard, 1973). Economic his-
torians, too, pointed out some time ago that de jure and de facto institutions
that can co-exist on dierent scales. Montinola et al. (1995) explained the puzzle
of late-twentieth century China's inecient institutions and its rapid growth with
the matrix in gure 4.6. In the two-by-two matrix, de jure institutions can be
either present or absent and de facto institutions can be either present or absent.
Researchers often assume that de facto and de jure go together - as in cell 1 -
but, as the matrix shows, they do not necessarily correspond. Cell 2, in which
de jure institutions are absent but de facto decentralisation is extensive, is what
Montinola et al. use to explain the puzzle.
Figure 4.6: De facto and de jure institutions
Notes: Adapted from Montinola et al. (1995).
As for quantitative measurement, I rely on the popular denition of institu-
tional eciency from Acemoglu et al. (2005, p. 389-90):
[Institutions] not only determine the aggregate economic growth po-
tential of the economy, but also an array of economic outcomes, in-
cluding the distribution of resources in the future (i.e., the distribution
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of wealth, of physical or human capital). In other words, they inu-
ence not only the size of the aggregate pie, but how this pie is divided
among dierent groups and individuals in society.
In a late-twentieth century study, it is possible to proxy this formulation of in-
stitutions using indicators on income inequality, education levels, and social mo-
bility. In historical settings, when such indicators are unavailable, measurement
is harder. My attempt is based on frontier analysis. If we follow the formulation
that institutions determine the distribution of resources, and that ecient insti-
tutions distribute resources more evenly, we can measure institutional quality as
the eciency at which material resources (GDP per capita) are converted into
resources like human capital.
An eciency frontier approach
Technical eciency in a production frontier model refers to the ability of a unit
(regional institution, in this case) to achieve maximum potential output (say,
human capital) from given amounts of inputs (say, income). Farrel (1957) was
perhaps the rst to use frontier analysis to measure technical eciency. Techni-
cally ecient units are ones that are on the frontier, while inecient ones will be
located below the frontier as they are achieving less output than is technically
possible. Technical eciency can thus be measured as the relationship between
the achieved output (Y ) and what would be achieved if the unit were on the
frontier (Y ). That is, 0  Y=Y   1.
The two main methods used in frontier analysis are data envelopment analysis
(DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis. The rst does not assume a functional
form for the frontier (it is non-parametric), and the second does assume a func-
tional form. It is parametric, stochastic, and uses econometric methods. I use
this latter method as it allows the frontier model's error term to be decomposed
into statistical noise and ineciency. DEA does not do this, and so attributes
deviations from the frontier only to ineciency. Furthermore, in a cross-section of
various regions like mine, this would make it hard to tell whether we are picking
up heterogeneity or eciency-dierences between regions.
Stochastic frontier analysis was pioneered by Aigner et al. (1977). Once a
functional form has been chosen for the production function, the authors put
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forward the following model y = f(xi) + "i, where yi is the output achieved
by region i, xi is the vector of used inputs,  is a vector of parameters to be
estimated, and "i is an error term composed of two elements, "i = vi + ui. The
component vi is the symmetric disturbance, capturing random variations in pro-
duction due to random errors, observation errors and measurement errors, and
is assumed to be identically and independently distributed. The component ui
is an asymmetric term, capturing technical ineciency, and is assumed to be
distributed independently of vi, and to satisfy ui  0. Within this framework,
maximum likelihood is used to produce consistent parameter estimates. The val-
ues for technical eciency can be calculated as the expectation of the term ui
conditional on the composed error term "i. That is, technical eciency for the
ith region is the ratio of the observed output for the ith region relative to the
potential output (frontier function). I use the standard assumption of a half-
normal distribution for ui. Therefore, technical eciency TE can be measured as
TEi = exp( ui), with 0  TEi  1 so as to ensure that scores remain either on
or below the frontier. TE measures the eciency of institutions in distributing
resources (outputs) based on its inputs.
How do I adapt this model to my case, that is, what do I use as an output and
as an input to measure the eciency of institutions? Acemoglu et al. (2005) men-
tion, in particular, wealth, and physical or human capital. While for my current
case, I do not have data on regional physical capital, I do have data on regional
literacy rates (a proxy for human capital) and data on regional GDP per capita (a
measure of income or economic prosperity). Literacy rates are a useful indicator
of how well distributed gains from economic prosperity are.1 Ecient regional
institutions are thus ones whose literacy rates are high relative to their GDP per
capita. This formulation is not a causal model, but one that is intended to mea-
sure the association between the two variables. As such, establishing exogeneity
is not a concern here.2 The relationship between GDP per capita and literacy
rates also has a sound economic historical basis. Around this period, governments
began public education plans in earnest, often devolved to subnational levels as
1See Appendix 2 for the literacy data sources and Appendix 3 for robustness tests of these
data.
2Refer to the discussion around table 4.3 for a test on the usefulness and information content
of this relationship.
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with Germany, with specic goals to spread and improve literacy. GDP was the
taxable base used to fund these plans and achieve these goals. As Engerman and
Sokolo (2000, p. 227-7) write about Latin America,
The institution of public primary schools was...the principal vehicle
for high rates of literacy attainment and an important contributor to
human capital formation. Major investments in primary schooling did
not generally occur in any Latin American country until the national
governments provided the funds.
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function, using linear presentation, and
taking into account my variables, I re-write the function to be estimated as
lnLit = +  lnYit + i + t + it (4.1)
where i continues to index regions and t years, L is literacy rate, Y is GDP
per capita, and i is a countey xed eects term and t is a year xed eects
term. The last two terms are particularly useful since the rst allows me to
analyse variation within regions, controlling for potentially confounding eects
of national-level institutions, and second controls for the fact that both variables
were trending upwards over time. The parameter of interest  gives the elasticity
of output (literacy) to input (per capita income).
Figure 4.7 provides a more intuitive representation of the frontier relationship
between literacy rates and GDP per capita. The red line marks the eciency
frontier, at which the \production" of literacy for a given amount of GDP per
capita is most ecient. A region's distance from that frontier, with the dashed
line providing an example, provides a measure of TE. To derive TE scores, hence-
forth INST , for each region at each year, I ran the model on the entire panel.
Results
The results of model 4.1 are displayed in table 4.2. Estimated values for the pa-
rameter  are positive and highly signicant across all years, as expected. The two
variances of the two error components indicate that the ineciency component
u is much more statistically signicant (T-statistic of -24.56) than the random
component v (T-statistic of -12.57). This implies that ineciency u makes a more
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Figure 4.7: Stylised literacy and GDP per capita frontier
Notes: While based on data for 1870, this is a stylised frontier plot, drawn as a visual aid
to the discussion on the frontier technique. Harald Tauchmann at the Friedrich-Alexander-
Universitaet Erlangen-Nuernberg kindly supplied the Stata code to produce frontier plots.
important contribution to the variability of the total error in the frontier model,
and that ineciency is highly signicant across regions and years.
The resulting mean technical eciency score is 0.79, with a standard deviation
of 0.175 and a minimum score of 0.18. The maximum score, which marks the
frontier, is always one. The main implication of this result is that the average
regional institution could have reduced its input (GDP per capita) by up to 21
per cent without reducing its output (literacy rates) - simply by improving its
institutional eciency. More ecient regional institutions, therefore, could have
increased levels of human capital without necessarily increasing their economic
prosperity. That idiosyncratic ineciencies exist tell us the measures of INST are
capturing something beyond the simple correlation between literacy and income.
In their evaluation of the human development index (HDI) and its usefulness
relative to per capita income, McGillivray and White (1993, p. 187) propose
criteria for a variable's redundancy. First, a variable is redundant if the corre-
lation coecient is higher than 0.90 (`Level 1 Redundancy') or 0.70 (`Level 2
Redundancy'). Second, a variable is redundant if a 'restricted' computation with
the relevant component (in this case, GDP per capita) is excluded and remains
highly correlated with excluded component. While I cannot test the second cri-
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Table 4.2: Frontier model results
lnL
 2.684***
(0.267)
lnY 0.253***
(0.037)
ln v -6.415
(0.510)
lnu -1.825
(0.074)
Log-likelihood 70.319
N 597
Notes: Estimated on entire panel with country xed eects, using maximum likelihood. Stan-
dard errors are in brackets. *** denotes statistical signicance at the one per cent level. De-
pendent variable is log of regional literacy rates; independent is log of GDP per capita (Y ).
v is the symmetric (random) disturbance; u is the asymmetric term, capturing idiosyncratic
technical ineciencies.
terion, since the only component or input is GDP per capita, I can test the rst.
Table 4.3 shows that while the pair-wise and Spearman rank correlation coe-
cients are statistically signicant, as we would expect them to be, they pass the
McGillivray and White (1993) 'Level 1' and 'Level 2' redundancy criteria. That
is, INST contains useful information beyond its GDP per capita input.
Table 4.3: Correlations of GDP per capita and INST .
Pearson Spearman
1870 0.228*** 0.223**
1900 0.403*** 0.162**
1910 0.420*** 0.182**
Notes: Statistical signicance: *** one per cent, ** ve per cent.
Another concern is that INST is not capturing anything beyond its output,
literacy. In table 4.4 I carry out a paramteric test of the two variables' inde-
pendence by regressing INST on literacy rates with both variables expressed in
percentage terms for comparability. For evidence of dependence, we would need
a coecient () that is signicant and close to one, and a constant term () that
is signicant and close to zero. The results of this exercise are in table 4.4.
While the s are all highly signicant, only that for 1870 is near enough to
one to indicate substantial dependence. Further,  for that year is 13 per cent,
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Table 4.4: Correlations of literacy and INST .
1870 1900 1910
 12.696 31.043 41.427
(3.208)** (2.463)*** (2.677)***
 0.866 0.625 0.490
(0.040)*** (0.032)*** (0.038)***
R2 0.926 0.832 0.646
N 199 199 199
RMSE 5.645 5.605 6.172
Notes: The dependent variables is INST , the measure of regional institutional eciency,
expressed in percentage terms; the independent variable is literacy rates, also in percentage
terms. Statistical signicance: *** one per cent, ** ve per cent. `RMSE' is the root
mean-square error. Robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets.
which is close to INST 's sample standard deviation of 0.17 or minimum value of
0.18. Moving to 1900, the relationship weakens, with a  of 0.63 and an  of 31;
almost double the standard deviation of INST . In 1910, it weakens further with
a  of 0.49 and an  of 41; this time surpassing INST 's standard deviation and
minimum value. The root mean-square error for all estimations hovers around six
per cent. This is large enough to take the sample median of INST (86 per cent)
to the top quartile of the distribution (91 per cent). On the balance, the results
in table 4.4 indicate that INST contains useful information beyond its literacy
rate output measure.
All quantitative measures of institutions are imperfect, and the one I present
here is no exception. It is both indirect and incomplete. The challenge I faced
here was constructing the same measure for all 199 regions across seven countries
at three dierent points in time within the timeframe of a doctoral project. This
excluded a number of options, not least popular national level measures or specic
within-country \natural experiments."
One idea for future work would be to use the geographical and temporal
variation in the French occupation of European regions in the early nineteenth
century. This occupation involved a set of reforms, including the imposition of
a civil legal code, the abolition of guilds and feudalism, and the introduction of
equality at law, and the undermining of aristocratic privileges. Acemoglu et al.
(2011) nd for a number of independent German polities that the \spread of the
French Revolution" fostered economic progress through these reforms. I have left
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this for future work because digitising the geographical spread of the reforms, as
well as taking qualitative notes of their de facto implementation, is no small task.
The analysis of Acemoglu et al. (2011), which is based on one country, is the work
of ve professors and ve research assistants.
4.4 Empirical Strategy
The goal here is to estimate the baseline implementation in model 4.2:
lnYit =  +  lnCoal Transportit + INSTit + c + t + it (4.2)
where GDP per capita Y of region i at year t is regressed on my measure of
coal transport costs (Coal Transport), and institutions (INST ). The terms 
and  are, respectively, country and year xed eects. By the start of the period,
Europe's regions had formed national units. Using region xed eects allows
me to control for region-specic, time-invariant characteristics like rst-nature
geography or a region's national institutional context. According to the popular
`executive constraints' measure, these changed very little between 1870 and 1910:
no change for Austria-Hungary, France, Spain, Sweden, and Britain; and a one
point improvement for Germany from 1900 to 1910, and a two point improvement
for Italy between 1870 and 1900 INSCR (2012).1 Region xed eects allow me to
econometrically exploit spatial variation within regions, ltering out confounding
variation. The year xed eects term controls for shocks common to all regions,
but specic to certain years. In practice, these were rare, but it controls for the
fact that both Y and INST are variables that were trending up with time, while
Coal Transport was trending down.2 The main issue with model 4.2 is, however,
the threat of endogeneity between income and institutions. This would result in
1\Executive constraints" measures the degree of constraints on a country's political execu-
tive. It ranges from zero to seven, with seven being the greatest degree of constraints. Its use
in recent years has been popularised by Acemoglu et al. (2001).
2On common shocks, there were no major climatic events that aected my sample. The
\Long Depression" of 1873 to 1896 misses my benchmark years. The numerous conicts aris-
ing mainly in southern and eastern Europe were bilateral or civil in nature, for example, the
Albanian Revolt of 1910, the 1897 Greco-Turkish War or the 1872 to 1876 Third Carlist War.
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a positive bias for INST - or the institutional explanation.
4.4.1 Identifying the institutions
Chang (2010) outlines three channels through which incomes can drive insti-
tutional development. First, higher incomes may lead to higher demands for
higher-quality institutions (for example, demands for institutions with greater
transparency). Second, higher incomes make better or more ecient institutions
more aordable, as functioning institutions are costly to establish and run. Third,
development creates new agents of change who demand new institutions. In the
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the working class' growing power led to
the rise of the welfare state and proactive labour laws, for example. Chang (2010,
fn. 3), in a footnote, writes that these channels are largely ignored by the empir-
ical literature with Acemoglu et al. (2001) being a `partial exception.' \Partial"
because the authors recognise the channels of reverse causality on a conceptual
level, but `go on to conclude, through the use of an instrumental variable, that
empirically the causality basically runs from institutions to development.'
While his conceptual critique is robust, Chang (2010) is weaker on the empiri-
cal problems and on suggestions. He does not say precisely what the issue with an
instrumental variable approach is. An instrumental variable (IV) approach does
not totally disregard the two-way relationship, but decomposes it into plausibly
exogenous and endogenous variation. Even Chang (2010) admits that some of the
variation in development is accounted for by variation in institutions, and that
\some" is what gets us one step closer to understanding the causal relationship.
Like all econometric estimations, we must interpret it with caution.
The Habsburg Division of 1521
Looking into the patterns of INST gives us an idea of what IV should be used.
Table 4.5, which summarises the INST data, shows that the lowest INST values,
that is the least ecient institutions, were found in Spain and Italy, with Austria-
Hungary much closer to the leaders, but still a laggard. These are the only three
countries whose regional mean INST values are below the sample mean. What
do these countries have in common? They range from the western to eastern-most
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extremes of my sample, and are separated rst by France and then by Germany.
Simple geographical variables often captured with climate, latitude or longitude
do not work here (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik, 2004). While Spain and Italy
were both predominantly Catholic countries, Austria-Hungary was home to a
large population of Protestants, following the Reformation Berend (2013). Other
important cultural variables, like language, were dierent across and even within
the countries (Schulze and Wolf, 2012).
Table 4.5: INST summary statistics
Country Mean Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation
Austria-Hungary 0.768 1 0.193 0.133
Britain 0.785 0.933 0.301 0.179
France 0.847 1 0.347 0.157
Germany 0.946 1 0.693 0.050
Italy 0.445 0.881 0.136 0.208
Spain 0.471 0.838 0.163 0.182
Sweden 0.897 0.957 0.810 0.033
Sample 0.789 1 0.136 0.212
Notes: INST gures of regional institutional eciency, where a value of one marks the
frontier.
What these countries did have in common was a Habsburg legacy. Until 1700,
before the War of the Spanish Succession, the Habsburg direct-rule dominions -
rather than titular sovereignties or vassal states - within Europe included all of
Spain, Milan (Lombardy), Sardinia, Sicily and southern Italy, along with the
Austrian Habsburg lands.1 These are the regions, and not just countries, which
are aicted with the lowest INST scores in my sample.
Two-sample T-tests of Habsburg direct-rule versus all other regions reject the
null of equal INST variances with a T-statistic of 7.83 in 1870, 13.85 in 1900,
and 13.76 in 1910. The number of Habsburg direct-rule regions is 39 versus 160
all other regions. The degrees of freedom equals 197. The dierence in means in
1Ceaseless inbreeding meant the Habsburg line died out by the late-seventeenth century.
The last Habsburg king, Charles II, designated Philip of Anjou, the grandson of sun-king Louis
XIV, as his successor. Fearing a dynastic unication of France and Spain, and a change in
Europe's balance of power, the Grand Alliance (consisting, at various times, of Austria, Bavaria,
Brandenburg, the Dutch Republic, England, the Holy Roman Empire, Ireland, the Palatinate
of the Rhine, Portugal, Savoy, Saxony, Scotland, Spain and Sweden) intervened. The War was
concluded with the treaties of Utrecht (1713) and Rastatt (1714), which put the Bourbon Philip
V in place as King of Spain, but removed him from the French line of succession.
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1870 is 0.291 (standard error of 0.037); 0.347 (0.025) in 1900; and 0.297 (0.022)
in 1910.
Given their shared Habsburg legacy, why are INST scores so much higher
in Austria-Hungary than in Italy and Spain? On April 21, 1521 King Charles
I of Spain (or Emperor Charles V) assigned the Habsburg's Austro-Hungarian
possessions to his brother, Ferdinand I. Habsurg Europe thus split into a Spanish
branch and an Austrian branch. The rst branch ruled over Spain (Castille and
Aragon), Sardinia, Sicily, Milan, and southern Italy, along with nominal rule of
out-of-sample Flanders. The Austrian branch ruled over the Austrian regions,
including Bohemia, and de jure presided over Transylvania and the Holy Roman
Empire, which was to become the German Empire. In reality, the Holy Roman
Empire was a very diverse collection of de facto princely states. Parts of Hungary
remained under Ottoman rule. Figure 4.8 shows the geographical extent of this
division before the War of Spanish Succession.
Two-sample T-tests of Spanish-branch Habsburg regions versus all other re-
gions reject the null of equal INST variances with a T-statistic of 8.12 in 1870,
11.47 in 1900, and 8.86 in 1910. the number of Spanish-branch Habsburg regions
is 24 versus 175 all other regions. The degrees of freedom is 197. The dierence
in means in 1870 is 0.319 (standard error of 0.039); 0.265 (0.023) in 1900; and
0.169 (0.019) in 1910. The next question is why.
Mechanisms: `The laws and statutes of a nation are inherited disease'1
Why were Spanish Habsburg institutions less ecient and why did their inef-
ciency persist until at least 1910? Taking the last point rst, historians have
long appreciated that `the legacy of the past posed a heavy burden on the present'
(Berend, 2013, p. 320). A number of recent studies have empirically identied in-
stitutional persistence over long periods (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Tabellini, 2010).
In a relevant example, Becker et al. (2011a, p. 1) show that the institutions of
the Austrian Habsburg Empire, which collapsed in 1918, `still [aect] trust and
corruption in local public services in Central and Eastern Europe today.' They
1In the words of Goethe's Mephisto, `The laws and statutes of a nation/Are an inherited
disease/From generation unto generation/And place to place they drag on by degrees.'(Goethe,
J.W. von, 1961, p. 203)
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Figure 4.8: Spanish and Austrian Habsburg branches
Notes: This map is imprecise since branches were allocated to regions in their 1913 borders:
if a region was for the most part under the rule of one of the branches before 1700, it was
coded as belonging to that branch. The sources consulted were: Berenger (1994); Luebke
(2014); Palmer et al. (2002); William Ward et al. (1912).
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argue that the eects of long-gone formal institutions move through the channels
of current cultural norms, values, beliefs, and formal institutions. Emperor Franz
Joseph, for example, was known to start his day early, and expected to able to
contact his civil servants equally early. In the Czech Republic today, public oces
still generally open at seven in the morning (Becker et al., 2011a, p. 8). Using
data from the Life in Transition Survey, the authors nd that respondents from
previously Habsburg-ruled areas were more likely to have higher levels of trust in
courts and the police, and are less likely to pay bribes. This was a legacy of the
trustworthy institutions that came before. As Taylor (1948, p. 44) wrote of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, `the Austrian bureaucracy was fairly honest,
quite hard-working, and generally high-minded, it probably did more good than
harm.'
The institutions Taylor (1948) discusses and Becker et al. (2011a) analyse have
their roots in the sixteenth century. Once Ferdinand I was given reign over the
eastern dominions, he immediately sought to establish a common administration
and royal authority over what was a fragmented territory. Predictably, he clashed
with the kings and princes who came before him; who enjoyed `personal privi-
leges...and...public liberties, and a long period of omnipotence' Berenger (1994,
p. 162). Intelligent and resolute, unlike his proigate brother, Ferdinand I tack-
led these problems of re-organisation, created a central government, established
order in particularly unruly regions like Bohemia, harmonised legal and nancial
systems, and reduced the Diet's power. By royal decree on 1 January 1527, the
central government now consisted of an Aulic Council (a supreme court), Privy
Council, a Post Master (a state postal service), a court chancellery and a cham-
ber of accounts (a forebearer to a ministry of nance). As Berenger (1994, p.
162) wrote, `jurisdiction extended over the whole monarchy, without distinction
between countries and particular privileges.'
Similar changes during this period were happening in the rest of my European
sample, excluding the Spanish Habsburg regions. Even a brief overview of these
widely discussed changes provides a contrast to the Spanish Habsburg regions.1
In Britain, the end of the conict between Parliament and th Stuarts in 1689
1See Craig and Fisher (1997) for a useful overview of European political integration in the
nineteenth century.
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led to two signicant events in econonic history. First, the perpetuation of Parlia-
ment's right to approve new taxes. Second, the establishment of a consitutional
monarchy, which delineated the interests and responsbilities of the monarch,
whose survival depended on the recognition of the Parliament. Rules were now
made by a body - Parliament - whose `interests were best served by private
property and elimination of crown monoploies' (North, 1981, p. 156). This insti-
tutional set-up guaranteed the property rights of a new commercial class, which
in turn invested its nances and human capital in industry, trade, and education.
Fiscal consolidation followed the growing tax base, giving the country institutions,
like the Bank of England (founded in 1694), which persist to this day.
France made no move towards a constitutional monarchy. Through marriage
and conquest, the Bourbons came to control the entire country in 1589, which was
previously divided among Brittany, Anjou, Bourbon, Valois, and Burgundy. The
Bourbons nanced their wars and conquests through local monopolies enforced
by guilds in return for taxes. The oces responsible for the collection, disburse-
ment, and borrowing of revenues were all up for sale. Though unthinkable by
contemporary standards, this consolidated the French state very early on and
created an eective bureaucracy. Some economic historians refer to the period as
`the beautiful sixteenth century' (Goubert, 2002). The well-documented political
and social upheaval that marked the end to the Bourbon reign ushered in, start-
ing around 1792, important institutional change: `the imposition of the civil legal
code, the abolition of guilds and the remnants of feudalism, the introduction of
equality before the law, and the undermining of aristocratic privileges' (Acemoglu
et al., 2011, p. 3286).
Germany was the last to take its modern form. The Catholic-Protestant
divided in the Holy Roman Empire during the Reformation delayed the coun-
try's political integration. Much of what became Germany was under the titular
sovereignty of the ecient Austrian Habsburgs by 1555. In that year, Ferdinand
I signed the Peace of Augsburg, which sanctioned the defeat of his brother's ag-
gressively intolerant (anti-Protestant) religious policy. In contrast to his brother's
rule, Ferdinand I, much like he did in the Austrian dominions, sought a compro-
mise between the various stakeholders: Catholics, Lutherans and Protestants. He
allowed the hundreds of princes to make their own religious policy (Cuius regio,
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eius religio), and dene the religious confession of their territories. He also recog-
nised the secular status of ecclesiastical property secularised before 1552. This
overall peace was interrupted by the Thirty-Years War, which ended in 1648, and
was the worst of the religious conicts. Costly in economic and human terms,
it split Germany into more than 300 principalities that would take another 200
years to mould together. Starting in the eighteenth century, the unlikely Hohen-
zollerns, the ruling House of the Electorate of (then peripheral) Brandenburg,
became a force for German integration. Between 1720 and 1772, they conquered
West Pomerania, West Prussia, and Silesia, along with many other territories.
A consolidated system of excise taxes, evenly distributed across income classes,
helped fund their wars. A series of customs unions, of which the Prussian Cus-
toms Union (1828) was the rst and the Zollverein (1834) the most decisive, set
Germany on the path to coherent state.
Sweden between 1387 and 1523 was part of the Kalmar Union of Norway,
Denmark, and Sweden. In 1523, Gustavus Vasa (a Swedish noble, and top ad-
ministrator of the joint kingdom) took Sweden out of the Union, `and began a
series of adventures in Scandinavia and on the Continent that brought Sweden to
a 200-year reign as the most powerful economic and military force in the Baltic'
(Craig and Fisher, 1997, p. 30). While it gained and lost territories during the
Thirty Years War, where it allied with France despite being Protestant, its sovere-
inty was never under threat. Indeed, even by 1611 Sweden passed a royal charter
that limited the powers of the King. The country can claim the world's rst cen-
tral bank - the Riksbank, founded in 1668 - and thanks the famous Church Law
of 1686, `had the most educated population in the whole of Europe' (Craig and
Fisher, 1997, p. 31). According to Sandberg (1979, p. 229) `this statute made
the [Lutheran] parish priests responsible for assuring that every young person in
their charge learned to read the Gospel and other specied religious works, and
even to write.' Helpfully, the Swedish clergy was numerous, university-trained,
and reached large areas of the peasantry.
By contrast, the Spanish Habsburg regions did not enjoy the same institutional
changes - even though some were half-measures or took rocky paths to completion
- as did the Austrians, and other Europeans discussed above.1 Their ruler, Charles
1 Grafe and Irigoin (2006, p. 41), who throw a more benign light on the Spanish Empire,
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I, had an `aristocratic...and medieval conception of patrimony...and...matters of
government and matters of family for him were closely connected' (Berenger, 1994,
pp. 140-4). It is with this mind-set that he approached governing Spain and much
of Italy. Berenger (1994, p. 145) gives evidence of hindered institutional advance
in Spain through tax revenues, which in 1523 were ve per cent of what they were
in France. Further, Spanish revenues showed no real increase from 1504. Charles I
was nancing his wars with France, as he spent money on little else, through credit
from German, Genoese and Antwerp bankers. The uncontrolled accumulation
debt throughout Habsburg Spain is a clear indicator of weak institutions, with
clear contemporary parallels of Spanish public debt proigacy (de Grauwe, 2010).
In sum, Charles I proved to be an incapable ruler, retiring some 30 years after
the 1521 Habsburg division to a Hieronymite monastery in Extremadura, Spain.
Control of the Spanish Habsburg regions was then assumed by the infamous serial
defaulter Philip II (Drelichman and Voth, 2011).
We can see more institutional decay quite dramatically in the Spanish In-
quisition, which Philip II greatly expanded in the mid to late-sixteenth century,
making Church orthodoxy a goal of public policy. Following this, we see the
expulsion of the industrious Moriscos, contrasting greatly with the societal trust
between citizens and their public institutions found in the Austrian dominions
(Becker et al., 2011a). Indeed, attempts at reforming Spain's bloated and ine-
cient bureaucracy running through to the mid seventeenth century were met with
staunch resistance (Elliott, 2009). Phillip II also continued his father's legacy of
plundering the state to nance unsuccessful wars, accumulating `towering debts
while stopping all payments to his lenders four times' (Drelichman and Voth, 2011,
p. 1205). Pointing to inecient and ineective rule, historians locate Spain's long
decline between the late-sixteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries (Elliott, 1961;
Hamilton, 1938; Thompson and Yun, 1994).
Some interesting variation comes from the prosperous state of Milan (what
became Lombardy), which the Spanish Habsburgs also ruled over. We nor-
mally think of Lombardy as a developed region not just of Italy, but of Europe.
still show that even in Latin America the `Spanish [Habsburg] path to the formation of an
empire turned out to be a poor basis for state formation and institution building in the post-
independence period.'
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While under Spanish rule, Lombardy managed a mean INST score of 0.738:
respectable, but still below the sample mean in table 4.5. As Tabellini (2010)
documents, even though Charles I had taken over with a new constitution, this
legislation was drafted by Lombard jurists on the basis of local legal traditions.
The Spanish Habsburgs were in eect `caretakers' of local traditions (Tabellini,
2010, p. 42). The Lombard Senate had, in the words of Tabellini (2010, p. 42)
`strong powers in implementing the law and the king's pardons, and was able to
exert strong inuence on the whole legislation. The senate often refused to im-
plement the Governor's deliberations, appealing against them to the king's nal
decision.' The de jure rule of Spanish Habsburgs and de facto rule of the Lom-
bard Senate explains the below-mean, but not disastrous, institutional eciency
of this region.
The remaining parts of Habsburg Italy were not so fortunate. Tabellini (2010,
p. 45) describes them simply as `absolutist and autocratic,' giving them the lowest
rank in his institutional scoring system. Berend (2013, p. 319) writes that even
the reforms that came with Italy's Risorgimento in the 1860s could be described
as `a failed revolution' of `pseudo-reforms' and `spurious changes.'
Given the historical institutional dierences between Spanish Habsburg re-
gions and others, and given the persistence of institutions, I dene my IV SH
as SHi = f1 if ever under Spanish Habsburg rule 0 otherwiseg. Following this
denition, SH = 1 for 24 (17 Spanish and seven Italian regions) of my 199 re-
gions, that is, 12 per cent of the sample. It is unlikely that SH breaks the
exclusion restriction. Spanish Habsburg regions show no obvious geographical
pattern (latitude or longitude), with regions in the western-most of my sample;
southern Italy, and northern-most Italy. These regions show no co-location pat-
terns with natural resources either, as a look back at map 4.5 shows. Neither am
I simply identifying regions of low per capita income levels, since the lowest were
in Austria-Hungary and, for example, Lombardy enjoyed high income levels. Re-
ligion, or Catholicism, is the only semi-palusible candidate. SH regions were all
Catholic. But then so were a number of high-income ecient-institution German
regions, and so was France. Secondly and more fundamentally, it is dicult to
conceptually disentangle religion from public institutions in an era of divine right
monarchs, Papal States, Holy Empires, and people like Cardinal Richelieu. We
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should not enforce a separation of powers if one did not exist.
There is one nal necessary adjustment. As it stands SH is time-invariant,
making incompatible with my regional xed eects implementation. To intro-
duce variation over time, as well as place, in the legacy of Spanish Habsburg rule
I interacted the SH dummy variable with the inverse number of years from the
Habsburg Division until each benchmark year in the sample. Put together, the
components measure the idea that regions under Spanish Habsburg rule needed
more time to recover from their institutional legacy.
The empirical implementation
The correlation between SH and INST is -0.456, signicant at one per cent.
Regressing INST on SH gives a coecient of -0.001, signicant at one per cent,
with an R2 of 0.21. The reduced form estimation - regressing lnY on SH -
gives a coecient of -0.001, signicant at one per cent, with an R2 of 0.19. The
conceptual as well as empirical basis for SH has been set out, so my IV estimation
strategy is as follows:
lnYit =  +  lnCoal Transportit + \INSTit + c + t + it (4.3)
INSTit =  +  lnCoal Transportit +?SHi + c + t + it (4.4)
where inthe rst stage (model 4.4) SH instruments INST . In the second stage
(model 4.3), the predicted values, \INST , are used to explain GDP per capita,
along with Coal Transport. This specication represents the clearest framework
for estimating the respective eects of coal access and regional institutions. It is
general, straightforward, and treats both variables symmetrically, giving either
one an equal chance.
4.4.2 Results
In column (1) of table 4.6, both coecients enter with their expected signs. The
more costly it is for coal to reach a region, the lower its per capita income. While
highly statistically signicant, the eect is small, with a 10 per cent increase
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in cost leading to a two per cent decrease in income. In contrast, the eect of
INST is both large and statistically signicant. A 10 per cent increase in a
region's INST score results in a 23 per cent increase in its per capita income
level. As a proportion of the sample mean income level, this eect equals $607,
which is greater than Galicia's (Spain) income in 1870.
In column (2) I swap the cost to coal measure for the simple distance to
coal measure. The latter is correctly signed, but insignicant. INST remains
signicant and in the same order of magnitude. Column (3) introduces year xed
eects. Here the magnitude of INST drops substantial to 0.203 from 0.817 in
column (1). Further, the cost to coal measure has been rendered insignicant.
One interpretation of the insignicance of Coal Transport is that the need to
be near coal declined dramatically towards 1910, and this decline is not fully
captured by the transport cost measure, but is captured by the year xed eects
(which are statistically signicant). In column (4), I introduce region xed eects.
The size of INST increase slightly to 0.297, and remains statistically signicant.
The coecient on Coal Transport remains insignicant.
While statistically signicant in the xed OLS estimations, INST has modest
eect on regional per capita income levels. Is INST robust to an IV estimation?
Table 4.6: Coal and Institutions OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnY lnY lnY lnY
lnCoal Transport -0.189*** -0.028 0.000
(0.034) (0.028) (0.044)
INST 0.817*** 0.920*** 0.203*** 0.297***
(0.053) (0.048) (0.046) (0.048)
lnCoal Distance -0.009
(0.027)
Year F.E. No No Yes Yes
Region F.E. No No No Yes
R^2 0.393 0.263 0.868 0.866
N 597 597 597 597
Notes: *** denotes signicance at one per cent. Robust standard errors clustered on regions,
and reported in brackets. Y is GDP per capita; INST is a measure of regional institutional
eciency; and Coal Distance is distance to nearest coal deposit; Coal Transport is trans-
port cost to nearest coal deposit.
Column (1) in table 4.7 shows the reduced form estimation, where GDP per
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capita is regressed on the IV SH, controlling for Coal Transport and region and
year xed eects. The highly signicant and negative coecient on SH provides
support for its use as an instrument. The coecient on Coal Transport, as in
the rst of the OLS estimates, is signicant. The rst stage results in column (2)
show that SH has a large negative eect on INST , even when controlling for
xed eects and Coal Transport, which itself has no eect on INST .
Given the estimates in columns (1) and (2), it is perhaps unsurprising that
SH passes an (Angrist-Pischke) excluded-IV F-test and an (Anderson) under-
idenication test. The second stage results in column (4) show, again, that
Coal Transport is insignicant. We can also see that correctly identifying INST
yields a larger, but less signicant, coecient in comparison to the OLS estimate
in column (4). The IV estimate implies that a 10 per cent increase in a region's
institutional eciency results in a 15 per cent increase in its per capita income
level; compared to 23 per cent for the OLS estimate.
One important thing to keep in mind on the institutional eect is that while
the potential gains of improving institutional eciency may have been large, it
does not mean they were realised. The transition probability of a region's insti-
tutional eciency going from the 25th percentile to the 50th percentile between
1870 and 1900 was 20 per cent; from the 50th to the 75th it was 22.5 per cent.
Between 1900 and 1910, a much shorter period, those same probabilities were
zero per cent (that is, no region's institutional eciency went from the 25th to
50th percentile) and 20.4 per cent. In both periods, most regions stayed where
they were. Some 68 per cent of the regions in the 25th percentile in 1870 remained
in the 25th percentile by 1900. Even more strikingly, 96 per cent of the regions in
the 25th percentile in 1900 remained in this percentile in 1910. If frequencies of
transitions indicate the ease of that transition, then these gures would show us
that income gains from improvements in institutional eciency, although strong,
were unlikely.
While it might be dicult to have full condence in the point estimates of
INST , the results in tables 4.6 and 4.7 do show that institutional eciency
mattered for regional per capita income levels. On the other hand, access to coal,
whether measured by geodesic distance or transport costs, did not matter. A
closer look at history, and indeed the basic correlations in gures 4.4 and 4.5,
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Table 4.7: Coal and institutions IV estimates
(3) (4)
OLS IV-2
lnY lnY
INST 0.297*** 0.408*
(0.045) (0.222)
lnCoal Transport 0.000 -0.007
(0.045) (0.034)
Year F.E. Yes Yes
Region F.E. Yes Yes
R^2 0.867 0.650
N 597 597
Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-test 12.56
Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic 12.28
(1) (2)
RF IV-1
lnY INST
SH -0.001*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000)
lnCoal Transport -0.278*** -0.027
(0.032) (0.034)
Year F.E. Yes Yes
Region F.E. Yes Yes
R^2 0.653 0.551
N 597 597
Notes: *** denotes signicance at one per cent; ** at ve per cent; and * at 10 per cent.
Robust standard errors clustered on regions, and reported in brackets. Angrist-Pischke mul-
tivariate F-test is on the excluded instrument, SH (Spanish Habsburg Regions). Anderson
canon. corr. LM statistic is for under-identication. Y is GDP per capita; INST is a mea-
sure of regional institutional eciency; and and Coal Distance is distance to nearest coal
deposit; Coal Transport is transport cost to nearest coal deposit. Column [1] is the reduced
form estimation; [2] is the rst stage; [3] is the OLS estimation; and [4] is the second stage.
Mark Schaer at Heriot-Watt University supplied the Stata code for this estimation.
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shows that this should not be much of a surprise.
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4.5 Discussion
There are at least three reasons that can explain coal's insignicance in this
context. First, transport costs declined so much over the period that they ceased
to be important, especially relative to other costs (Jevons, 1915; Wright, 1990).
Second, for regions that did not have access to coal, energy substitutes existed
(Simpson, 1997). Third, technological advances in industrial production lowered
the price of coal relative to other inputs (Simpson, 1997).
Taking the last point rst, Simpson (1997) reminds us that the Bessemer pro-
cess - the rst technique for the mass-production of steel from pig iron, patented
in 1855 by Henry Bessemer - favoured locating industry near iron ore rather than
coal deposits. The process, by heating iron ore more eciently allowed for `a
dramatic reduction in costs' of coal inputs (Strassman, 1959, p. 343). It also
increased the value of iron ore deposits, which were previously used to produce
iron only. The Basque region (Spain) `enjoyed Europe's best resources of high
grade non-phosphoric [iron] ore' (Simpson, 1997, p. 353). It had, however, poor
access to coal: Bilbao, the main centre, was 209 kilometers from the nearest de-
posit versus the sample mean of 181 kilometers. Once the Bessmer process took
hold commercially, in the late-nineteenth century, the Basque region developed
an international comparative advantage in iron, exporting a quarter of its output
between 1881 and 1910 (Simpson, 1997, p. 353). The same is true of Spain's
other auent, iron-producing region Catalonia, which is also coal-free.
Figure 4.9 shows the correlation between regional GDP per capita and regions'
distances to their nearest iron ore deposits, from the same USGS (2013) source.
The strong negative correlation is immediately clear, but what is important here
is that the correlation is stronger than that of GDP per capita and distance
to coal, as in gure 4.4. Here we have an R2 of 0.147 versus 0.005 for coal-
distance, and a T-statistic of -10.13 versus -1.78. While the eect of iron-distance
ultimately washes out in the same way as coal in the models I used throughout
this chapter (see Appendix B for some empirical tests), it does seem unusual that
the recent literature has focused on coal when iron is more likely to provide a
better explanation for the location of industry. This is a point not missed by
an earlier generation of economic historians. Landes (1965, p. 456-7) relates the
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Figure 4.9: Iron ore and income correlation
Notes: Values on y-axis are log GDP per capita. Iron Distance is the geodesic distance in
kilometers to the nearest iron ore deposit. Includes full sample. For sources, see text.
`industrial map of Europe' in 1870 to deposits of iron ore - but more recently
attention has shifted almost exclusively to coal.
The second point seems to hold some power, given the results in tables 4.6
and 4.7. There is some more evidence I have to back up the idea that coal
transport costs, or access costs broadly conceived, faded into signicance over
the late-nineteenth century. First, Jevons (1915) documents a rapid growth in
Britain's coal exports to coal-poor areas over the late-nineteenth century.1 While
greater export demand may reect a better ability to pay for coal in industrialising
Europe, the rate of growth, as can be seen in table 4.8, would be inconsistent with
prohibitive or even high transport costs. By 1912, Britain controlled 70.8 per
cent of the world's sea-borne coal trade (Jevons, 1915, p. 681). Other coal-rich
countries were also exporting coal, however: in 1912, Germany exported 10.36
million tons (four million in 1906) and Belgium, 1.28 million tons (0.69 million in
1906) (Jevons, 1915, p. 681).
The primary reason for this growth cited by Jevons (1915, p. 691) is `the
wonderful fall of freight rates [which] far exceeds the reduction in the cost of
railway transport, or in the price of any of the staple commodities of trade.'
1This is not the same\Jevons"as Jevons (1865) of `The Coal Question' fame. Jevons (1915)
is a far better resource for economic historians.
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Table 4.8: Britain's coal exports ('000 tons)
Importers 1887 1912
Baltic and North Sea 7,296 25,271
France and Mediterranean 11,814 31,132
Brazil, Argentine, Uruguay, and Paraguay 1,203 5,879
North and South America and Pacic Coasts 300 575
Notes: From Jevons (1915, p. 683).
The \transport revolution" durinsg this period is understood well by economic
historians (O'Rourke and Williamson, 1999). It was also recognised quite clearly
by contemporaries. Declining freight rates, according to Jevons (1915, p. 691),
...resulted from the manifold improvements in steam navigation...Vessels
have been built of steel, and much larger, and with engines more eco-
nomical in fuel consumption; so that both the initial cost [terminal
cost] and the cost of running per ton of carrying capacity [variable
cost] have been greatly reduced.
He goes on to explain that while the carrying capacity of ships increases as the
cube of their dimensions (lenght or width), the resistance to water increases ap-
proximately only as the square of such dimension. This makes for savings in fuel.
Further, the navigating sta increases much less proportionally with the size of
a ship. A large steamship can carry much more coal than a small one, and only
needs a few, if any, additional ocers. Jevons (1915, pp. 692-3) provides a table
of `outward freight rates from Cardi [a major coal exporting city] to represen-
tative foreign ports.' I decimalised the gures, deated them into 1910 pound
sterling, and plotted them in gure 4.10.
As gure 4.10 makes clear, the decline in coal freight rates was universal and
fast. The start of the period is characterised by a wide dispersion in freight rates,
with all rates at an elevated level. The lowest rate in 1864, for Bordeaux (France)
at $1.50 per ton, dropped to less than $0.50 by 1912. Even more dramatic was
the decline in rates for destinations that pre-Suez had to be reached via the Cape.
Singapore's rate dropped from $4.50 in 1864 to around $0.50 in 1912, and Bom-
bay's from $4.25 to $1.00, as the nautical distances to these locations dropped
by 29 per cent and 41 per cent, respectively. This reduction in intercontinental
transport costs should put the debate on coal access in Continental Europe in
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Figure 4.10: Coal freight rates from Cardi
Notes: Values on y-axis are 1910 $per ton of coal. Data, including nautical miles in
brackets, from Jevons (1915, pp. 692-3). Decimalisation: 12 pennies per shilling, and 240
pennies per pound. The numbers for Bordeaux are given in francs, which were converted
using Global Financial Data (2014). London and Paris consumer price indices from Allen
(2001).
perspective. The average distance between regional nodes and coal deposits is
113 miles (98 nautical miles).
The eects of this drop in transport costs can be seen in the unusually de-
tailed German data on domestically produced versus imported coal prices - which
include tari costs - from the Die Grosshandelspreise in Deutschland von 1792
bis 1934 (Jacobs and Richter, 1935).1 The spread or imported and domestic coal
prices, displayed in gure 4.11, went from an average of $1.00 between 1850 and
1860 to $0.13 by 1913. That is, Germans were paying a premium of 13 pennies
per ton for imported coal. This number represents 21 per cent of the price of a ton
of coal in 1913. This is a much lower gure than that given by Mokyr (1983, p.
152-8) (quoted in Fernihough and O'Rourke (2014)) for Ireland's import-premium
on British coal of between 100 and 150 per cent. Further, Mokyr (1983)s writes
that fuel costs in `nonmetallurgical industries' were at most four per cent of total
costs, implying that Irish costs were pushed up by at most 10 per cent relative to
British costs. This brings us to Jevons's second reason for the growth in the coal
trade.
1Alexis Wegerich at the University of Oxford kindly supplied these data.
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Figure 4.11: German imported and domesitc coal price spread
Notes: Values on y-axis represent the dierence in $between imported and domestically pro-
duced coal. Data from Jacobs and Richter (1935). The underlying numbers were converted
from American dollars into pound sterling using Global Financial Data (2014), and refer
to the price per ton of coal. Alexis Wegerich at the University of Oxford kindly shared these
data.
As `the peoples of Europe have gradually become more wealthy, so have they
been able to purchase more coal for domestic as well as industrial purposes'
(Jevons, 1915, p. 690). As the cost of producing and transporting coal declined,
the purchasing power of Europeans rose. The expenditure proportion of fuel costs
dropped. Further, this also matters because, as Allen (2006, p. 10) summarises
the argument against his case, `...businesses are only concerned about costs in
toto-and not about labor costs or energy costs in particular-so all cost reductions
are equally welcome.' While businesses in coal-poor regions in, say, Spain or Hun-
gary paid a premium on coal, they enjoyed lower input costs elsewhere, especially
with labour. Further, there are substitution possibilities to consider.
Simpson (1997, p. 353) tells us that in Spain, for example, the
...cotton textile industry...adapted to high coal prices, with the im-
provement in turbine technology allowing the industry to relocate away
from Barcelona's coastal plain [where imported coal arrived] to the
mountainous interior [where rivers owed fastest] after 1860. By
1914, about 80 per cent of its spindles were water driven, and the hy-
draulic energy used was equivalent to roughly a quarter of Barcelona's
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coal imports.
Similarly, Zamagni (1993, p. 92) writes that in Italy, a virtually coal-free country,
by 1913 coal was rarely used in `industrial processes.' According to her gures,
`only 20 per cent of industrial energy took the form of [coal-powered] steam power,
a further 22 per cent was hydraulic, whereas 48 per cent was...generated by electric
motors, which made it possible to decentralise factories and workshops...'
For the 1870 to 1910 period at least, the empirical and historical case for a
coal based explanation of European regional income is weak. We have to consider
costs of accessing coal, and those costs relative to other inputs, the presence of
potential more valuable endowments like iron, and of substitutes like rivers and
water power. Furthermore, in some cases, as in northern Britain and central
Germany, coal might have been the primary reason for industrial location, but
high income did not necessarily need coal: think of London and Brandenburg.
That institutions trump coal in my empirical results also tell us something about
coal's second-order nature.
Spain had numerous coal deposits, as gure 4.5 shows. But as the discussion
surrounding 4.5 shows, it also had weak institutions. Indeed, Berend (2013, p.
318) writes of `a medieval mining law [that] impeded the extraction of Spain's
highly abundant natural resources.' When this law was modied in 1825, it
was `deemed that all of the country's natural resources belonged to the crown -
thus assuring that all landowners would have no interest in exploring for natural
resources on their properties.' With the Spanish Liberal Mining Act of 1868,
nationals and foreigners were allowed to obtain mining rights `as perpetual con-
cessionaires by paying royalties to the State' (Lieberman, 2013, p. 126). The
rst law outright prevented resource extraction, and the modied versions cre-
ated monopolies and ensured that large gains go to the crown - hardly what we
would call institutional eciency.
Institutions do not only determine whether a natural resource is exploited.
They determine per capita income in their own right, and they do so on a subna-
tional scale. While European economic history has only just started dealing with
these issues empirically, Latin America has provided fertile ground for research
into subnational institutions and their economic eects. Dell (2010), for exam-
ple, examines the long-run eects of the mita, an extensive forced mining labour
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system used in colonial Peru and Bolivia. She nds that the mita eect lowers
household consumption by 32 per cent in subjected districts today. Dell (2010)
traces this to the fact that mita districts historically had fewer large landowners
and lower educational attainment. Today these same districts are poorly inte-
grated into road networks and their residents are more likely to be subsistence
farmers. Acemoglu et al. (2008) nd a negative association between political in-
equality in nineteenth century Cundinamarca, Colombia (measured by the lack of
turnover mof mayors in the municipalities) and economic outcomes today. They
argue, in line with Dell (2010), that the availability of local (subnational) public
goods is an important intervening channel. Naritomi et al. (2012) obtain similar
results for Brazil.
As Acemoglu and Dell (2010) summarise, the recurring theme in this line of
research - what they refer to as\local institutions"and current economic outcomes
- is an attempt to isolate a source of historical exogenous variation in future insti-
tutions. My attempt at this was to use institutional legacies from the sixteenth
century. If it stands up to future research, then the implication is that the 1521
Habsburg Division has had important implications for regional income dieren-
tials in Europe. Historians have long traced patterns of European development
far back time. Berend (2013, p. 324) writes that `the long survival of the acien
regime [broadly conceived] was accompanied by a lack of education, and mass
illiteracy.' Berend gives some gures on southern Italy and Spain, inheritors of
the Spanish Habsburg institutions, showing that illiteracy was generally high in
Italy (75 to 80 per cent in 1890), but `much higher in the south of the country.'
In Spain, Berend (2013, p. 324) writes, `secular and scientic thinking' was `sup-
pressed' - `an oppressive legacy of the Inquisition since the sixteenth century.' For
all its aws, an instrumental variable strategy species the long historical roots of
underdevelopment more clearly. This, as opposed to coal, appears to be a more
promising line of research, especially constructing new measures of subnational
institutions.
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Chapter 5
An Alternative Explanation:
Market Potential
5.1 Introduction
Can market potential explain Europe's late-ninteenth regional per capita income
structure? In Chapter 3, I outlined Europe's spatial income structure, which by
1910 concentrated in the northwest, relegating the rest of the Continent to the
economic periphery. In Chapter 4, I showed that, for most of Europe, the cost of
accessing coal deposits was not correlated with higher regional per capita income
levels, on account of the dramatic reductions in transport costs. In contrast, my
measure of regional institutions is signicantly correlated with per capita income
levels, indicating that in this period of state-formation regional de facto institu-
tions played a role in the location of economic activity. Still, these institutions
cannot fully account for Europe's spatial income structure or, more specically,
the northwestern clustering in regional per capita income.
In this chapter, I provide an alternative explanation; one that can account
for the spatial and temporal distribution of regional income and ts with the
broader historical context of falling barriers to trade. Since the pioneering work
of Krugman (1991), market potential has been used to empirically explain county-
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level wages in the late-twentieth century United States, regional income in late-
twentieth century Europe, and industrial location in interwar Poland, for example
(Hanson, 2005; Wolf, 2007). The basic idea is that the level of economic activity
(which can be measured by per capita income) in a region is conditioned by
that region's access to markets for its goods. Economies of scale and trade costs
- transport and tari costs - created demand linkages between regions which
contribute to agglomeration. Producers are drawn to economically active regions
by the prospect of serving their large markets at low trade costs. Congestion
costs, which come with higher property prices and labour costs, act to limit the
degree of geographical concentration.
A corollary of this argument is that when trade costs are very high or very
low, regional income levels will be dispersed. At very low costs, production would
not need to concentrate in a particular region: this would create congestion costs
that are greater than serving the regional market from a distance. At very high
costs, markets would be dispersed and production would focus on serving distinct
regional markets.
A further corollary is that even with perfect institutions everywhere, the in-
tegration of regional markets may lead to economic divergence. This is an im-
portant point in light of the Chapter 4 's nding that regional institutions have a
signicant eect on per capita incomes.
The market potential idea is based on Harris (1954), who argued that the
demand for goods produced in a region is the sum of purchasing power in sur-
rounding regions, weighted by trade costs to those regions. Since Harris (1954),
geographers have used the ad hoc formulation to successfully explain urban pat-
terns and income structures (Keeble et al., 1982). More recently, economists have
derived estimates of market potential from formal models of bilateral trade
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. First, I examine the neo-
mercantilist arguments put forward in the historiography. I then describe my
measures of market potential and the sources used, giving further details in Ap-
pendix C. I then set out my empirical strategy, which is geared towards uncovering
baseline eects of market potential on income, dierences between foreign and do-
mestic market potential, and whether the relationship is uniform across regions.
The nal section concludes with a discussion of the issues raised.
118
5.2 The Age of Neo-Mercantilism?
Pollard (1981, p. 252) described the 1870 to 1914 period as one of growing neo-
mercantilist tendencies among European states. He writes that the openness that
allowed for Europe's industrialisation running up to 1870 began to decline there-
after, as political authority became progressively more powerful. In his words,
...governmental actions increasingly came to disrupt the relatively
easy and free intercourse of commodities as well as factors of pro-
duction between nations on which the successful industrialisation of
Europe had so largely depended.
In particular, Pollard (1981) bases his characterisation on three dierent trends.
Firstly, there was growing nationalism across the Continent. As a force of action,
this was actually a positive trend: feudalism was destroyed; new institutions like
the Napoleonic Code introduced; and mass literacy, required for urban living
and factory work, was promoted by states. The reaction, however, was negative.
Russia, for example, deliberately held back Polish eorts at industrialisation, lest
they led to Polish independence. Secondly, as economies and the civil services
managing them grew, so did the opportunities for taxation. Greater tax revenues
were required to fund previously non-existent public services like sanitary and
safety interventions in working class areas and on sea vessels, education, and a
police force. Thirdly, industrialisation was concentrated in a small proportion
of northwestern regions, as we saw in Chapter 3. These industrial regions were
surrounded and outnumbered by agrarian regions which, given the growing fran-
chise and democratisation of political power, were able to push for protectionism,
particularly in agricultural goods and as a response to the inux of cheaper grain
from the US and Russia (O'Rourke, 1997).
Pollard (1981, p. 258) illustrated the practical eect of these trends through
import taris. German rates were initially moderate, around 10 to 15 per cent
of value on industrial goods and ve to seven on agricultural goods, but these
rate rose in 1885 and then again in 1887, by when the corn tari increased ve-
fold. In France, agricultural protection increased in 1885 and again in 1887, in
synch with Germany. The Meline Tari of 1892 made clear France's protection-
ism. Austria-Hungary implemented similar tari hikes starting 1878; while Italy,
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which was initially free-trade, became clearly projectionist especially in manufac-
tures by 1894.1
A salutary lesson in considering variables in isolation
While the historical argument for neo-mercantilism is appealing, and potentially
devastating to my own own market potential thesis where declining barriers to
trade is central, it relies on selective evidence. First, by looking at specic prod-
ucts or industries, the general trend, which is after all what Pollard (1981) seeks
to explain, is obscured. We cannot describe this period as neo-mercantilist by
looking at taris on industrial or agricultural goods in isolation. Issues arise with
the grouping of products and industries, and how well they are reected in trade
volumes and values. According to Pollard (1981, p. 259), the average ad val-
orem taris on industrial goods in circa 1914 were 13 per cent in Germany, 18
per cent in Italy and Austria-Hungary, and 20 per cent in France. The average
total ad valorem tari levels, calculated as total customs revenue over total im-
port value from Mitchell (2003), were 7.6 per cent in Germany, six per cent in
Austria-Hungary, 7.7 per cent in Italy, and 8.2 per cent in France. The general
tari level is less than half the specic industrial good levels reported in Pollard
(1981), and certainly lower the agricultural levels reported in O'Rourke (1997).
Secondly, rising taris would only matter if they aected consumers' and pro-
ducers' decisions. The assumption in Pollard (1981) is that they did but, as with
the cost of transporting coal discussed in the previous chapter, actors consider
costs in toto. Even if we do accept that general tari levels were rising or that
it is a country's specic tari structure that matters, as argued by Lehmann and
O'Rourke (2011), it does not necessarily imply that the overall costs of trading
were also rising. The historiography also makes clear that there was a trans-
port revolution underway during this same period (Berend, 2013; O'Rourke and
Williamson, 1999; Pollard, 1981). We can see the extensive growth of Europe's
transport network in gure 4.1 in the previous chapter. Indeed, O'Rourke and
Williamson (2000, p. 17) write that in the late nineteenth century `rising taris
were mainly a defensive response to the competitive winds of market integration
1O'Rourke (1997) provides a more detailed analysis of the agricultural tari hikes and their
eects.
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as transport costs declined.' An example using my data is illustrative.
To take two random regions, the cost of transporting a ton of coal-grain (av-
eraged) by rail, road, waterway and ocean from Aveyron (France) to Abruzzi
(Italy) in 1870 was $182.9.1 The 1870 Italian tari level was 8.3 per cent. This
tari added $18.98 to the transport cost, making the total trade cost $201.87.2
In 1900, the same journey - without taris - cost $102.7; a 44 per cent decrease.
Italian taris, however, were hiked by 5.2 percentage points, making for an addi-
tional cost of $17.33 and a total trade cost of $120 in 1900. The rst point is that
taris accounted for very little of total trade costs: 9.4 per cent in 1870 and 14.4
per cent in 1900. Second, despite the 5.2 percentage point increase in taris from
1870 to 1900, total trade costs were dropping drastically due to improvements in
shipping and rail transport. The journey cost dropped by 44 per cent excluding
taris, and by 41 per cent with taris. Indeed, if a 5.2 percentage point increase
in taris shaved three percentage points o the total trade cost decrease, then it
would have taken an additional 71.1 percentage point increase (= 41 5:2=3) to
keep journey costs constant. Despite the worst eorts of trade policy, Europe re-
mained open for business. This can be seen clearly in the calculation of European
regional market potential.
5.3 Measuring market potential
Constructing market potential using data on transport and tari costs and trans-
port networks is the approach taken in the economic history literature and when
subnational units are used (Crafts, 2005a; Schulze, 2007b). This is because mar-
ket potential estimation requires data on bilateral trade ows which are scarce
the further back in time we go, and are especially scarce for subnational units.
Still, there are ways around this, and I implement both approaches to ensure
robustness.
1This average cost adds in grain, as a representative good, in contrast to the use of coal
only in the previous chapter. More details on this in the following section.
2Tari to transport cost conversion is done using the technique in Estevadeordal et al.
(2002), which estimates a gravity model for trade where distance has an elasticity of -0.8 and
a tari elasticity of -1.0.
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5.3.1 Constructing market potential
To construct market potential, I use the Harris (1954) type function, which is
more popular in the economic history literature (Crafts, 2005b; Schulze, 2007b).
In this formulation, purchasing power is weighted inversely to distance, so that
the MP of region i at year t is
MPit =
X
j
1
Dijt
Pjt (5.1)
where D is the distance from i to j, and Pj is the purchasing power at j.
Following the literature, I take P to be the GDP data underlying gure 3.2. D
is the transport cost, where I took the average of coal and grain as representa-
tive freight goods, as well as taris (customs revenue over import value, from
Mitchell (2003) along with additions from Schulze (2007b, Appendix)) for inter-
national connections, between nodes in regions i and j. I converted the taris into
transport equivalents using the technique in Estevadeordal et al. (2002), which
estimates a gravity model for trade which has a distance elasticity of -0.8 and
a tari elasticity of -1.0. This is also the technique used by Crafts (2005a) and
Schulze (2007b). As in Keeble et al. (1982), I control for own-regional distance:
I add onto the denominator distance a third of the radius of the square root of a
circle the size of the given region.
To put the regions in the wider global economy, I included important out-of-
sample economies, drawing GDP from Bolt and Van Zanden (2013): Argentina
(Buenos Aires), Australia (Sydney), Belgium (Brussels), China (Shanghai), Den-
mark (Copenhagen), India (Bombay), Japan (Tokyo), the Netherlands (Amster-
dam), Norway (Oslo), Portugal (Lisbon), Russia (Moscow), Switzerland (Zurich),
Turkey (Istanbul), and the United States (New York). These economies were not
necessarily major trading partners of the European regions in my sample, but the
point is to capture potential rather than actual market access. It is a dierent
story altogether whether regions failed to capitalise on (trade with) markets that
were there. Where country-specic railway costs were unavailable, I used the\Eu-
rope" series from Schulze (2007b, Appendix). In practice, this rarely applied since
overland out-of-sample country connections only existed with Denmark, Portu-
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gal, the Netherlands, and Norway, and most of them could be reached at a much
lower rate by ocean transport. As with all other countries, ad valorem taris for
these countries came from Mitchell (2003).
The transport network I used here is the same GIS as that from section 4.2.1
of the previous chapter, save for two changes. First, to allow the aforementioned
out-of-sample connections, I supplemented the RRG (2012) shipping lines map by
digitising the global steamship lines from the `World Trade Routes, 1912' map in
Rodrigue (2013) and digitising the international ports from V. Alexander & Co.'s
`Seaports of the World by Country' dataset (V. Alexander and Co., 2013). Second,
I took coal and grain as representative goods, using the same sources for ocean and
railway freight, which also provide grain freight rates (Cain, 1980; Kaukiainen,
2006; Noyes, 1905; Schulze, 2007b; U.S. Bureau of Railway Economics, 1915).
Owing to data scarcity and a lack of research, for roads and waterways, I had no
option other than assuming the ratio of coal to grain transport costs for railways
was the same as it was for roads and waterways (Moulton, 1914; Van Vleck, 1997).
The railway transport costs I are in table 5.1. While terminal costs were
equally high - except for Italy - across countries, variable costs varied by country.
France, for example, had variable railway costs three to four times lower than
Spain's. These relatively high costs exacerbated Spain's backwardness. Another
notable feature in table 5.1 is that some countries lowered their railway costs
dramatically over the period, as Austria-Hungary did, while others remained
unchanged, as with Italy. Italian railway costs, in fact, stand out as persistently
low. It is the only country were terminal costs were, at $8.35 to $6.22, were lower
than $20. This is the result of generous state subsidies to railway companies.
Schram (1997, p. 46-9) writes that the new Italian state was so enamoured by
railways and their perceived power to unify the country that, in the 1865 Railway
Act, provided a guarantee on gross revenue, ensuring that it would never fall
below a certain level, and allowing railway companies to keep fares low. In short,
this table shows the importance of using costs rather than simple distances along
a transport network, as in A'Hearn and Venables (2013).
Table 5.2 shows the tranport costs for road, waterway, and sea transport. As
discussed, road and waterway transport costs are the same across the sample,
given data constraints. Road transport costs are high both in terminal and vari-
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Table 5.1: Railway transport costs
1870 1900 1910
Austria-Hungary 20.73 12.25 11.78
(0.51) (0.31) (0.29)
Germany 24.97 24.50 22.15
(0.21) (0.20) (0.18)
Spain 28.74 25.45 23.10
(0.41) (0.36) (0.33)
Europe 28.74 25.45 23.09
(0.21) (0.19) (0.17)
France 29.22 28.74 25.92
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
Britain 8.95 9.42 8.48
(0.32) (0.33) (0.30)
Italy 8.35 6.85 6.22
(0.25) (0.20) (0.18)
Sweden 28.74 25.45 23.09
(0.12) (0.16) (0.14)
Notes: Costs are in $. Variable costs, costs per ton-mile, are in brackets. Non-brackted
gures are terminal costs. See text for details on sources. AH is Austria-Hungary; DE is
Germany; ES is Spain; FR is France; GB is Britain; IT is Italy; SE is Sweden; and EU is
Europe.
able components. This reects the arguments in, among others, Pollard (1974,
p. 38), who argues that roads were unable to support commerce beyond local
transactions: `the farthest possible distance for transporting timber or grain was
about twelve miles: beyond it the cost of freight began to exceed the value of
goods...' Waterways were substantially cheaper than this - cheaper, even, than
railway transport - but were naturally limited in their geographical coverage. As
Moulton (1914) comprehensively argued, this limiting factor meant that very few
waterways earned a prot, and quickly lost trac to railways (see upcoming dis-
cussion around gure 5.1). The costs that stand out here are variable shipping
(sea) costs. The terminal component starts out in 1870 at an unusually high
level, but quickly drops to a level similar to the cheapest railway terminal costs
seen in table 5.1. The variable costs, however, are persistently low: at every year,
cheaper than all other modes of transport. The advantage of coastal regions
versus landlocked regions, in promoting trade, market integration, and economic
development, is widely discussed in the literature (Easterly, 2003; Odell, 1989;
Sachs et al., 1999). Here, as the empirical analysis makes clear, it manifests itself
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in higher market potential values for coastal regions.
Table 5.2: Road, waterway, and sea transport costs
1870 1900 1910
Road 30.55 30.55 30.55
(0.43) (0.43) (0.43)
Waterways 12.32 12.32 12.32
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Sea 46.41 23.06 20.49
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Notes: Costs are in $. Variable costs, costs per ton-mile, are in brackets. Non-brackted
gures are terminal costs. See text for details on sources.
By way of practical example, it cost $201.87 to transport one ton of coal-grain
from Aveyron (France) to Abruzzi (Italy) in 1870. Of this cost, as we have already
seen, 9.4 per cent can be attributed to taris; 19.2 per cent to rail transport; 33.2
per cent to road transport; 8.9 per cent to waterway transport; and 29.3 per
cent to ocean transport. Figure 5.1 shows the trade cost breakdown by year for
this pair of regions. It makes clear some important features that characterised
trade during this period. First, it shows the well-known dramatic decline in trade
costs, especially between 1870 and 1900 (Berend, 2013; O'Rourke and Williamson,
1999). Second, it highlights the minimal role of taris in those trade costs - by
1910, 10 per cent ($9.10) of the total cost. Third, it shows how road and waterway
haulage declined in importance once Europe's railway network was built by 1900
(Marti-Henneberg, 2013; Moulton, 1914).
To arrive at D for Aveyron, I followed the same procedure by year for every
one of the other nodes along with Abruzzi; summing them all up yields Aveyron's
D. ApplyingD to the GDP data as in equation 5.1, yields theMP variable, which
is summarised in table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Constructed market potential summary statistics.
Year Mean Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation
1870 4,795 9,177 1,586 1,010
1900 13,848 20,942 4,031 3,760
1910 17,202 26,523 5,265 4,670
Sample 11,900 26,500 1,590 6,310
Notes: Regional constructed market potential in millions of 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars.
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Figure 5.1: Trade cost ($) breakdown: Aveyron and Abruzzi
Notes: All costs are in 1990 Geary-Khamis $. Extent of column is the total trade cost of
transport a ton of coal-grain in that year. See text for sources.
5.3.2 Estimating market potential
While trade data do exist for some European regions (see, for example, Wolf
(2007)), most countries did not record regional trade ows during this period.
For this reason, I follow the procedure in ? and use national-level bilateral trade
data to arrive at estimates for regional market potential. The trade data are from
Jacks et al. (2011), which covers global bilateral trade ows between 1870 and
2000. Trade values and GDP levels are all measured in 1990 dollars, making the
data consistent with the GDP data I use here.1
The strategy is to use information contained in international trade ows to
get estimates for price indices and bilateral trade costs, and apply these estimates
to regions.2 The assumption is that interregional trade ows follow the same
patterns as international ones. This assumption is supported by studies that
are able to exploit interregional trade data (Combes et al., 2005). ? proposes
a number of adjustments to make this assumption more reasonable. First, I
restrict the data to exports within my sample of countries, and from my sample
countries to the rest of the world. This captures the notion that trade ows
1Full details on sources and adjustments are in Appendix C.
2For a more detailed exposition of the theory, readers should refer to ?, or the broader
literature on gravity trade models and market access as in Redding and Venables (2004).
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(and so market potential) may operate dierently in dierent parts of the world,
especially when trading areal units are at dierent levels of development. Second,
I also control for factors other than bilateral distance. As ? points out, this is
particularly important in a regional implementation, as trade between regions
of the same country is usually a multiple of trade between regions with similar
bilateral features, but in dierent countries (McCallum, 1995). To capture this,
I include a set of dummies that indicate whether countries share a border, and
whether countries share an ocial language.
Despite these controls, some problems of course persist. There is, in particular,
high variability in regional output structures, which is not borne out in national
aggregate data. Given these empirical constraints, I view this estimation as a
cross-check on the previously constructed market potential measure rather than
a central or stand-alone variable.
More formally, I assume that bilateral trade costs between any two countries
i and j are given by:
Tij = dist
0
ij  (exp(borderji)1)exp(languageij)2 (5.2)
In this expression, border and language are the dummies discussed earlier, and
0 and 2 are the elasticities of trade cost with respect to its dierent components.
Inserting a time dimension yields the following econometric implementation:
ln

xijt
EitEjt

=  + 1t ln(distij) +
X
i
2itborderij + 3tlanguageij
+ 1itexporterit + 2jtimporterjt + "ijt
(5.3)
Where xijt is the value of exports from i to j at year t, and Eit and Ejt are
the trading partners' GDPs. The coecients on exporter and importer dummies,
1itand 2jt, are used to obtain estimates for price indices, since relative prices
aect trade ows, but are unobservable. To arrive at trade costs for each bench-
mark year in my sample, I estimate model 5.3 on 14-year windows of theJacks
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et al. (2011) data between 1870 and 1920.1
As is standard in the literature, market potential is the trade cost and price
index weighted sum of GDPs of all surrounding regions and countries, that is,
regions in the same country (cty), and regions in the rest of the sample (ROS).
I use the results from the gravity equation to calculate market potential for each
region i at each year t for all countries j as follows:
MPit =
X
j"ctyi

e
b3tdistb1tij

 1jt Ejt
X
j"ROS

e
b2iteb3languageijdistb1tij

 1jt Ejt (5.4)
where  1jt and the parameters c1t, d2it, and c3t were estimated in the gravity
trade equation 5.3, and Ejt is again proxied by a region or country's GDP in year
t. The results are summarised in table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Estimated market potential summary statistics.
Year Mean Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation
1870 13,144 386,501 22 48,971
1900 8,868 170,875 29 18,856
1910 33,016 499,064 387 55,621
Sample 18,343 499,064 22 45,315
Notes: Regional estimated market potential in millions of 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars.
5.3.3 Comparing two measures of market potential
The main purpose of estimating market potential is to provide a cross-check,
given its centrality to my research, of the constructed market potential variable.
I include both in my empirical implementation, but it is worth looking at the
relationship between the two rst.
Looking at the summary statistics in tables 5.4 and 5.3, the estimation pro-
cedure produces a market potential variable with much greater variation, as can
be seen in the standard deviations of $6,310mn for constructed market potential
1The results of these estimations are in Appendix C. The length of the window is, roughly,
the length of the entire period, divided by three. I experimented with dierent windows, nding
more or less the same results.
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(MPC) and $45,315mn for estimated market potential (MPE). While the mini-
mum value of MPE ($22mn) is much smaller than that of MPC ($1,590mn), the
estimation generally produces larger values, with a mean value that is 54 per cent
larger. Dierences are to be expected, given the imperfection of both methods
used to caluclate market potential, but what matters in the ultimate empirical
analysis is whether the variables are monotonically dierent. The Spearman rank
correlation between MPE and MPC , at 0.584 and signicant at the one per cent
level, shows that this is - by and large - not the case.
As a more rigorous paramteric test, I standardised both variables, so that
they both have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one, and regressed
MPC on MPE. Standardising the variables removes the issue of dierent levels,
which we already know exists from the summary statistics in tables 5.4 and 5.3.
This OLS correlation can be seen in gure 5.2. The coecient implies that for
every standard deviation increase in MPE, MPC increases by 0.612 standard
deviations. This is not a perfect correlation, but with a T-statistic of 18.89, it is
a highly statistically signicant one. The R2 is a respectable 0.375.
Figure 5.2: Constructed versus estimated market potential
Notes: Values on y-axis represent the standardised values of MPC , the constructed market
potential measure, and the x-axis represents the standardised values of MPE, the estimated
market potential measure. The variables are standardised so that they have a mean of zero
and standard deviation of one.
The most reassuring similarity between the two standardised variables is their
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(log-normal) distribution. The kernel density plot in gure 5.3 shows that de-
spite their dierences both variables capture the sample's bi-modal distribution
of market potential. This distribution, incidentally, is a necessary condition for
an explanation of regional per capita income, which is also bi-modal.
Figure 5.3: Log-normal distribution of constructed and estimated market potential
Notes: Estimated using Epanechnikov kernels. Values on the x-axis represent the standard-
ised values of MPE, the estimated market potential measure, and MPC , the constructed
market potential measure. The variables are standardised so that they have a mean of zero
and standard deviation of one.
All in all, both variables capture the \true" variation in market potential in
the sample. Indeed, the rst principal component of the two variables accounts
for 81 per cent of their total variation, and both variables are correlated with the
component at 0.90, signicant at one per cent.1 Again, the purpose of estimating
market potential was to provide a cross-check on the main variable of interest,
MPC . The checks in this section show us that the dierences in measurement,
an important but un-tested concern in Hanson (2005), are overstated. This cross-
check also adds weight to market potential work in the economic history literature
that has been unable to work with anything other than Harris-type forumaltions
(Crafts, 2005a; Schulze, 2007b).
1I extracted this component using principal components analysis. Its eigenvalue is 1.612.
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5.4 Empirical strategy
The goal here is to estimate equation 5.5 where, for the sake of brevity,MP refers
to both the constructed and estimated measure of market potential:
Yit =  +  lnCoal Transportit + INSTit + lnMPit
+ c + t + it:
(5.5)
The issues with INST 's endogeneity remain, however, and there is now the
threat of market potential-related endogeneity that I must deal with. Given
these concerns, I implement following system of equations, where in equation 5.7
I rst instrument INST using the same procedure in the preceding chapter and
then in equation 5.8 instrument market potential. Since MP includes own-region
demand, increases in income lead to increases in MP . I then use the predicted
values dMP and \INST to estimate the second-stage equation 5.6:
Yit =  +  lnCoal Transportit + \INST it + ln dMP it
+ c + t + it
(5.6)
INSTit =  +  lnCoal Transportit +?SHi +  lnDist Londonit
+ c + t + "it
(5.7)
MPit =  +  lnCoal Transportit +?SHi +  lnDist Londonit
+ c + t + "it:
(5.8)
Identifying market potential
The instrument forMP is Cost London: the distance from each regional node to
London, measured in kilometers, multiplied by the cost of getting there in dollars
using the same GIS as in section 5.3.1. Distance-based instruments for market
potential are the convention in the literature (Head and Mayer, 2006; Redding
and Schott, 2003; Redding and Venables, 2004; ?). I have extended it here with
131
a time-varying measure so as to make it compatible with regional xed eects.
This technique has also been used in studies of market potential, with Holl (2011)
interacting historical road placement with national railway network growth rates.
Both components of this instrument capture the same idea. They provide
exogenous geographical variation that captures the market potential advantage
of locations close to the economic centre, London. The choice of centre depends
on the sample, so ? uses Brussels since his sample is contemporary Europe while
Redding and Venables (2004) use London, New York, and Tokyo since they work
with a contemporary global sample. London makes most sense here because it
was by far the most important economic node in my sample across all benchmark
years.
Head and Mayer (2006) point out that restricting a sample to European re-
gions implicity determines a centre to begin with, and the location and relative
prosperity of the continent was itself the outcome of an endogenous process. To
get at this concern they construct an instrument, `Global Centrality', which equals
the distance from each region to the centre of every inhabited one-by-one degree
cell in the world population grid. Using this instrument, the elasticity on market
potential they get is 0.0877, compared to 0.0996 when using `distance to Brussels'
and 0.0790 when using distance to the centre of their sample. In short, there is
in eect no empirical dierence between these instruments. I have experimented
with using as an IV distance to my sample's geographical centre, the sum of re-
gions' inverse distances (suggested in Head and Mayer (2006)), distance to New
York (as an alternative to London), and distance to my sample's economic centre
(calculated using the technique in Mathys and Grether (2010)). Of all these,
Cost London shows the strongest correlation and as all of them get at essentially
the same idea, making the choice an empirical question, I stuck with distance to
London.1
The Pearson correlations between Cost London and MPC and MPE are re-
spectively -0.385 and -0.378, both signicant at the one per cent level. Applying
1The correlations between lnMPC and log distance to the sample geographical centre, log
distance to New York, log distance to the sample economic centre, and log sum of inverse
distances are, respectively, -0.024, -0.007, -0.108, 0.024. For lnMPE , the correlations in the
same order are: 0.012, -0.015, -0.083, 0.032. Only distance to the sample economic centre is
statistically signicant, but at a lower level than Dist London.
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some more rigour, table 5.5 shows the results from regressions of lnMPC and
lnMPE on lnCost London. The R2s are low, at around 14 per cent (column
4), but both the coecients (column 1) are signicant at the one per cent level:
MPC with a T-statistic of -5.15 (column 3), and MPE with a T-statistic of -
7.17.The standardised-s (column 5) show that Cost London has a very similar
eect on either market potential measure, which is reassuring. Column (6) shows
the T-statistics from a robust regression estimation, desgined to control for out-
liers, which are present in Cost London in the form of, for example, the Canary
Islands (Spain). The estimation rst runs the normal OLS estimation, calcu-
lates the Cook0sD for each observation, and then drops any observation where
Cook0sD 1.1 The T-statistics maintain the same levels of statistical signicance
for both variables, indicating that even when dropping outliers the picture does
not change. Column (7) gets at the same issue by running a jackknife estimation:
the T-statistics again maintain their levels of signicance. In short, Cost London
is a relevant predictor of market potential.
Table 5.5: OLS correlations between Cost London and market potential
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
 R.S.E. T-stat. R2 Std.- Rob. Jack.
lnMPC -0.039*** 0.007 -5.15 0.148 -0.385 -23.51 -4.98
lnMPE -0.136*** 0.019 -7.17 0.143 -0.378 -11.2 -6.97
Notes: The independent variable is lnCost London. MPC (MPE) is the constructed (es-
timated) market potential measure. R.S.E. is the robust standard error, clustered by region,
where *** indicates statistical signicance at the one per cent level. Std.- is the standard-
ised regression coecient. Rob. is the T-statistic from the robust regression. Jack. is the
T-statistic from the jackknifed estimation.
Following Clogg et al. (1995), I test for the equality of the coecients reported
in column (2) of table 5.5 using a Z-test, subtracting the coecient of MPC from
MPE, and dividing the result by the square root of the sum of their standard
errors. The resulting Z-score is -0.60, implying no statistically signicant dier-
ence.
The exclusion restriction is that Cost London does not have any eect on
1Cook0sD is the squared dierence between the predicted values of a dependent variable
from a normal OLS and the prediction of that same variable in which an observation has been
omitted, divided by the number of tted parameters in the model times the mean square error
of the model.
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real per capita income levels other than through its eect on market potential.
The presence of an unobserved variable that is correlated with Cost London
would break this restriction, since the eect of Cost London would be working
through a channel other than market potential. While we can never test the
exclusion restriction directly, we can at least test an auxiliary hypothesis that
lends credence to it. Since Cost London is spatial in nature, the competing
hypothesis must also be spatial and as I discussed in the previous chapter, spatial
explanations for Europe's regional income are not forthcoming.
Once such hypothesis is that climate, which is spatially correlated with Cost London's
gradient, also aects economic activity, providing an alternative channel to mar-
ket potential. The climate argument has been made by among others Sachs et al.
(1999) and Easterly (2003), and is often proxied using latitude and longitude
coordinates (Easterly, 2003; Gallup and Sachs, 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004; Sachs
et al., 1999). In table 5.6, I regress market potential on Cost London and control
for latitude and longitude. The results for lnMPE show that both latitude and
longitude are statistically insignicant, and that Cost London retains the same
magnitude and signicance as in table 5.5. The results for lnMPC show the
same picture. While a fuller test on the usefulness of Cost London as an IV will
have to wait until the IV estimation in the following section, it is reassuring that
popular geographical controls used in the literature have no eect on market po-
tential, when Cost London is controlled for, which goes some way in supporting
the exclusion restriction here.
Another hypothesis is that distance to London is correlated with the diusion
of technology from Britain to Continental Europe. This is dicult to test empir-
ically here, but a long line of literature has debunked the idea of a technological
diusion gradient across Europe. As I wrote in ?, in this \leader-follower" scheme,
Britain industrialised rst, which raised its productivity in manufacturing above
European levels. Then, in varying degrees, European countries are argued to
have adopted Britain's productive technology. The pace at which they did this,
the scheme goes on, determines the extent of their income lag behind Britain.
Rostow (1960) provided the GDP gures and one of the scheme's keywords: `dis-
continuity', which described the movement from one of his stages of growth to
another. Gerschenkron (1962), focusing on industrial production instead, wrote
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Table 5.6: Latitude and longitude versus Cost London
lnMPC lnMPE
Longitude 0.008 -0.018
(0.007) (0.026)
Latitude -0.001 0.006
(0.005) (0.020)
lnCost London -0.039*** -0.137***
(0.007) (0.019)
Constant 23.784*** 26.798***
(0.439) (1.387)
R2 0.150 0.143
N 597 597
Notes: Latitude and longitude are measured in decimal degrees, taken from a WGS84 pro-
jection. MPC (MPE) is the constructed (estimated) market potential measure. Robust
standard errors clustered by region are reported in brackets. *** indicates statistical signi-
cance at the one per cent level.
of economic `backwardness' in peripheral Europe, giving the scheme its next key-
word. Landes (1969) and Pollard (1973) wrote of the `diusion' of industrialisa-
tion across Europe (Pollard, 1973, 1981). Following this scheme, explanations of
income dierentials would be the determinants of the speed of adoption of the
leader's technology. The authors assumed that new technology is adopted only if
more capital is available, and so European economic history was one of dieren-
tial rates of capital accumulation. Gerschenkron (1962), for example, spent a lot
of time on the role of banks and states in overcoming underinvestment.
This scheme was undermined by the production of quantitative evidence -
ironically, given this was Rostow's aim - which was occurring in parallel. Rostow's
\discontinuities" and \take-os" in European economic development proved to be
hard to pin down. Gerschenkron's higher shares of production-goods in the output
of backward economies, and the importance of investment banks, did not show
up in the data underlying the comprehensive book of Milward and Saul (1973).
Nor did the theory hold up well to newer economic ideas (Sylla and Toniolo,
1992). The jump in capital accumulation was not necessitated by manufacturing,
but railways. In Britain, railways accounted for a much higher proportion of the
economy's capital stock until the interwar years (Feinstein and Pollard, 1988).
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5.4.1 Baseline market potential eect
Before getting into the instrumented results of model 5.6, it is worth comparing
the eects of MPC and MPE on regional per capita income, Y , in a OLS setting
with region and year xed eects. The results in table 5.7 show that both mea-
sures have a highly statistically signicant eect on Y . The magnitude of MPC ,
with an elasticity of 0.083, is larger than that ofMPE, with an elasticity of 0.008.
Both are statistically signicant at the ve per cent level. While the dierences in
magnitude appear large, their t-statistics, at 2.14 and 2.26 respectively, are sim-
ilar, indicating less precission for MPC . This is supported by its larger RMSE
and slightly smaller bR2. Following Clogg et al. (1995), I test for the equality of
these coecients using a Z-test, subtracting the coecient of MPE from MPC ,
and dividing the result by the square root of the sum of their standard errors.
The resulting Z-score is 0.35, implying no statistically signicant dierence.
Table 5.7: OLS market potential and income
lnY lnY
lnMPC 0.081**
(0.038)
lnMPE 0.008**
(0.004)
Constant 7.268*** 5.645***
(0.07) (1.331)
Region F.E. Yes Yes
Region F.E. Yes YesbR2 0.955 0.857
RMSE 0.096 0.905
N 597 597
Notes: Dependent variable is log of regional per capita income, Y . MPC (MPE) is the
constructed (estimated) market potential measure. RMSE is root mean-square error. Region
FE is a regional xed eects term. Year FE is a year xed eects term. Robust standard
errors clustered by region are reported in brackets. ** indicates statistical signicance at the
ve per cent level; *** at the one per cent level.
Table 5.7 shows that, despite their dierent conceptual and empirical bases,
the coecients on MPC and MPE are similar in magnitude and statistical sig-
nicance, but what does the eect mean in practice? The MPC eect implies a
0.135 standard deviation increase in income for every standard deviation increase
in market potential. This would, according to the sample's income standard de-
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viation of $842, add $114 onto a region's per capita income level. This is the
equivalent to ve per cent of the sample mean per capita income level, $2,350.
As another comparator, it is also the equivalent to 19 per cent of the sample
minimum per capita income level, $606 (Galicia, Spain in 1870).
Does instrumenting market potential and the introduction of controls change
the picture? Table 5.8 contains the results, for both measures of market potential,
of model 5.6. Starting with the rst stage for market potential, we can see that
Cost London is a strong predictor of market potential. For bothMPC andMPE,
the coecient is correctly signed and highly statistically signicant. Both also
have large F-statistics, backing up the tests on Cost London in tables 5.5 and
5.6. The rst stage for INST , which is of course the same for both measures of
market potential, shows that SH continues to be a strong predictor of INST :
the coecient is correctly signed and highly signicant, and the F-statistic on its
exclusion is also large in both cases.
Taking the predicted values for INST and MP , we see strong results in
the second stage. It is unsurprising given the rst stage results that the second
stage estimations both pass a Cragg-Donald Wald joint F-test for weak identica-
tion and an Anderson underidentication test. They also both pass the Angrist-
Pischke F-test on their joint exclusion. The elasticity at which Y responds to
MPC is a signicant 0.403. The coecient on INST is insignicant. The elas-
ticity on MPE is much smaller, at 0.0.67, but still highly statistically signicant.
The result for INST is larger here, but is still insignicant. lnCoal Transport
continues to be insignicant in all estimations.
Are the market potentials comparable? While their coecients a very dif-
ferent, their t-ratios are similar at 5.10 for MPE and 4.81 for MPC . Further,
conducting a z-test for the equality of coecients following Clogg et al. (1995)
produces a z-score of 1.08, implying no statistically signicant dierence between
them. There is simply less precision surrounding the constructed measure of
market potential, as discussed in the previous section.
The insignicance of regional institutions, after controlling for market po-
tential, is perhaps unsurprising when we consider that the explanation cannot
account for spatial patterns. There are no conceptual priors that tell us ecient
institutions, especially on the sub-national level, should be co-located.The empir-
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Table 5.8: IV market potential and income
Constructed MP
IV-1: MP IV-1: INST IV-2: Y
\lnMP 0.403**
(0.084)
\INST 0.522
(0.505)
lnCoal Transport 0.084 -0.011 0.021
(0.089) (0.044) (0.046)
lnCost London -0.361*** -0.047***
(0.008) (0.005)
SH 0.002* -0.002**
(0.001) (0.000)
Y earF:E: Yes Yes Yes
RegionF:E: Yes Yes YesbR2 0.909 0.457 0.837
N 597 597 597
Angrist-Pischke F-test 9.46 15.96
Cragg-Donald Wald joint F-statistic 15.83
Anderson canon. corr. LM-statistic 13.04
Estimated MP
IV-1: MP IV-1: INST IV-2: Y
\lnMP 0.066***
(0.013)
\INST 1.031
(1.268)
lnCoal Transport 1.989 -0.011 -0.058
(1.745) (0.044) (0.085)
lnCost London -1.084*** 0.047
(0.067) (0.005)
SH -0.068** -0.0002**
(0.008) (0.000)
Y earF:E: Yes Yes Yes
RegionF:E: Yes Yes YesbR2 0.526 0.457 0.489
N 597 597 597
Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-test 13.26 59.5
Cragg-Donald Wald joint F-statistic 17.82***
Anderson canon. corr. LM-statistic 24.75***
Notes: *** denotes signicance at one per cent and ** at ve per cent. Robust standard
errors clustered on countries, and reported in brackets. Angrist-Pischke F-test is on the
excluded IV. Cragg-Donald Wald joint F-statistic for weak identication is conducted jointly
on the excluded IVs. Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic is for under-identication. Y is
GDP per capita; INST is a measure of regional institutional eciency; Coal Transport is
transport cost to nearest coal deposit; SH is the Spanish Habsburg dummy; MP is market
potential; and Cost London is cost to London. IV-1 (IV-2) is a rst (second) stage. Mark
Schaer at Heriot-Watt University supplied the Stata code for this estimation.
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ical results shown here nd much in common with Redding and Venables (2004)
who, in their analysis of international per capita income, nd that institutions
- risk of expropriation and length of Soviet rule - are insignicant in their full
specications that include total, as opposed to foreign-only, market potential.
The MPC coecient in table 5.8 is similar to those found in the literature. In
their IV regressions of international-level log real GDP per capita on log market
potential (derived using a trade equation), Redding and Venables (2004, p. 69)
estimate a coecient of 0.256 compared to my 0.403. The IV regressions of
European regional log GVA per capita on market potential in ?, p. 609 show
coecients on market potential ranging from 0.275 to 0.309.
The IV results in table 5.8 imply a one standard deviation in market potential
results in a 0.65 standard deviation increase in per capita income. That is, an
increase of $547 on the sample mean income of $2,350 or almost equal the sample
minimum income of $606 (Galicia, Spain in 1870).
5.4.2 Domestic versus foreign market potential
Were domestic or foreign markets the income drivers behind the baseline results
in table 5.8? This question is related to a large literature on global integration
and trade liberalisation versus inward-looking policies like import-substitution
industrialisation in economic development. Dollar (1992, p. 523), summarising
the World Bank's position on the matter, wrote that accessing foreign markets
`generally results in more rapid growth of exports, and there may be externalities
associated with exporting that cause open economies to grow more rapidly over
long periods of time.' The work of Sachs and Warner (1995) shows dierential
levels of foreign market potential can explain the divergence and inequality I
found in Chapter 3. They write that `open economies tend to converge, but
closed economies do not. The lack of convergence in recent decades results from
the fact that the poorer countries have been closed to the world' (Sachs and
Warner, 1995, p. 3). In their empirical analysis, Redding and Venables (2004, p.
65) nd that the per capita income eect of foreign market potential is three-times
greater than that of domestic market potential.
In this subsection, I disaggregate MPC into foreign and domestic regional
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market components, and use them in the same IV setting as model 5.6. MPE
has served its purpose as a cross-check on MPC in the preceding section. The
domestic market potential term - DMP - is composed using the formulation
5.1, but restricting the sample to same-country regions. This means a region's
market potential is only aected by its neighbours in its own country, and so
taris drop o, leaving transport costs as the weighting parameter. The foreign
market potential term - FMP is constructed by restricting the sample to out-
of-country regions, so that a region's market potential is aected only by foreign
markets. A region's MP is thus the sum of its foreign and domestic components,
as in MPit = DMPit + FMPit. The results are displayed in table 5.9.
The rst stage results for INST are the same as those reported in table 5.9,
and so I have excluded them here. I have reproduced the estimations for total
MPC , for the sake of comparison. The Cost London instrument continues to
work well across domestic and foreign market potential. It comfortably passes
the F-test on its exclusion, and under- and weak-indentication tests.
In the second stage results, we that foreign market potential yields a coe-
cient as large and signicant as total market potential, but that domestic market
potential is insignicant. This implies that most of the gains of market potential
were working through increasing foreign not domestic market access. This ts
with the historical literature's emphasis on the pull of expanding core markets in
Europe, and overseas (Bairoch, 1997; ?). The eect of foreign market potential
implies a $488 increase in income for its every standard deviation increase.
Redding and Venables (2004, p. 65) derive similar results. First, the size
of their foreign potential coecient, at 0.311, is close to the one reported here.
Second, their estimations consistently show foreign markets are more important
than domestic ones. Given that foreign market potential is always larger than
domestic - by construction of my sample and that in Redding and Venables (2004)
there are more regions outside a country than it - a one per cent increase in foreign
market potential in reality corresponds to a much larger income eect. The result,
however, also has theoretical support. According to NEG theory, a reduction in
international trade costs, which is what we see in this historical context, makes
domestic markets less attractive relative to foreign markets. These results are
also in line with work done outside NEG. Both Dollar (1992) and Sachs and
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Table 5.9: IV domestic versus foreign market potential estimates.
(1) (2)
IV-2 IV-2
lnY lnY
\lnMPC 0.403**
(0.084)
\lnDMPC 0.016
(0.208)
\lnFMPC 0.365**
(0.153)
lnCoal Transport 0.021 -0.0005
(0.046) (0.088)
\INST 0.522 0.323
(0.505) (0.286)
Year F.E. Yes Yes
Region F.E. Yes YesbR2 0.837 0.836
N 597 597
Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-test 5.48 18.87
Cragg-Donald Wald joint F-statistic 10.19 13.76
Anderson canon. corr. LM-statistic 13.04 19.77
(4) (5)
(6)
IV-1 IV-1
IV-1
lnDMPC lnFMPC
lnCoal Transport -0.230 0.161
(0.179) (0.196)
SH -0.001 -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
lnCosst London -0.250*** -0.338***
(0.012) (0.012)
heightYear F.E. Yes Yes
Yes
Region F.E. Yes Yes
YesbR2 0.847 0.916
N 597 597
597
Notes: *** denotes signicance at one per cent and ** at ve per cent. Robust standard
errors clustered on countries, and reported in brackets. Angrist-Pischke F-test is on the
excluded IV. Cragg-Donald Wald joint F-statistic for weak identication is conducted jointly
on the excluded IVs. Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic is for under-identication. Y is
GDP per capita; INST is a measure of regional institutional eciency; Coal Transport
is transport cost to nearest coal deposit; SH is the Spanish Habsburg dummy; MP is mar-
ket potential; FMP is foreign market potential; DMP is domestic market potential; and
Cost London is cost to London. IV-1 (IV-2) is a rst (second) stage. Mark Schaer at
Heriot-Watt University supplied the Stata code for this estimation.
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Warner (1995) found that openness to foreign markets resulted in faster export
growth and income convergence among developing countries. While lower access
to foreign markets may not have been a conscious policy choice in this context
and was, rather, the eect of poor transport infrastructure, the eect is the same:
domestic markets were unable to support per capita income development as much
as foreign markets were.1
5.4.3 Falling behind
In the previous subsection, I showed that foreign markets had a bigger eect
on per capita incomes. To the extent that regions experienced varying relative
levels of foreign and domestic market potential growth, this can explain some of
the income divergence and inequality I found in Chapter 3. There is, however, a
more immediate cause behind Europe's periphery falling behind. NEG holds that
as trade costs drop to an intermediate level, economic activity locates near large
markets to save on trade costs. The relocation of this activity further increases
the size of the market, drawing in more activity at the expense of peripheral
regions. This is the \unequalising spiral" that Krugman and Venables (1995)
described theoretically. As Crafts and Wolf (2013a) note, the `rst globalisation'
of the nineteenth century - driven by improvements in transport technology - saw
the simultaneous processes of industrialisation in Europe and de-industrialisation
in Asia. On a less grand scale, this section shows the same processes were at work
within Europe.
Following Clingingsmith and Williamson (2008) who work with employment
data rather than income, a region experiences strong de-industrialisation if its
absolute per capita income level falls. It experiences weak de-industrialisation if
its percentage share of sample income (GDP shareit = 100  GDPit=
Pj
n=1GDPt)
falls. These are my measures of de-industrialisation. To measure the extent
to which regions' market potentials are falling behind, I create two variables.
The variable MPmaxit is the ratio of the sample maximum regional MP
C to re-
gion i's MPC at year t (MPmaxit = max(MP
C
t )=MP
C
it ). The variable MP
med
it
1For an econometric analysis on the debilitating eects of poor infrastructure on trade, see
Limao and Venables (2001).
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is the ratio of the sample median regional MPC to region i's MPC in year t
(MPmedit = median(MP
C
t )=MP
C
it ). Table 5.10 displays a regression analysis of
these variables, where I instrument MPmed and MPmax with Dist London.
As the Krugman and Venables (1995) argument is about the eects of increas-
ing market potential on peripheral countries, I restrict the sample here to regions
that fall within the bottom two quartiles of distance from London. That is, the
regions farthest away from the sample's economic core.
Table 5.10: De-industrialisation and market potential
IV-1 IV-1 IV-2 IV-2 IV-2 IV-2
MPmed MPmax lnY lnY GDP share GDP share
lnCost London 0.020*** 0.047***
(0.003) (0.010)
MPmed -0.699** -0.017**
(0.334) (0.006)
MPmax -0.290** -0.009**
(0.147) (0.466)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R^2 0.477 0.435 0.072 0.327 0.554 0.539
N 597 597 597 597 597 597
Angrist-Pischke 44.33 21.30
Anderson 14.24** 37.58 24.17 24.01
Notes: Sample restricted to bottom quartiles of distance to London (those farther away). ***
denotes signicance at one per cent and ** at ve per cent. Robust standard errors clustered
on countries, and reported in brackets. Angrist-Pischke is the F-test is on the excluded
instrument, Cost London (cost to London). Anderson is the canon. corr. LM statistic is
for under-identication. Y is GDP per capita; GDP share is regional GDP percentage share
in sample GDP; MPmed is sample median MPC relative to regional MPC ; and MPmax is
sample maximum MPC relative to regional MPC . Mark Schaer at Heriot-Watt University
supplied the Stata code for this estimation.
The results in table 5.10 show that Dist London is a good predictor of the
two relative market potential measures, MPmax and MPmed, as indicated by its
statistical signicance and the large Angrist-Pischke F-statistics. In this case,
the coecients on Cost London are positive since increasing distance to London
is correlated with a greater ratio of maximum (or median) market potential to
regional market potential. Both MPmax and MPmed have a large negative eect
on regional per capita income levels, implying strong deindustrialisation. For the
former, a one unit increase in the ratio of median market potential to regional
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market potential decreases income by 0.70 per cent. For the latter, the coecient
is a smaller, but still highly signicant, -0.30 per cent. In reality such large eects
are unlikely to have been realised, and there is likely to be imprecision around the
estimate, but these results are still consistent with the Krugman and Venables
(1995) hypothesis that as a region's market potential decreases relative to the
\global" level, its output
This is backed up by the results on GDP share. Both MPmax and MPmed
have a large negative eect on regional GDP shares. The coecients indicate
that for every unit increase in the ratios, a region's share in the sample output
will drop by, respectively, 0.02 and 0.01 percentage points. Again, while I am only
describing patterns in historical data here and there is bound to be imprecision
around point estimates, these results are at least clear in direction: a decline in
relative market potential, caused by declining trade costs, resulted in absolute
losses in per capita income and losses in sample output shares. This is consistent
with the concentration of income in the northwest of Europe and the decline of
the periphery, analysed in Chapter 3.
5.4.4 Why isn't everything on the coast?
Figure 5.4 maps the values of MPC in standard deviations at each year. Two
general patterns are immediately visible. First, there was indeed a concentration
of market potential in the northwestern core. This was already visible by 1870,
but was much more so in 1910. This trend was accompanied by a relative decline
of market potential in the periphery. The interior of France - the Massif Central
- was \hollowed" out by 1900. Sweden became increasingly peripheral over the
period so, that by 1910, only the southern most tip of the country, Stockholm,
and the mineral-rich north had middling levels of market potential. The second
pattern, which can be seen at each year, is that coastal regions - even if they were
poor - had high market potentials. By 1910, this is so clear that the map looks
as though dark perimeter surrounds the Continent, running from East Prussia,
along the the Bay of Biscay, and then along the western Mediterranean coast.
There are, of course, pockets of high market potential where we would expect
them - the industrial heartlands of eastern Germany and northern England, and
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the London-agglomeration. Still, the high-market potential coast calls out for an
explanation. Not in the sense that is unusual - it is widely acknowledged that
shipping freight was so much cheaper than any form of overland transport that
coastal regions are at a locational advantage - but that not all of these regions
were developed (Crafts, 2005a; Schulze, 2007b). That is, if the coastal regions
had such high market potential, why did economic activity not follow instead of
locating inland?
To be sure, many of the most developed regions in my sample are either coastal
- Catalonia (Spain), Stockholm (Sweden), the Basque Country (Spain), Bouches-
du-Rhone (France), the Northeast and Northwest (Britain), for example - or very
close to the coast or on a river - London, the Rhineland and Hamburg (Germany),
for example. The high market potential of poor Sicily (Italy) or France's western
coast, however, shows the correlation between income and market potential, while
strong, is not uniform.
This can be seen in gure 5.5, which maps the residuals from a regression of
log per capita income on log MPC , instrumented with log Dist London, con-
trolling for region and year xed eects. Robust errors from this regression are
clustered by region. Figure 5.5 shows, in cross-sectional standard deviations, the
size of regions' over or under-performance in per capita income relative to their
market potentials. A large positive standard deviation indicates that a region is
performing better than expected given its market potential, and vice-versa.
Looking across the maps in gure 5.5, a clear \capital city advantage" can
be seen. All major capitals stand out as over-performers, particularly the inland
ones: Madrid, Paris, Brandenburg, and Vienna. This ts with NEG. Early on,
Krugman (1993) wrote how Chicago, the central city of the American heartland,
developed in the nineteenth century without any distinctive natural advantages.
The city rst stood on a plain, near a barely-nvigable river, and on inadequate,
silty lakeside harbour. It was connected to the great Mississippi watershed by
a canal, but that canal only had a few years of economic importance before
the railways came along. Still, that was long enough for Chicago to become
a central market - a focal point for transport and commerce that fed on itself
through increasing returns. In Europe, a number of cities followed this same
pattern Madrid, for example, arbitrarily became Spain's capital when Philip II
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moved his court there from Toledo in 1561, making Madrid the political centre
of the monarchy. The area is dry, at the time poorly inhabited, and far from the
coast and other cities in Spain, but it persisted despite this low market potential.
Why? `Cities are costly to build. Since xed costs are a source of increasing
returns, \sunk investments" (\history" in the Krugamanian sense) may account
for path dependence' (Jedwab et al., 2014, p. 2). The same can be argued for
Brandenburg (home to Berlin), which was a \sandy plain" before the reign of
Friedrich Wilhelm I (reigned 1713 to 1740). Determined to build a great military
power, he promoted immigration of Protestants from across Germany and France
and Switzerland. These ideas have found strong empirical support in Redding
et al. (2011), who found that the explanation for Frankfurt airport's dominance
in passenger ows is its status as a hub - not its locational fundamentals or its
proximity to other cities. Establishing its \hub" status was the event that set
increasing returns in motion.
Another interesting feature of gure 5.5 is the over-performance of Austrian
and northeastern Hungarian regions. These are all very low-market potential
regions, and so have higher per capita income levels than the model predicts.
This suggests that the literature's focus on peripherality is correct, but that some
countervailing inuence existed (Schulze, 2007b).
Most regions are quite close to the yearly mean, but a few under-performers
stand out. In 1870, East Prussia is a clear under-performer, falling into the
negative 2.5 standard deviation interval. East Prussia had a lot going for it in
market potential terms: coastal, and part of a fast-growing country. Its economic
structure, being predominantly agricultural, however, meant that the region had
little value-added to export. For an increase in its income based on market
potential, it would have to draw in footloose industry. To some extent, this was
achieved. Its per capita income level rose, as its share of industry relative to
agriculture grew. By 1910, its performance relative to market potential was in
mean territory. We see the same story with other coastal under-performers like
Dalmatia (Austria-Hungary), Galicia (Spain), and Finistere (France). All are
coastal regions, and while the rst two were part of low-income countries, all had
potential access to large markets beyond their shores.
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Figure 5.4: Market potential map
Notes: Data are constructed market potential, MPC , and originally in $. The standard
deviations are calculated at each year.
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Figure 5.5: Market potential residuals map
Notes: Residuals from a regression of log per capita income on log MPC , instrumented
with log Dist London, controlling for region and year xed eects. Robust errors from this
regression are clustered by region. The standard deviations are calculated at each year.
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5.5 What about Belgium and the Netherlands?
Two small, rich countries are noticeably missing from my sample of regions: Bel-
gium and the Netherlands. I was not able to include becase there were no es-
timates of regional GDP available at the time of writing. Both countries are
included in my calculations of market potential, as foreign markets. Their exclu-
sion may matter because (1) they are both home to coal deposits, (2) they enjoyed
the kind of institutional change that is argued to improve growth prospects, (3)
they are located close to large markets, and (4) they are both rich by European
standards.
In other words, their exclusion might be exerting a bias towards zero for
the institutional, cost to coal, and market potential variables. While this would
aect my empirical point estimates, the biases are all in the same direction. This
means that the hierarchy of coecients, or the relative importance of the coal,
institutions, and market potential explanations, are less likely to be aected.
This is, unfortunately, one other reason besides measurement error that makes
the estimation of point estimates dicult in historical work. My strategy here
has been more modest: uncovering which explanations mattered a lot or a little
for regional income dierentials.
Still, we can get an idea of what might happen with the inclusion of Belgium
and the Netherlands by looking at a recent paper on market potential and Amer-
ican productivity by Liu and Mesissner (2014). The authors measure market
potential for 27 countries including Belgium and the Netherlands in 1900 and
1910. They nd that larger market potential is positively associated with GDP
per capita the sample, but nd heterogeneous eects depending on countries' sizes
and borders. They single out Belgium and the Netherlands as two small coun-
tries that have high foreign market potential. In a counterfactual exercise where
they eliminate international borders, they nd welfare gains (in real income) of
25 per cent for the two countries, among the largest gains across all countries.
They control for factor endowments, human capital, and geographical positions
of countries.
The results of Liu and Mesissner (2014), then, suggest that had Belgium
and the Netherlands been included in my sample, we might have seen a yet
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greater eect of market potential on income. That is, a larger point estimate or
more reason for market potential to be ranked above institutional and coal-based
explanations.
5.6 Discussion
The general ndings of this chapter are as follows: (1) whether constructed or
estimated, market potential has an economically meaningful and statistically sig-
nicant eect on per capita income levels; (2) foreign markets have a larger eect
on per capita income levels than domestic markets; (3) increasing core market
potential relative to peripheral market potential results in an absolute decline in
peripheral per capita income levels and a decline in peripheral share's of total
GDP; and (4) the relationship between market potential and per capita income
is not uniform. Residuals suggest the inuence of increasing returns, and smaller
role for factor endowments and locational fundamentals.
Given recent work, the baseline nding should not be surprising. Roses (2003),
looing at Spain between 1797 and 1910, shows that as transport costs declined
and internal barriers to domestic trade were eliminated, Spanish industry concen-
trated in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Wolf (2007) shows that after Polish
unication in 1918, when internal taris were removed and transport infrastruc-
ture improved, Polish industry relocated based on skilled labour endowments as
well as access to markets. Crafts (2005a), looking at Britain between 1871 and
1931, shows that the North, Scotland, and Wales were much more economically
peripheral before WWI than after. This, he argues, was due to the rise of road
haulage at the expense of coastal shipping. The novelty here, if I can claim any,
is using the tried-and-tested concept of market potential to explain a specic
historical episode: the crystalisation of Europe's core-periphery spatial income
structure, in aggregate. A number of explanations have been put forward for it.
In the previous chapter, I discussed the two dominant ones - coal endowments
and institutions. While the latter explanation held up well against the coal ex-
planation, it loses all signicance when controlling for market potential.
The value in analysing Europe in aggregate is that economic activity was
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not simply responding to markets within its own country, but to markets across
the Continent. If this were not the case, then one important feature in the
data would not be there - the consolidation of Europe's core-periphery pattern
- neither would the two following ndings - the importance of foreign versus
domestic market potential, and the de-industrialisation eect of relative declines
in market potential.
The few analyses of foreign versus market potential that we have show the
assert the importance of foreign markets (Redding and Venables, 2004). This is
uncontroversial: a reduction in international trade costs, an important feature of
this period, makes foreign markets more attractive since, in aggregating all mar-
kets in the sample, they are much larger than domestic markets. In other words,
even if market sizes (the numerator) were held constant and international trade
costs (the denominator) dropped, foreign market potential would grow faster than
domestic market potential. This is in eect the same argument found in the devel-
opment literature, which argues that openness to foreign markets induces export
growth and income convergence, while the opposite is true for countries that are
close to international markets (Dollar, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1995).
In some senses, the historical literature has implicitly dealt with these ideas.
Kenwood and Lougheed (1982), for example, write about Britain's pace of in-
dustrialisation accelerating relative to Europe on the back of its cotton-goods
exports to the United States. While we do observe these aggregate eects, in
reality the pull of markets only applied to a few select areas within countries,
which is why see so much regional diversity in Europe's income map. Pollard
(1981, p. 8-9) gives the example of the way in which the British linen indus-
try dramatically relocated from its main centre of the West Country and East
Anglia (south east of Britain) to the West Riding of Yorkshire (north west of
Britain), as demand markets shifted from Europe and the Mediterranean to the
United States. To use the current terminology, Yorkshire's market potential was
greater than East Anglia's, for two reasons. The size of the American market
was expanding faster than Continental Europe's, and the cost of transport from
Yorkshire to the United States was lower than that from East Anglia, which is
better placed to serve the Continent. The result was production moving to York-
shire. Scandinavia's rising income after 1870 was export-led rather than based
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on domestic markets - a consequence, as Pollard (1981, p. 201, 236) put it, of its
high degree of integration with `Inner Europe.' Sweden, in particular, still had
a small population, agriculture was stagnant, and it was often easier to trans-
port goods from abroad than from another region in the country - a fact that
can be seen in the previous chapter's transport map, gure 4.1. It cost less to
ship goods from Stockholm to Continental Europe than from Stockholm up to
Norbotten in the north of Sweden, which was not much of a market in any case.
Swedish production thus concentrated in the southern tip of the Swedish penin-
sula. Moving to Central and Eastern Europe, we see that the Czech lands, then
part of Austria-Hungary, came close to the industrial regions of northwestern Eu-
rope. The thriving textile industries there were certainly not supported by the
poor domestic market of peripheral Austrian and Hungarian regions, but by the
booming export markets of neighbouring German Saxony and Silesia. This is
why the income gradient of Austria-Hungary declined as one moved east, which
brings us to de-industrialisation.
When markets exert their pull, there will be winners and losers. The winners
are regions that have successfully attracted economic activity; the losers, the
source of that activity. NEG holds that rms locate near large markets when trade
costs drop to an intermediate level, further epxanding the size of those markets -
or setting in increasing returns. This was theorised to occur at an international
level by Krugman and Venables (1995), and has received some attention in the
historiography (Crafts and Wolf, 2013a). This explanation is consistent with
Europe's core-periphery structure at large, but is also visible within countries.
As industrialisation progressed through Britain, as an early example, the cotton
weavers in rural counties around Manchester were replaced by power looms in the
city. The weaving sheds did not revert back to agriculture, but were abandoned
by their labourers, who moved into industry in the Lancashire industrial complex
(Crafts and Wolf, 2013a; Pollard, 1981). The eect on those rural Manchester
regions was an absolute loss of income. Production also moved to regions much
farther aeld, in spite of the fact that the mobility of production factors was
lower between than within countries - the relative size of foreign markets, as we
have seen, compensated for this. For example, as markets grew in northwestern
Europe, the Languedoc wool industry lost its demand markets across Europe to
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Yorkshire exporters, who found the benet of already-established markets with all
their distribution facilities and infrastructure (Pollard, 1981, pp. 29, 123). This
not only made the Languedoc area poorer than Yorkshire, but poorer in absolute
terms. By the start of the twentieth century, it had completed its transformation
from an industrial area successful in woolens to an agricultural area, producing
(good) wine (Johnson, 1995). While these examples show the pull of markets and
their losers, some regions held onto high (low) levels of income despite their low
(high) market potentials, as seen in the map of residuals from the income-market
potential relationship (gure 5.5.
In the discussion around gure 5.5, I related the large positive residuals for
inland cities to increasing returns. For whatever reason \historical accident" as
Krugman (1991) calls it, these cities were established as locations of activity.
These xed costs then became sources of increasing returns, creating income levels
that are at odds with their market potentials, as exemplied by Madrid. To be
sure, locational fundamentals did matter - to the extent that they also aected
market potential. Keeping to Spain, the other centres of economic activity were
coastal: Catalonia and the Basque Country proted from cheap ocean transport.
At the other end of the spectrum we have Dalmatia (Austria-Hungary), which in
spite of its coastal access and so high market potential, was consistently among
the poorest regions in my sample.
The implication of this is that locational fundamentals are often less important
than increasing returns (and the historic event that set them in motion) in the
distribution of economic activity (Davis and Weinstein, 2002; Krugman, 1991).
Market potential should in theory draw in economic activity to these regions
but, for example, Dalmatia was poor long before 1870 and, despite its coastal
access, remained poor since. The operative word in the term is potential. That
Dalmatia, despite its potential access to foreign markets failed to draw in activity
is an important point. It shows that even dramatic changes in trade costs, and
hence market potential, cannot always undo historic events (Davis and Weinstein,
2002).
There are, of course, other determinants that may be at play. Wolf (2007),
for one, found that market potential mattered in attracting industry in conjunc-
tion with other factor endowments, particularly skilled labour. The relationship,
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however, is not necessarily so clear-cut. The location of skilled labour, or human
capital more generally, is itself determined by market potential. As Redding and
Schott (2003) argue, besides the direct trade costs savings that matter to central
regions, market potential also provides longer-run incentives for human capital
accumulation by increasing the demand for skilled labour. As the development of
skills requires investment, the decision to invest is based on the expected returns
of that investment. Labourers would only acquire skills if they foresaw improve-
ments in market potential that would, given the established relationship, lead
to improvements in production. A negative residual may thus indicate a failure,
for whatever reason, to invest in other determinants of production despite high
market potential levels. That is, market potential may have been attracting pro-
duction, but lagging in its ability to incentivise investment in factor endowments.
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Chapter 6
Addendum: Market Potential
and Human Capital
6.1 Introduction
Did market potential have a direct eect on other determinants of income, namely
human capital? In the preceding chapter I showed that regions with high market
potential generally enjoyed higher per capita income levels. I also showed that
while market potential is a strong determinant of income, there is - as always
- a residual. Authors have emphasised the joint role of market potential and
factor endowments. Wolf (2007) nested both skilled labour and market potential
in his model of Polish inter-war industrial location, and Crafts and Wolf (2013b)
consider both physical geography, like coal deposits and climate, as well as market
potential in their explanation of the location of nineteenth-century British cotton
textile industires.
Redding and Schott (2003) and ?, however, show us that market potential
can have causal eects on those very factor endowments. Their work shows that
market potential provides incentives for `long-run human capital accumulation by
increasing the premium for skilled labour' (?, p. 610). We would expect people
to respond to the potential gains from an increasingly larger market by investing
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in their human capital levels. That is, increasing market potential increases the
return to skill. The authors build on the standard two-sector agriculture and
manufacturing NEG model from Fujita et al. (1999b), to let unskilled workers
endogenously decide whether to invest in education. The basic logic being that
an increase in remoteness, measured by market potential, inicts higher trade
costs on rms selling their products, which has the same eect as a reduction
in the price of a manufactured good relative to an agricultural one. Therefore,
as manufactured goods are more skill-intensive than agricultural ones, rms had
less value-added to pay and retain their skilled workers, and workers had less of
an incentive to acquire skills. Redding and Schott (2003) empirically show that
countries located far away from centres of world economic activity tend to have
lower levels of educational attainment. Lopez-Rodriguez et al. (2007) and ? used
the same framework to motivate their empirical analyses, which both found that
increases in market potential had signicant positive eects on education levels
in contemporary Europe.
My hypothesis here is that, generally, regions far from the northwestern Eu-
ropean core had low stocks of human capital, as measured by literacy (more on
this later), but as economic distance, as measured by market potential, between
the core and periphery dropped over the late-nineteenth century, the periphery's
incentives to invest in human capital increased. This produced an international
convergence in literacy (Cipolla, 1969; Crafts, 1997). National law that made
primary enrolment compulsory is an alternative explanation for this convergence
but, as I show in this chapter, regional variation in literacy was higher within
than between countries. Further, regional literacy rates were spatially correlated.
These features in the data are consistent with my hypothesis: market potential,
itself spatially correlated, varied by region causing the incentives for human cap-
ital investment to also vary by region. The emphasis here is on market potential
providing an incentive on which agents can decide to act: it reects the demand
for, rather than supply of (as with national law), for human capital. A negative
residual in the market potential relationship, as highlighted in the conclusion of
Chapter 5, may be interpreted as agents failing to invest in their human capital
despite their regional level of market potential.
In the previous two chapters, I argued through my measure of regional insti-
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tutions that one of the functions of institutions whether de facto or de jure is to
provide goods like human capital; in this case, literacy. Here I am arguing that
growing industry created incentives for people to educate themselves. How do the
two arguments tie in together? As the previous chapters showed, high regional
literacy dierentials existed. My regional institutions variable measures the ex-
tent to which these dierentials were a function of de facto political choices. A
look back to the frontier model results of this exercise in table 4.2 shows that the
formulation does not explain all the variation in literacy. As I go on to argue in
this chapter, governments made serious, almost concerted attempts at legislating
for the public provision of education, and many of these attempts were success-
ful, but some were unsuccessful. A portion of the within- and between-country
literacy dierentials, I argue here, can be attributed to varying incentives for ac-
cumulating human capital. In short, there is room for both the incentives and
institutional explanation.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In the following section, I
review the relevant historiography, which also serves to introduce this chapter's
conceptual basis. I then discuss my data on regional literacy rates in more depth
than in Appendix B. The empirical strategy follows, with a discussion of estima-
tion issues and then results. The nal section concludes.
6.2 Demand verus supply of human capital
While the paths taken varied from country to country, most European states
institutionalised mass education - primary enrolment - before WWI. Table 6.1
shows dierences in the timing of compulsory schooling among countries and, as
a measure of the latter's success, their primary enrolment ratios in 1870. Prussia
was unusually early in enacting compulsory primary enrolment, thanks to the
enlightened Frederick II, who set up a national education system to `save the
souls' of his subjects (Soysal and Strang, 1989, p. 278). The system failed to
meet its goals of universal schooling. Still, enrolment ratios grew rapidly as part
of Prussia's attempt to nation-build after its 1806 defeat to Napoleon.
Conicts between secular and religious authorities delayed the enactment
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Table 6.1: Compuslory schooling introduction and enrolment in 1870.
Country Introduction of Compulsory Schooling Laws Primary Enrolment Ratio (%) in 1870
Prussia 1763 67
Spain 1838 42
Sweden 1842 71
Austria 1869 40
Italy 1877 29
Britain 1880 49
France 1882 75
Ireland 1892 38
Portugal 1844 13
Greece 1834 20
Notes: taken from Soysal and Strang (1989, p. 278). Primary enrolment is for both sexes,
aged between ve and 14. The years refer to the introduction of compulsory school attendance
- not the establishment of public schools or important, generic education reforms.
of laws in other countries. The French state, for example, struggled with the
Catholic Church for control over schooling over most of the nineteenth century.
The Church and landed gentry wanted to ensure the perpetuation of conserva-
tive sympathies, while the state was after building a republican France. The
passage of the \Jules Ferry Laws", which established free education in 1881 and
then mandatory and laic education in 1882, are in fact interpreted as part of
a broader anti-clerical campaign in France (Barnard, 1969). There were earlier
attempts: laws enacted in 1791 and 1833 to establish a state education system
were repealed by Napoleon and Louis Napoleon. Similarly, in Britain a number of
powerful interest groups prevented the state from controlling education until the
Foster Education Act of 1870, which provided a framework for national schooling,
and the 1880 Act which made schooling compulsory. Anglicans, Non-conformists,
and Dissenters tried to expand their congregations through schooling. The mid-
dle class was intent on maintaining its sons' advantages over the working class
(Soysal and Strang, 1989). These groups and their aims blocked the supply of a
unied national system until a late date, by European standards.
Crucially, table 6.1 also shows us that there is a weak relation between the tim-
ing of compulsory schooling laws and primary enrolment ratios. France achieved
an exceptionally high ratio by 1870, when its laws were enacted in 1882. Spain, by
contrast, enacted compulsory schooling lawas unusually early, in 1838, but only
managed a ratio of 42 per cent by 1870. Portugal and Greece had compulsory
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schooling laws for at least 25 years before registering some of the lowest enrolment
ratios in 1870.
While counter examples like Prussia and Sweden exist, these numbers indicate
a problematic relationship between national legislation and outcomes. That is,
the increases in literacy, numeracy, and enrolment ratios observed by historians
like Cipolla (1969) and in the lieracy data under study here cannot be solely a
supply-side story: laws sometimes came after enrolment improved, most notably
in France. Neither can it solely be a supply-side story in terms of resources:
Britain, with a developed economy, large taxable base, and stable institutions,
had persistently low literacy rates until the turn of the nineteenth century (Mitch,
1992). Further, even after the enactment of compulsory schooling laws, there was
considerable regional variation in literacy and enrolment rates within countries.
A Theil Index shows that within-country inequality in literacy rates was twice
as high as inequalities between countries: 0.062 for within country inequality,
and 0.036 for the between-country component. This either implies that the de
facto enforcement of schooling laws varied within countries, much like the ideas
underlying my regional institutions (INST ) measure, or that enforcement was
consistently poor wtihin countries, and variation in educational outcomes came
from variation in demand -drivers.
What could those demand-drivers be? Redding and Schott (2003) developed
a model that allows unskilled workers to endogenously decide whether to invest in
education based on the economic (export) prospects of their location. The main
explanatory variable is market potential. The intuition is an increase in mar-
ket potential lowers trade costs for rms exporting their products, increasing the
price of manufactures relative to agricultural goods. As manufactured goods are
more skill-intensive, rms would have less value-added to pay and retain skilled
workers, and so workers had less of an incentive to acquire skills. This predic-
tion has found empirical support in contemporary settings at international and
subnational levels (Lopez-Rodriguez et al., 2007; Redding and Schott, 2003; ?).
In the context under study here, however, we rst need establish some prelim-
inary foundation that is usually taken for granted in contemporary settings: in
particular, we need to ask whether the demands for human capital were coming
from industry - rather than agriculture or services - in the \Second Industrial
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Revolution."
Industrial demands for literacy
Becker et al. (2011b) provide us with evidence of this at the subnational level
in nineteenth century Prussia. The authors show that for Prussia, which was a
technology follower rathern than leader like Britain, formal education mattered.
They show that primary enrolment, across 344 counties, in 1816 had a strong
positive eect on the presence of metal manufacturers in 1849 and 1882. That is,
education is signicantly correlated wtih industrialisation in the early and later
phases of the Industrial Revolution. As Becker et al. (2011b, p. 120) conclude,
Industrial development...depended on the availability of an educated
population that was earlier aware of the producive potential of new
technologies and more capable of adjusting to change, Some regions
lacked these skills necessary to adopt the new industrial technologies
from and catch up to Britain.
Using some of my own data on French and German regional sectoral employment
(see Chapter 3 ) and on regional literacy rates, we can nd further support for
this. Literacy, as I discuss in section 6.3, is a noisy but useful measure of human
capital. Table 6.2 shows the correlations between regional literacy rates (L) and
agricultural and industrial employment shares in the regional labour force ( A
LF
and I
LF
, respectively). I control for year xed eects, since literacy and industrial
employment trend up over time while agricultural employment trends down, and
for country xed eects, since there a dierences in the meausurement of literacy
by country1 and because they introduced compulsory schooling laws at very dif-
ferent times (see table 6.1). Put together, French and German regions make up
53 per cent of my sample of regions. The results in columns 1 and 2 show that
the share of agricultural employment in total employment is negatively associ-
ated with literacy rates, and that the opposite is true for industrial employment;
both coecients are highly signicant. Introducing lags in columns 3 and 4, we
see that higher agricultural employment shares in previous years (the data cover
1870, 1900, and 1910) predict lower literacy rates; the opposite being true for
1I expand on this issue in section 6.3.
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industrial emplyoment shares. Finally, in column 5 we see that as the ratio of
industrial to agricultural employment shares ( I
LF
= A
LF
) increases, literacy rates
also increase.
Table 6.2: OLS French and German literacy rates versus sectoral employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A
LF -14.952***
(0.157)
I
LF 15.157**
(5.177)
A
LF t 1 -3.180**
(1.431)
I
LF t 1 5.755**
(2.173)
I
LF =
A
LF 0.457***
(0.084)
Country F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 324 324 216 216 324
R^2 0.663 0.671 0.222 0.100 0.658
Notes: Dependent variable is L, regional literacy rates measured in percentages. ALF is the
share, from zero to one, of a region's labour force in agriculture; ILF is the same for industry.
I
LF =
A
LF is the ratio of industrial to agricultural employment shares. Estimated using OLS,
with robust standard errors clustered on regions reported in brackets. The results do not
change when using a Tobit estimation procedure, with an upper censoring limit of 100 and
lower of 0. Panel consists of 23 German and 85 French regions over 1870, 1900 and 1910.
Employment data same as used in Chapter 3.
This is not to say that human capital, or literacy as measured here, was
useless to agricultural workers. As Lockheed et al. (1980) show in their rigorous
survey, there are positive and signicant returns to education in the form of
increased agricultural productivity and higher wages. The point of the model is
to say that the returns to human capital, proxied by literacy, were much higher
in the high value-added manufacturing sector relative to the low value-added
agricultural sector (the empirical results in Chapter 3, where I estimate regional
income using employment shares, makes this point on the relative productivity
dierences between the two sectors).1 Indeed, even when it comes to agriculture,
1Parnam (2012) nds substantial returns to education for farmers in the American Midwest
during the early-twentieth century. This is all well and good, but his study does not provide
estimates of these returns relative to non-agricultural sectors, which is crucial to the conceptual
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Lockheed et al. (1980) stress that returns are highest in modernising economies,
where there are new technologies (for example, chemical fertilisers) to adopt.
The rate of technological progress was also higher in the manufacturing sector
than in any other. As Mokyr (2002a, p. 67) discusses, industrialisation was about
the development of and commitment to technical knowledge, which depended on
literacy. In Britain this happened earliest. By the early-nineteenth century, the
commitment to `technical knowledge', as Mokyr (2002a) calls it trickled down
from the elite to the middle classes, to the extent that one observer noted, `In
every town, nay almost in every village, there are learned person running to and
from with electrical machines, galvanic troughs, retorts, crucibles, and geologist
hammers' (cited by Mokyr (2002a, p. 73)). These ideas were not new to West
(1985, p. 231), who argued that as Lancashire's indigenous population moved
into `key growth areas like manufacturing', where he says 'literacy was of more
consequence', Irish immigrants moved into the low-skilled jobs they left behind.
West (1985, p. 231) makes the additional point that as the literacy of the Irish
immigrants improved, compared to normal levels in their place of origin, `we can
still speak of this as a growth in education, and one that was associated with
industrialization.'
Why is manufacturing rather than services central to the explanation? Follow-
ing on from the discussion above, returns on education were higher in the man-
ufacturing sector because economically useful knowledge was increasing fastest
there. For example, London, already then a services centre, was as Van der Beek
(2010) writes less aected by technological progress because of its economic struc-
ture. Secondly, market potential is more relevant to manufacturers since, unlike
most services, they export their production and are, unlike agriculture, footloose.
The cost of distance has a more immediate eect on manufacturers than on ser-
vices where, during this period, output was mainly non-traded.1 Traded goods,
also contain embedded knowledge, which inuences human capital levels (Gross-
man and Helpman, 1991). More fundamentally, manufacturing is at the centre
of the model because this was an industrial age and we are trying to understand,
model I use here. We cannot know whether education was better rewarded in agriculture if we
do not know how well rewarded it was in manufacturing or commerce.
1Arguably, the traded proprotion of the London services sector was high enough for market
potential to have an eect. We cannot test this due to data unavailability.
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like Becker et al. (2011b), whether regions adapted to the growing and spreading
industrial economy; in this case, in terms of their human capital levels.
The foundation we have to lay down concerns the explanatory variable: why
should we expect the Redding and Schott (2003) market potential explanation to
work in this context? First, table 6.1 has already shown us that the argument
cannot be simply an institutional one. Laws that unied and established national
compuslory schooling were enacted some times after primary enrolment improved,
as in France, and some times long before, with no improvement in enrolment af-
terwards, as in Spain. Secondly, the Theil Index of regional literacy rates brought
up earlier shows us that the within-country component of inequality accounts for
two-thirds of the total inequality in literacy rates (the rest accounted for by the
between-country component). Not only was regional literacy rate variation high,
but like per capita income and market potential, it was spatially autocorrelated,
as can be seen in gure 6.1.
We can be more systematic about this and calculate Moran's I statistic of
spatial autocorrelation. The statistic is calculated as:
I =
NP
i
P
j wij
P
i
P
j wij(Li   X)(Lj   L)P
i(Li   L
)2 (6.1)
where N is the number of regions indexed by i and j; L is regional literacy
rate; L is the cross-sectional mean of L; and wij is an element of the spatial
weights matrix used in Chapter 3. It is a squared inverse distance spatial ma-
trix, where Euclidean distance is measured between all regional nodes, but only
geographically close regions are substantially associated with one another. That
is, closer regions get bigger weights. Values for I range between -1 (perfect dis-
persion) to 1 (perfect spatial correlation), and its expected value under the null
hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation E(I) equals  1=N   1. The results in
table 6.3 show that at each year regional literacy rates were spatially autocorre-
lated, that is, high (low) regional literacy rates were located near other high (low)
regional literacy rates. I is not particularly large, but it is positive, and highly
statistically signicant.
High within-country variation and evidence of spatial autocorrelation in lit-
eracy rates imply that changes on the supply-side, in states enacting laws that
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Figure 6.1: Map of regional literacy rates
Notes: Underlying data are in percentages, and are expressed as cross-sectional standard
deviations on the map.
Table 6.3: Spatial autocorrelation in regional literacy rates
1870 1900 1910 Sample
I 0.131 0.137 0.125 0.183
E(I) -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002
Notes: I is the Moran's I statistic; E(I) is its expected value. All values of I are statistically
signicant at the one per cent level, as calculated with a one-tail test.
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made primary education compulsory and in building schools, do not really work
as an explanation. As Murtin and Viarengo (2011) discuss, enforcement of these
laws was weak due to budget constraints, making primary schooling more of an
option than a rule. So, while the option of education may have been enabled by
these laws, regional literacy variation shows that the option was valued dierently
across space. This calls for an explanation of literacy rates that is spatial and
sub-national in nature. Market potential can, in theory, account for both these
observations in the literacy data: as the preceding chapter has shown, it predicts
clustering and operates at subnational levels.
Indeed, ?, p. 593 nds that access to markets of demand play an important
role in Europe's contemporary regional income structure, but that the benets
of market access, he argues, come from `increased incentives for physical and
human capital accumulation and not from direct trade cost savings.' This is
an expected nding for a European economy with no taris and low transport
costs that is mainly based on tradeable services, but in the 1870 and 1910 period,
when economies were industrialising and there was no customs or monetary union
to speak of, the human capital channel is unlikely to be as substantial as the
direct trade cost savings channel. Still, the intention here is not to set up a
horse race between the two channels; it is only to show that both mattered,
that is, \geography" mattered in more ways than one, and can in fact integrate
explanations (as in, human capital versus geography) that are often pitted against
each other (Hanson, 2005; Midelfart et al., 2000). Before getting into the empirical
analysis, it is important to examine whether literacy rates proxy human capital
levels well enough for my purposes.
6.3 Literacy Rates as human capital
Woessmann (2003) discuss a range of human capital proxies. Many of them, like
\education-augmented labour input," are dicult to use in historical work due to
data constraints. Even if the data do exist, however, the time and labour needed
to \augment" them are beyond what I can do here (Cvrcek and Zajicek, 2013;
Hippe, 2012). As such, (Hippe, 2012, p. 1530) writes that `the most important
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proxies for human capital in Europe are literacy (the ability to read and write,
and to sign a register) and, more recently, numeracy.' Other economic historians
have used school enrolment ratios and book production, but even these variables
are dicult to nd in most cases (Baten and Van Zanden, 2008; Becker et al.,
2011b). Here I use the regional literacy data used in Chapter 4, and detailed in
Appendix B, but given its more central role in this chapter, it is worth reviewing
the use of literacy in historical work and its associated issues.
Literacy has long been a popular measure of human capital. It is a noisy
\output" (or stock) measure of human capital, as opposed to \input" (or ow)
measures like school enrolment. As Vincent (2004, p. 24) put it, literacy is a
`tool for enabling individuals and social groups to extend theur understanding of
themselves and their world.' Gra (1991) categorises work done on historical lit-
eracy into three generations. First, authors like Schoeld (1968), Cipolla (1969),
and Stone (1969) laid the groundwork for future research in the eld by emphasis-
ing the importance of literacy and its changes - in the case of Cipolla (1969), on a
global scale. It also provided us with extensive sources of data, Building on their
work, the second generation exploited more detailed quantitative information on
literacy with more advanced techniques (Mitch, 1992; Schoeld, 1981). Lastly,
the third generation has been combining the study and collection of literacy data
with other measures, such as numeracy (Crayen and Baten, 2010; Hippe, 2012;
Reis, 2005). Throughout all these generations the main aim has been to measure
human capital through literacy, and to check this measure against other possible
ones.
What are the issues with using literacy? First, observations may be of people
who can read but are not necessarily capable of understanding the content of what
they are reading. Second, we might also be observng people whose only writing
skill is that of signing a contract or marriage register - like Vincent (2000), I use
marriage registers to measure nineteenth century British literacy. Third, literacy
may be measured dierently across countries. For Germany, my literacy data
is drawn from adult military recruits listed in yearbooks, while for France, it is
\jeunes gens" listed in census books. Fourth, literacy may be a relevant proxy of
human capital, but is more relevant in certain periods than in others. That is,
literacy may only contain useful information on human capital in periods where
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economies and societies were literacy-scarce. Further Woessmann (2003, p. 243)
makes the point that while literacy rates `certainly reect a component of the
relevant stock of human capital...they miss out most of the investments made in
human capital because they only reect the very rst part of these investments.'
That is, literacy rates exclude the acquisition of more \advanced" human capital,
like logical or analytical reasoning. I deal with these points below.
6.3.1 Literacy in the Second Industrial Revolution
Perhaps it is best to start with the criticism that, during the Second Industrial
Revolution, literacy was not a relevant form of human capital. That is, during
this period of industrialisation acquiring education was often done in the form
of on-the-job learning, apprenticeships, and general work-experience, rather than
learning how to read and write at school. A corollary of this point is that the mass
of (factory) workers during this period did not require, and so did not achieve,
literacy in their working lives.1
The regression results in table 6.2 have already shown us that as a the share of
a region's labour force in industry increased, and increased relative to agricultural
shares, its literacy rate also increased. If literacy were irrelevant to industrial em-
ployment during this period, then we would expect a negative or insignicant
correlation. Even if literacy preceded industrialisation, as it did in Sweden or
Britain, industry still placed demands for more literacy: I am not after explain-
ing the initial spurt in industry or literacy (Sandberg, 1979). As Becker et al.
(2011b) argue, education may not have been important for the rst industrialiser,
but was important in the Continent's catch-up industrialisation. The corollary
of this is that regions starting from a low-GDP base would invest more in edu-
cation in an eort to catch up, as evidenced by the German experience (Becker
et al., 2011b). Further, even if we accept that low-level factory work may not
have required literacy, industrialisation more generally `created more jobs, both
in skilled artisanal and supervisory capacities...for which literacy was, if not an
absolute requirement, at any rate a great advantage.' (Laquer, 1974, p. 102).
1These pessimistic views of the eects of industrialisation are were summarised quite early
by West (1978). It is surprising that the tradition persists.
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Moreover, it is a misconception that this phase of industrialisation bred a mass
of low-level, illiterate factory operatives. Even in towns were industry was the
largest employer, factory operatives formed only a minority of the labour force.
In, for example, nineteenth century Manchester and Salford, `only 25 per cent of
the working classes - which themselves were said to constitute only 66 per cent
of the community - worked in any capacity in textile factories' (Laquer, 1974,
p. 102). In Bury, another town dominated by the cotton industry, only 40 per
cent were so employed. In mid-nineteenth century industrial Preston, only 26 per
cent of the male population over 20 were ccategorised as in factory employment
(Laquer, 1974, p. 103). Industrialisation did not create, as Laquer (1974, p. 103)
put it,
...an urban economy and society which was dominated by the lower
factory operative. Not only did the economy require supervisory per-
sonnel for whom literacy was necessary, or very nearly so, but it cre-
ated a whole mass of ancillary jobs - in engineering, transport, trade,
retailing, nance, and the older artisanal trades.
Indeed, West (1978, p. 381) identies 1867 - the approximate start of the\Second
Industrial Revolution" - as a truning point in the decline of illiteracy in Britian.
That is three years before the Forster Act; 13 years before national compulsion
was enacted; and 15 years before the state provided \free" schooling.
Finally, even if education was acquired through on-the-job learning or ap-
prenticeships, this would not exclude the potential for workers to become liter-
ate. First, it is important to note that apprenticeships were more a system of
the early-modern economy rather than the Second Industrial Revolution (Leunig
et al., 2012). Second, Humphries (2010, p. 342) shows that, in Britain, the mean
years of schooling for the 1851-1878 cohort was 10 per cent higher for those in
mining and metals than it was for those in agriculture. Third, Laquer (1974, p.
106-7) gives evidence that shows factory workers would attend Sunday schools
- set up for the express purpose of schooling factory workers - to improve their
literacy and numeracy skills, and move into other occupations. Indeed, Becker
et al. (2011b) show that primary schooling was the most important source of
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literacy acquisition.1
6.3.2 Reading and writing quality
Another objection to using literacy is that it is too basic: that people may have
been able to read, but not understand the content of what they are reading,
and that, in the case of the British data, could only sign their name, but not
write. One way of getting at these concerns is to compare my literacy data with
other data on human capital, wherever it is available. Hippe (2012) shows, for a
number of European regions over the nineteenth century, strong positive correla-
tions between adult (ages 23 to 72) literacy rates and numeracy (as measured by
age-heaping). This encouragingly indicates that those recorded as literate were
also likely to be numerate.2 In this vein, I draw out a number of comparisons
between my literacy data and the available school enrolment data. While liter-
acy is a stock and enrolment a ow measure of human capital, ows of human
capital depend on contemporaneous levels of human capital. The return, and
so acquisition, of human capital depends on its stock. As Mokyr (2002b, p. 2)
counter-intuitively argues, skilled workers are much more productive when they
are among other skilled workers - not when they are the scarce resource. If there
is a strong positive correlation between the literacy data and enrolment data,
where more than a basic reading and writing ability is required, then it tells us
two things: literacy does not occur in isolation of other forms of human capital
(it is unlikely to have a literate, and unschooled population), and it is correlated
with the \true" variation in human capital.
Starting with some straightforward national enrolment numbers, table 6.4
shows the Spearman rank correlations between my literacy data, averaged by
country-year, and the national primary and secondary enrolment rates in Lindert
(2004), for Austria, Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and Fernandes and
Schulze (2009) for Hungary. The ranks show strong consistency between the two
measures, adding weight to the validity of the literacy data, and the notion that
1Primary schooling data cannot be used here because it is unavaible for most regions and
years under study. See Hippe (2012) for human capital data constraints and alternatives.
2Hippe (2012) was, unfortunately, unable to share any of his data.
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literacy is correlated with other measures of human capital.
Table 6.4: Literacy and primary and secondary enrolment rank correlations
1870 1900 1910
1870 0.77***
1900 0.83***
1910 0.84***
Notes: Literacy rates are means by country-year, and enrolment rates are from Lindert
(2004). Figures are Spearman rank correlation coecients, where *** indicates statistical
signicance at one per cent. Countries: Austria, Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and
Hungary. Values for Hungary from Fernandes and Schulze (2009). The cross-sections in
Lindert (2004) only match with my 1870 (1880 in Lindert (2004)), 1900, and 1910 data.
Moving onto regions, we can draw comparisons between enrolment and literacy
for Austria, Britain, and Italy. The data for Austrian regions are from Cvrcek
and Zajicek (2013), and record the school enrolment for both boys and girls
between the ages of six and 12, which was made compulsory in 1869. The authors
provide data on enrolment by generation for the 1830 to 1850 period. The data
for British regions are from the 1851 Education Census, and record \elementary
school enrolment,"which is the the number of pupils in attendence in day schools
(not evening or Sunday schools) on census day in 1851, divided by population
aged between 5 and 19 inclusive. I also collected additional literacy data from the
Annual Register books for the 1841 to 1861 period to draw further comparisons
in this exercise.1 The data for Italian regions are from Felice (2012), and are
unusually detailed. He provides, for 1871, 1891, and 1911, regional data on
primary and secondary enrolment (ages six to 14); tertiary enrolment (ages 14 to
19); and on total enrolment (all ages).
In table 6.5 I show the OLS correlations between all the available enrolment
data and my literacy dataset. The average R2 of all regressions is 68 per cent; a
strong correlation, given the varying leads and lags used, and the small number
of regions available per regression. It also tells us that the literacy data are a
fair reection of what was going on, in terms of human capital, in a region. Of
all 44 regressions, the only statistically insignicant coecient is that for the
correlation between British literacy in 1910 and school enrolment in 1851, with
a P-value of 0.33. Including this gure, the average probability value is 0.01,
1See Appendix 2 for more details on sources of literacy data.
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Table 6.5: OLS correlations between literacy and other human capital measures
Country Group Literacy Rate in: Ind. Variable Coe. T-stat. P-value R2 N
Britain 1841 Enr., 1851 2.117 3.540 0.008 0.296 10
Britain 1851 Enr., 1851 1.353 10.340 0.000 0.520 11
Britain 1861 Enr., 1851 1.048 6.790 0.000 0.503 11
Britain 1870 Enr., 1851 0.831 4.300 0.002 0.523 11
Britain 1881 Enr., 1851 0.587 4.270 0.002 0.520 11
Britain 1891 Enr., 1851 0.271 3.440 0.007 0.540 11
Britain 1900 Enr., 1851 0.069 2.070 0.068 0.466 11
Britain 1910 Enr., 1851 0.029 1.030 0.331 0.147 11
Austria 1870 Enr., 1830 generation 46.481 3.910 0.002 0.707 13
Austria 1870 Enr., 1840 generation 50.811 4.550 0.001 0.778 13
Austria 1870 Enr., 1850 generation 55.849 5.020 0.000 0.835 13
Austria 1900 Enr., 1830 generation 27.504 3.020 0.012 0.609 13
Austria 1900 Enr., 1840 generation 30.355 3.350 0.007 0.681 13
Austria 1900 Enr., 1850 generation 30.355 3.350 0.007 0.681 13
Austria 1910 Enr., 1830 generation 12.073 4.580 0.001 0.755 13
Austria 1910 Enr., 1840 generation 13.163 5.760 0.000 0.827 13
Austria 1910 Enr., 1850 generation 14.491 7.260 0.000 0.889 13
Italy 1870 Total Enr., 1871 5.313 15.280 0.000 0.879 19
Italy 1870 Total Enr., 1891 5.243 17.210 0.000 0.928 19
Italy 1870 Total Enr., 1911 5.099 8.590 0.000 0.842 19
Italy 1870 P. + S. Enr., 1871 1.121 34.290 0.000 0.963 20
Italy 1870 P. + S. Enr., 1891 1.244 7.400 0.000 0.898 20
Italy 1870 P. + S. Enr., 1911 1.425 7.890 0.000 0.851 20
Italy 1870 Tertiary Enr., 1871 49.965 2.950 0.009 0.375 19
Italy 1870 Tertiary Enr., 1891 24.136 3.420 0.003 0.436 19
Italy 1870 Tertiary Enr., 1911 14.215 3.020 0.008 0.325 19
Italy 1900 Total Enr., 1871 6.518 11.820 0.000 0.827 19
Italy 1900 Total Enr., 1891 6.746 32.240 0.000 0.961 19
Italy 1900 Total Enr., 1911 6.731 13.100 0.000 0.918 19
Italy 1900 P. + S. Enr., 1871 1.144 9.600 0.000 0.898 20
Italy 1900 P. + S. Enr., 1891 1.362 23.760 0.000 0.965 20
Italy 1900 P. + S. Enr., 1911 1.541 14.640 0.000 0.892 20
Italy 1900 Tertiary Enr., 1871 64.878 2.950 0.009 0.396 19
Italy 1900 Tertiary Enr., 1891 31.366 3.730 0.002 0.461 19
Italy 1910 Tertiary Enr., 1911 18.846 3.270 0.005 0.358 19
Italy 1910 Total Enr., 1871 6.308 9.330 0.000 0.772 19
Italy 1910 Total Enr., 1891 6.734 24.060 0.000 0.954 19
Italy 1910 Total Enr., 1911 6.880 19.250 0.000 0.955 19
Italy 1910 P. + S. Enr., 1871 0.989 5.530 0.000 0.793 20
Italy 1910 P. + S. Enr., 1891 1.239 16.680 0.000 0.942 20
Italy 1910 P. + S. Enr., 1911 1.411 8.390 0.000 0.882 20
Italy 1910 Tertiary Enr., 1871 66.176 3.040 0.007 0.410 19
Italy 1910 Tertiary Enr., 1891 31.804 3.860 0.001 0.472 19
Italy 1910 Tertiary Enr., 1911 19.457 3.350 0.004 0.379 19
Notes: See text for sources of data. Underlying data are regions, grouped by countries,
where \N" is the number of regions. \Ind. Variable" is the independent variable used in
the regression. \Coe." is the regression coecient on that variable. 'Enr.' stands for
enrolment; 'P+S' for primary plus secondary enrolment. N=number of regions. Estimated
using OLS, with robust standard errors clustered on regions. Rates are in percentage form.
The OLS results do not change in a Tobit estimation.
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implying statistical signicance at the ve per cent level. The coecients reect
the dierence in timining of the variables. In Austria, the largest coecient is
that for the correlation between enrolment of the 1850s generation and literacy
in 1870, by when that generation would have made it into the adult literacy
sampling. Still, the coecient on the 1830s generation is only 17 per cent smaller,
so we cannot be sure that schooling was the only source of literacy. In Italy, we
see similar eects. There is, for example, a particularly strong correlation (R2 of
96 per cent) between literacy in 1910 and total school enrolment in 1911. While
it is normal in the literature to think of school enrolment as an input and literacy
as an output, these regression show us that the relationship can be interpreted
in much broader terms. There were, according to this estimates, other sources
of literacy, and the contemporaneous eects (of, say literacy and enrolment in
the same year being highly correlated) indicate that literate societies were ones
where schooling and literacy were both important. Quantitatively speaking, the
measurement error in literacy rates (as a measure of human capital) is not great
enough (or random) to distort its correlation with other, more formal measures
of human capital, so it is not unreasonable to assume that literacy is correlated
with the \true" and unobservable value of human capital. We can extend this
idea in another check.
Taking Felice (2012) data series on regional literacy, primary and secondary
enrolment, and tertiary enrolment, I extracted the rst principal component of all
the regional cross-sections put together to approximate something a\true"human
capital component. This rst component has an eigenvalue of 2.62 and explains
87 per cent of the variation across all three series. Its correlation coecient with
tertiary enrolment is 0.88; 0.95 with primary and secondary enrolment; and 0.97
with literacy, where all coecients are signicant at the one per cent level. While
its strongest correlation is with literacy, we should not put too much weight on
this exercise; it is here to support the results in table 6.5 and their interpretation.
6.3.3 Cross-country measurement of literacy
One nal issue is the whether regional literacy rates are comparable between
countries, given their dierent samples (for example, military recuits in Germany
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or youth in France) and dierent measurement (for example, signing a register in
Britain or comprehension tests in Germany).
Given the results in table 6.2 establish strong correlations between literacy
rates and industrial employment for a sample of French and German regions, we
take this relationship as a baseline correlation and see how country eects dier. If
dierences in the way literacy was measured between the two countries produced
systematically dierent variation in their regional literacy series, then we would
expect those series to have dierent eects on the same target variable: industrial
employment. If dierences in measurement produced no systematic dierence in
variation, then they should have similar eects on industrial employment.
In this estimation, I replace country xed eects with regional ones, so we are
looking at variation within regions rather than countries; I standardise the data
(0 mean; 1 standard deviation) and run regressions for both countries together
and then separately. The results are in table 6.6.
Table 6.6: Cross-country comparison of literacy
(1) (2) (3)
L L L
I
LF 0.979*** 0.767** 1.025***
(0.240) (0.224) (0.290)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.101 0.331 0.094
N 324 255 69
Sample FR+DE FR DE
Notes: *** denotes statistical signicance at one per cent; and ** at ve per cent. Robust
standard errors are clustered on regions, and are reported in brackets. ILF is a region's share
of industrial employment I in its labour force LF ; and L is literacy rate. FR denotes French
regions, and DE German ones. The OLS results do not change in a Tobit estimation.
Column (1) shows a standardised coecient of 0.979, signicant at one per
cent, when the sample includes both countries. This is the baseline eect. Column
(2) shows a coecient that is 0.21 standard deviations smaller. The T-ratios, at
4.079 for column (1) and 3.424 for column (2) are also very similar. Column (3),
the French regions sample, produces a coecient of 1.025, which is 0.26 standard
deviations larger than the German sample one. This may appear to be a more
meaningful dierence, but with a T-ratio of 3.534, the estimate is actually almost
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identical to that of the France sample. In practice, these dierences are not large
enough to produce any substantive dierences between the two countries.
This admittedly brief check shows us that while there were dierences between
countries in the way literacy was measured, they do not produce any systematic
biases. A possible explanation is that adult literacy is likely to have been cor-
related with youth literacy, and the literacy of military recruits is likely to have
been correlated with that of the general adult population. Further, when it comes
to the econometrics, it is possible to look at variation within countries - the level
at which measurement methods varied. It should also be noted that when it
comes to analysis of my full panel of data, a systematic bias can only occur if
literacy measured in one country is correlated with the panel model's error term,
and there is no reason that I am aware of to suspect this.
6.4 Empirical Strategy
In their empirical analyses, Redding and Schott (2003) and ? regress contem-
poraneous levels of human capital on levels of market potential. They nd a
signicant and robust positive relationship. Regressing my literacy rates in per-
centage form on my log market potential (MPC), I get an R2 of 0.226 and a
coecient, signicant at one per cent, of 2.87 per cent (= ln[17:72]). With region
and year xed eects, the R2 rises to 0.241 and the coecient, signicant at ve
per cent, falls slightly to 2.10 per cent (= ln[7:85]). There is clearly a strong
contemporaneous correlation, given the correlation between stocks and ows of
human capital. Market potential would aect, contemporaneously, ows, but I
can only measure stocks. Redding and Schott (2003) and ? do not address this
issue, but in my OLS estimations I experiment with lags, showing the same eect.
A more important issue is the endogeneity between literacy and market po-
tential. Data on GDP forms a large part of MPC , and a number of studies have
established a causal relationship running from human capital to income (Barro,
1991, 1997). To alleviate the risk of endogeneity, I rst-dierence the variables
in a simple OLS setting, and then instrument market potential, as in Chapter 5,
with distance to London (Dist London).
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The OLS implementation takes the following form:
Lit   Lit 1 = + [ln(MPCit )  ln(MPCit 1)] + X+ c + t + it (6.2)
where L is the literacy rate in percentage form of region i at year t; MPC is
the constructed market potential measure; X is matrix of control variables that
may aect changes in regional literacy rates;  is a year xed eects term to
control for common shocks and upward trends in literacy growth rates; and  is
a xed eects term for regions, c.
Under X, I control for two other variables that proxy for supply-side deter-
minants of literacy. First, regions' shares of sample GDP by year, GDP shareit
(= 100  GDPit=
Pj
n=1GDPt). Second, population density, PD. The rationale
for the latter is that services like education are more eciently supplied among
dense populations (Olsson and Hansson, 2011). The rationale for the former is
based on historical accounts of education as a way of improving or maintaining
an economy's standing. For example, according to Sanderson (1999, p. 15-6),
Baron Lyon Playfair, a Scottish chemist and Liberal MP for the Universities of
Edinburgh and St. Andrew's, later Postmaster General under Gladstone, took
the view that
...if Britain were to remain without taris, as he [Playfair] advocated,
then it would be self defeating unless British industry were made as
ecient as that of countries from which we imported. Education for
economic eciency was the only true protection.
This view was motivated by the rise of industrial Germany, which had come to
dominate the world chemicals and dye market by 1913. It was echoed by Sir Philip
Magnus, an educational reformer, MP for the London University constituency,
and director of the City and Guilds, who argued for `...state support for science
and education to create industries from chemistry and electrical physics based
on creatable and educable expertise...' Sanderson (1999, p. 15-6). Along with
PD, this variable is intended to control for the supply-side story; or at least, the
motivations for the state supply of human capital. If a region's share of output
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fell from one year to the next, or even if it were at a low level, policymakers would
be incentivised to invest in the provision of education. We see this in the quotes
of Baron Lyon Playfair and Sir Philip Magnus, but also in ocial reports like
that of Mann (1846) or Stowe (1834), who toured Europe, examining national
public education systems in the service of American states. Their reports make
clear the internationally competitive nature of public education provision, even
in the early nineteenth century. As Stowe (1834, p. 8) writes,
In short the world seems to be awake and combining in one simul-
taneous eort for the spread of education; and sad indeed will be the
condition of that community which lags behind in this universal march.
The quantitative analysis in Benavot and Riddle (1989) of a global sample of
countries between 1870 and 1913 shows that this synchronised move towards
public education was motivated by international economic and political competi-
tion. Were these forces feeding through to the regional level? I can do no better
than quote from Cousin's report on Prussian public education for the Count of
Montalivet, French Minister of the Interior. Full of praise for public education in
Prussia, Cousin (1834, p. 21) writes that,
In short, the end of the entire organization of public instruction in
Prussia is, to leave details to the local powers, and to reserve to the
minister and his council the direction and general impulse given to the
whole.
We have seen in the preious chapter that relative market potential aects regional
GDP shares, which may present multicolinearity here. The Pearson (Spearman)
correlation between log market potential in its absolute form and GDP shares,
however, at 0.030 (-0.005) is small and insignicant. The variable GDPshare
is interesting because both a negative and positive signed coecient would be
consistent with its conceptual basis. If fears of falling further behind dominate
public policy (the \follower" eect), then a negative coecient should emerge. If
fears of losing an initially high standing dominate (the \leader" eect), then a
positive coecient should emerge. It is dicult to form expectations based on
the historiography, which provides evidence for both, so this is a purely empirical
question.
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Growth in literacy can arguably aect growth in GDP (and so market po-
tential). One way of dealing with this source of potential bias is to use an IV
strategy. I instrument market potential in the same way as the previous chapter,
by using distance to London, Dist London, and control for the same variables in
X. The IV implementation is as follows:
Lit =  +  ln\MPCit + X+ c + t + it (6.3)
lnMPCit = +  lnDist Londonit + X+ c + t + it (6.4)
where equation 6.4 is the rst stage regression, in which market potential is
regressed on distance to Lonon and the other independent variables, and equa-
tion 6.3 is the second stage, in which the predicted values of market potential are
used to explain literacy rates. While an IV estimation gets us closer to a causal
explanation, there a number of things that can be improved; more detailed data
on human capital (wider coverage of school enrolment or age-specic literacy),
for example. Still, a signicant and positive coecient on market potential here
would lend further empirical support to the Redding and Schott (2003) theory,
and provide an explanation that is consistent with regionally clustered and un-
equal literacy rates, as seen in gure 6.1 and table 6.3.
6.4.1 Results
Table 6.7 shows the OLS results. Column (1) starts o the estimations, where
all variables are specied as contemporaneous changes, controlling for region and
year xed eects. The market potential eect is large and highly signicant. The
coecient implies a three per cent (= ln[21:886]) increase in regional literacy
rates for every one per cent increase in market potential. In standardised form,
this a 0.685 standard deviation eect on literacy - or 14.72 percentage points of
literacy. In 1870, three Italian regions and one Spanish region had lower literacy
rates than this: Lucania, Calabria, Sardinia, and the Canary Islands. GDP share
(in percentage form) and lnPD are insignicant, supporting the demand-side
explanation for literacy. Given its statistical insignicance, we should not place
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too much emphasis on GDP share , but that it is positive supports the \leader"
eect. That is, regions that grew their share of total output also improved their
literacy rates.
In column (2), I use a lag of market potential (lnMPCt 1), which is signicant
at the ve per cent level. The coecient implies a much smaller 5.7 per cent
eect.This reduction in magnitude is likely to be a result of the large gaps between
each benchmark year. The other independent variables remain insignicant.
Table 6.7: OLS literacy and market potential
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 lnMPC 21.886*** 21.886*** 1.893* 7.415**
(1.501) (1.501) (1.044) (3.717)
GDP share 1042.5 -468.4** 1042.6 -106.59 821.09
(710.26) (351.184) (810.26) (765.183) (664.67)
 lnPD -10.943 3.339 -10.943 -2.559 -1.243
(9.645) (2.883) (9.645) (2.076) (11.437)
 lnMPt 1 5.699**
(1.641)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region F.E. Yes No Yes Yes Yes
 0.737***bR2 0.562 0.084 0.542 0.081 0.083
N 398 199 398 143 56
Notes: Dependent variable is the percentage point change in literacy rates, L. *** denotes
statistical signicance at one per cent; ** at ve per cent; and * at 10 per cent. Robust
standard errors are clustered on countries, and are reported in brackets. MPC is constructed
market potential; PD is population density; GDPshare is a region's cross-sectional GDP
share in sample GDP in percentage form; and .  is the coecient on the spatially-weighted
error term in the spatial error model. The dependent variables in columns 4 and 5 are,
respectively, the top two and bottom two quartiles of regional literacy levels. The OLS
results do not change in a Tobit estimation.
In the remaining columns, I deal with three potential sources of error. In
column (3), I use a spatial error model to correct for spatial autocorrelation in
the model's error term, given the high spatial correlation of literacy seen in table
6.3. This might bias the standard errors reported in column (1). A spatial error
model applies a spatial weights matrix to the model's error term. The matrix I
use is the same as that in Chapter 3 and underlying table 6.3. It is a squared
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inverse distance spatial matrix, where Euclidean distance is measured between all
regional nodes, but only geographically close regions are meaningfully associated
with one another. The coecient on this saptially-weighted error term, , is
positive and signicant, indicating the presence of spatial autocorrelation between
the errors. As the spatial error model treats spatial eects as a spatial nuissance
to be corrected, this is only of interest if it aects the model's other coecients.
This it does not do: the magnitude and signicance of all coecients are the same
as previous estimations.
In columns (4) and (5), I run the same specication as in column (1), only
dividing the samples into the top two and bottom two quartiles of literacy levels.
Column (4) is the top two, and column (5) is the bottom two quartile sub-sample.
Most regions enjoyed high and increasing literacy rates throughout the period,
so the distribution of literacy is skewed to the right. This skew may result in
coecients that are biased to high literacy regions. It is also interesting to see
how the market potential eect varied according to literacy levels. The coecients
are signicant across both subsamples, but less so for the high literacy regions,
as we would expect.
Table 6.8 contains the results of the IV implementation 6.4 and 6.4. Column
(1) shows the rst-stage estimation, that is, a regression of market potential on the
cost to London instrument (lnCost London), population density and GDP share,
while controlling for region and year xed eects. We see that the instrument
continues to have in this specication a highly signicant negative eect on market
potential, as in previous chapters. This results is backed up by the Angrist-
Pischke F-statistic on excluding the instrument, which is far above the 12-points
rule of thumb mark. The Anderson LM-statistic for weak identication, at 67.09,
is also re-assuring.
The second stage results in column (2) stand alongside the OLS equivalent in
column (3). The coecients on market potential are both highly signicant. The
IV estimate (a 2.9 per cent eect) is similar to the OLS estimate (a 3.11 per cent
eect). The IV results also support the OLS results in table 6.7. They show us
that the spatial distribution of human capital was not random, and that it was
driven by demand-side variables, namely market potential. A market potential
explanation deals with the spatial structure of the distribution, and the paradox of
179
Table 6.8: OLS literacy and market potential
(1) (2) (3)
IV-1 IV-2 OLS
lnCost London -0.091***
(0.022)
 lnMPC 19.346** 22.553***
(1.152) (1.091)
GDP share -125.82 -522.52 -59.21
(123.46) (328.96) (327.47)
 lnPD 2.655*** -11.983**
(0.250) (4.254) (9.645) (4.282)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Region F.E. Yes Yes YesbR2 0.552 0.706 0.718
N 597 597 597
Notes: *** denotes statistical signicance at one per cent; ** at ve per cent; and * at
10 per cent. Robust standard errors are clustered on countries, and are reported in brack-
ets. IV   2 is the second stage IV estimation; and IV   1 is the rst stage. L is literacy
rate in percentage form; MPC is constructed market potential; PD is population density;
GDPshare is a region's cross-sectional GDP share in sample GDP in percentage form; and
lnCost London is distance to London. Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-test is on the ex-
cluded IVs for MP rst stage. Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic for weak identication is
conducted jointly on the excluded IVs. Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic is for under-
identication. The OLS results in column 3 do not change in a Tobit estimation. Mark
Schaer at Heriot-Watt University supplied the Stata code for this estimation
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national laws enforcing compulsory education along with the presence of high re-
gional inequalities in literacy rates. To the extent that industrialisation depended
on human capital, and authors have shown this to be the case, these results have
implications for the Continent's catch-up industrialisation (Becker et al., 2011b;
Leunig et al., 2011). According to this line of argument, market potential did
not only aect industrialisation through the trade cost savings channel, but also
through its eects on human capital.
6.5 Discussion
In this chapter, I have shown that changes in human capital, measured by literacy
rates, were caused by changes in market potential, as people sought to capitalise
on higher returns to education. To the extent that technological and industrial
progress depended on a region's human capital, the implications of these results
are that market potential shaped a region's ability to industrialise. Leunig et al.
(2011, p. 434) conclude their analysis of London apprenticeships and human
capital formation by writing, `where barriers exist that prevent people exploiting
their talents, societies as well as individuals will suer.' This much we know, but
the debate centres on what these barriers were. This chapter's results show that
trade costs were an important barrier: they not only determined the location of
economic activity directly, but also indirectly, through its demands for human
capital.
For Pollard (1981, p. 249), `adverse social milieu' (typied, partly, by low
literacy rates) were dening characteristics - rather than a cause or eect - of
underdeveloped regions. In his words, `illiteracy gures of countries like Russia
or Italy were extremely high even at the end of the [nineteenth] century, and
there was `Gefaelle' [gradient] of literacy across Europe as there was of national
incomes.' This gradient can be explained by the cultural characteristics Pollard
alludes to,1 but such a cultural explanation should not be the rst port of call:
growth in literacy was largely a function of, quite simply, expanding markets.
1'Italian entrepreneurs were unwilling to take risks...Spanish society was too rigid and there
was social resistance to change...' (Pollard, 1981, p. 249).
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Similarly, Berend (2013, p. 348) described the core's incentives as `the entic-
ing spectacle of Western industrial transformation,' but did not explicitly connect
this to education or literacy. Like Pollard (1981), he blames illiteracy on social
characteristics and government inaction, but does not explain why governments
might have been inactive or that it might have been people who were unrespon-
sive. The gradient of illiteracy can be explained through rational human capital
investment decisions in the periphery. It is not `market consciousness and capi-
talist spirit' that people had to wait for, but market potential (Pollard, 1981, p,
249). Investments in education were costly, especially in countries with inecient
public service provision, and it would make no sense in making them unless the
expected returns were high.
Market potential thus shaped Europe's regional income structure through the
trade cost and market potential channel, as well as through the incentives it pro-
vided for the accumulation of human capital. This second eect also goes some
way in explaining why some regions, despite having high levels of market po-
tential, failed to exploit it. That failure may have been a result of blockages in
the market potential-human capital channel; perhaps changes in market poten-
tial were not high enough to warrant human capital investments. Low levels of
human capital, in turn, hindered regions' abilities to develop. More broadly, this
chapter gives us another way of thinking about the relationship between factor
endowments and market potential in industrial location, in contrast to pitting
the variables against each other.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
The literature on late-nineteenth century European regional development has
been empirically and theoretically incomplete. Starting with Pollard (1973), his-
torians picked Europe apart into regions, and explained industrialisation across
the Continent in terms of\diusion", as though the only barrier to industrial loca-
tion was time. Many years later, economists formalised old geographical ideas like
market potential, providing us with a theoretical and empirical framework to un-
derstand regional development: NEG (Harris, 1954; Krugman, 1991). Some years
later, economic historians applied these ideas to individual European countries,
nding that per capita incomes were higher in regions with better market poten-
tial and that as trade costs dropped, production concentrated spatially (Combes
et al., 2011; Crafts, 2005a; Roses, 2003). Building on this progress, I extended
the same theoretical framework over Europe during a period of fast-falling trade
costs, in search of an explanation of its spatial income pattern.
At the start of the period, trade costs were high, and so economic activity
- long concentrated in Britain - was spread out more or less evenly across Eu-
rope. By the end of the period, when trade costs dropped, economic activity
concentrated in the northwest of Europe, being better placed to serve the larger
markets there and also able to serve more distant markets at lower trade costs.
The point at which trade costs drop so much that economic activity is free to
locate anywhere - as it would be equally cheap to serve any market - had not
been reached by this point. The resulting pattern was the consolidated \Golden
Triangle." This pattern persists until today. This, however, is only the broader
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picture. Foreign markets, for example, mattered more than domestic ones, and
increasing market potential in the core relative to the periphery resulted in an
absolute and relative decline in peripheral income levels, as predicted by NEG.
The explanation can thus explain the de-industrialisation of Europe's periphery,
like Languedoc going from a textile powerhouse to a gloried vineyard.
Four analytical chapters, on the distribution of regional income, the traditional
explanations of this distribution, on the role of market potential in explaining
it, and the role of market potential in other determinants of income, all point
towards accepting the hypothesis that NEG was an important reason for Europe's
regional income structure. More specically, I nd that: (1) per capita income
inequalities were higher within than between countries, a fact that does not sit well
with traditional institutional or Solowian explanations, and that regional income
clustered with a northwestern European bias; (2) traditional explanations based
on coal deposits work only when there are no controls for regional institutions,
and that regional institutions work only when there are no controls for market
potential; (3) market potential has, across a number of dierent specications and
calculations, a signicant positive eect on per capita income levels but relative
declines in market potential have a negative eect on peripheral regions' income;
and (4) market potential also has a positive eect on regional human capital levels.
Together, these relationships provide reasons as to why some regions developed
while others did not, and more importantly, why regional income formed clear
spatial clusters.
This dissertation modestly revises the way in which we look at the Continent's
economic development in the `Second Industrial Revolution' (Mokyr, 1990). Most
histories of the topic were written either as disjointed national narratives, as
with Milward and Saul (1973), or as pan-European histories that glide over the
spatial patterns that I stress, taking them as self-evident (Berend, 2013; Pollard,
1981). Even when I consider regional de facto institutions, I nd the institutional
explanations washes out after the inclusion of more \basic" ideas, like market
potential. This is perhaps unsurprising, given institutional explanations are a-
spatial in nature and there were clear spatial income clusters, but still contrasts
with the inuential work of, for example, Acemoglu et al. (2001) and North and
Weingast (1989). Likewise, the coal-based explanations, persistent from Pounds
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and Parker (1957) and Parker (1961) to Wrigley (2010), do not to hold up well.
The growing economic history literature that applies NEG methods is also, again,
limited to national cases (Crafts, 2005a; Henning et al., 2011; Roses, 2003; Schulze,
2007b). It provides us with useful historical evidence, and shows how economic
geographical patterns play out within the border of a nation, but misses the
patterns that are only visible when looking at a broader map of Europe's regions.
When this is done, we nd that European regions interacted with one another
to a greater extent than we thought, where in particular foreign markets are
shown to be more important to domestic ones, which contrasts to the `Age of
Neo-Mercantilist' thinking that has framed the debate for some time (Pollard,
1981).
This dissertation also provides some novelty in its empirics. Regional insti-
tutions, for example, are often ignored, as they cannot be directly observed and
are controversial to measure. While the regional institutions I propose here are a
distance from the ideal, they do give us some new ways of thinking about and ap-
proaching the issue. Ignoring the existence of de facto institutions, as in Redding
and Strum (2008), is not a promising route. There is also some novelty in the
estimation of regional income for France and Germany, where I provide a method
that can be applied to other countries (Sweden and Austria-Hungary at least, as
in the robustness checks) when data are scarce.
Indeed, empirical researchers working on European economic history face con-
siderable obstacles in their work in terms of data availability and especially com-
parability.1 These problems mean that testing relationships drawn from eco-
nomics is dicult, and so we nd a historiography of Europe's economy that is
broad in scope and sweep, but perhaps not as analytical and hypothesis-driven as
an economic historian might like it to be (Berend, 2013). This dissertation shows
that it is possible to do European economic history covering a number of re-
gions from dierent countries over dierent years, with a single hypothesis-driven
empirical strategy, and with little pomp and little funding.
A causal explanation of Europe's regional income dierentials required a va-
riety of dierent techniques. Drawing inspiration from empirical economics and
quantitative economic history, the search for appropriate instrumental variables,
1Perhaps not as many obstacles as those working on African economic history (Jerven, 2013)
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for example, took the dissertation deeper into Europe's history. The Habsburg
Division of 1521, that I used to instrument regional institutions, threw new light
on late-nineteenth century institutional dierences that economic historians of-
ten accept as a product of their own time or less-credibley attribute to legacies
like the Roman Empire (Tortella, 1994). The emphasis on spatiality required the
construction of a GIS of historical roads, railways, waterways, ports, shipping
lines, and ton-mile and tari costs. It adds to a growing literature in economic
history that exploits the benets of attributing spatial information to historical
data (Atack, 2013). As always, there is a feedback between the collection and
analysis of quantitative data, and the historical record. Both are used to inform
one another, and neither can work alone.
An essay in prediction
There is one nal task of the economic historian: the essay in prediction. Advice
based on historical evidence for those in the present is normative by denition.
A dissertation should not be normative, and so no concrete prescriptions are
oered here. Still, it is hoped that the analysis of the role of market potential
in late-nineteenth century European regional income dierentials can provide a
historical antidote to presentist accounts of European regional inequalities as a
particularly twenty-rst century issue. Solow (1970, p. 103) famously wrote that
most explanations of relative economic performance end in `a blaze of amateur
sociology.' With this in mind, what follows is more indulgence than policy advice;
a speculative end to pages of academic restraint.
Starting from the observation that Europe's map of regional income has not
changed much since 1870, I explained its late-nineteenth century map through
a simple NEG framework. These NEG frameworks set up a deep structure to
economies, shaped by geography, initial conditions, and trade costs. Multiple
equilibria can found in that dierences and random events in initial conditions
- historical accident - can lead to various results. I could not go back further
then 1870, but we saw that Europe's core-periphery pattern really consolidated
by 1910; the spatial distribution of income was relatively much more even in 1870.
Is \geography" destiny? If initial conditions are set long ago, countries are
locked onto a path, incapable of breaking free until another shock resets the
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conditions. Irwin (2006, p. 42), on thinking about this, is reminded of the
Englishman driving through rural Ireland, who `stopped by the side of the road
to ask a farmer, \What's the best way to get to Dublin?" To which the farmer
replied, \Well, if I were you, I wouldn't start from here."
While some regions may nd themselves at the periphery of an industrial
boom, there are things that can be done to overcome their \bad geography" -
or unfortunate initial conditions. Australia is a good example of an economy
overcoming its peripherality through good transport, trade policies, and com-
munication systems. Limao and Venables (2001) show that landlocked African
countries have not simply been penalised by exogenous distance from markets,
but by poor domestic transport infrastructure. Donaldson (2012) showed that
large-scale railway construction in colonial India decreased trade costs and inter-
regional price gaps, increased interregional and international trade, and increased
real income levels. That the constraints of geography can be alleviated through
transport and trade policy is clear. Indeed, the 2012 to 2015 World Bank Group
budget allocated 43 per cent of total assistance to transport infrastructure - it
is now `the single largest business of the group' making the Group `the largest
multilateral development nancier in infrastructure' (World Bank Group, 2014).
Similarly, the OECD (2013a), an organisation of brain but not brawn, advised
that `enhancing the capacity of infrastructure primarily transport systems is a
priority in some member countries.'
Crafts and Wolf (2013a) show us that there are other policy options. Look-
ing at nineteenth-century Lancashire, they ask how this small region of a small
country produced most of the world's cotton textiles, when the technology was
universally known, and it was a high-wage, adamantly free-trade economy, in
a world of fast-dropping trade costs and cheap Asian competition. Besides the
large private investments in the region's transport system, which were encour-
aged by parliamentary legislation, there were two other reasons for Lancashire's
success. First, the region's urban and industrial development was not constrained
by land-use planning regulations. Second, while the provision of public goods like
healthcare increased the supply price of labour, they reduced not only the health
risks of working in textile towns, making them more attractive places to settle
and work. In short, Crafts and Wolf (2013a) conclude that a policy stance that
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is more supportive to agglomeration is the key to success.
Is this what European policymakers are implementing? The ongoing Eurozone
crisis is increasingly being seen as one of fundamental dierences in national com-
petitiveness, although the debate rages on (Draghi, 2012; Trichet, 2011; Wyplosz,
2013). Greece's troubles, for example, are framed as result of its high unit labour
costs, built up during the heady capital inows of the pre-crisis boom years. Since
Eurozone economies cannot devalue their currency, they are advised to internally
devalue `through wrenching labour-market adjustments' (Blanchard et al., 2013).
While these reforms have had an eect on the Eurozone's recovery, progress on
the fronts highlighted by Crafts and Wolf (2013a) - land-use regulation and public
goods provision - has been mixed.
The OECD (2013a) report on economic policy reform notes that land reform,
particularly housing policies, can boost labour productivity and utilisation. Strict
regulation blocks investment and supply of residential and commercial units, lim-
its labour mobility, preventing the re-allocation of labour across sectors and re-
gions. Unlike nineteenth-century Lancashire, a number of European countries are
bound up in strict regulation. Since 2010, the OECD (2010) has been advising
a revision of land-use regulation in Denmark, Israel, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Poland, Slovak Republic, Sweden and the United Kingdom. They maintain
these revisions for beyond 2013 (OECD, 2013a). While the OECD (2013a) re-
port notes that major healthcare reforms are needed in some member states, like
Russia, European countries have been, in a climate of scal contraction, making
headway. For example, Greece introduced a new output-based hospital funding
system; Italy is reforming its uncompetitive pharmaceutical distribution market,
as is Spain; and Portugal is investing in performance management systems for
hospitals (OECD, 2013b). These reforms are promising, and are in line with the
public-good provision policy implications of Crafts and Wolf (2013a). There is
no reason why Europe's periphery should remain the periphery for another 140
years. Greece was the centre of the ancient world, Italy of the medieval, and
Spain of the early-modern. Where to next?
188
Appendix A
Regional income
A.1 Comparison of French and German Esti-
mates to New Estimates
In on-going research with Joan Roses, Nikolaus Wolf estimated the NUTS-2-level
GDPs of France in 1990 borders for decadal benchmark years from 1900 to 2000,
using the Geary and Stark (2002) method. These estimates were unavailable to
me at the initial stages of my research. The provided estimates are expressed
as regional shares of national nominal GDP. I use them here as a cross-check on
my own estimates derived in Chapter 3. I aggregated all 85 French departments
into their NUTS-2 groupings, expressing their nominal GDPs as shares of the
national GDP for 1900 and 1910, which are the only overlapping years between
the datasets.
The summary statistics are in table ??. They show reassuring similarity. The
means are the same, and a t-test accepts the null hypothesis of equal means
between the two series with a t-statistic of 0.018. The standard deviations, as
well as the minimum and maximum values, are also similar.
The Pearson correlation between my estimates and the Wolf-Roses estimates
is 0.93, and the Spearman rank correlation is 0.80. Both correlation coecients
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Table A.1: France NUTS-2: Own Estimates vs Wolf-Roses.
N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Own 40 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.16
Wolf  Roses 40 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.22
are signicant at the one per cent level.
As a parametric check, I regressed my estimates on the Wolf-Roses estimates.
For a sample of 40 observations, the regression yields an R2 of 0.87, an F-statistic
of 249.08, and a root mean-square error of 0.011. The coecient of 0.653 is
signicant at one per cent, and the constant term of 0.017 is also signicant at
one per cent.
Roses-Wolf also provided estimates of Germany's Regierungsbezirk-level GDPs
from 1900 to 2000, estimated using the Geary and Stark (2002) method. It is
not possible to run the same kind of comparison as for France, as their German
estimates are for 1990 borders, and are again expressed in shares.
However, they also provided an estimate for Alsace-Lorraine's regional GDP
level in dollars for 1907. This is helpful as a look back to Chapter 3 shows I had
no income estimates for this region, and so resorted to using an average instead.
My estimate for the region's 1907 GDP is 62 per cent of the Wolf-Roses
estimate. This is a large discrepancy, but does it aect the estimation procedure?
This is what matters in the end, as I am scaling to known national GDP numbers.
In table A.2 I compare the cross-section regression results with my estimate of
Alsace-Lorraine and that of Wolf-Roses.
While the size of the F-statistic has dropped to 246.3 from 672.6, it remains
large and highly signicant. The other noticeable change is that the S
LF
coecient
is signicant at the 10 per cent level rather than the ve per cent level. The sizes
of the coecients have changed slightly, but none to a statistically signicant
degree. Z-tests for the equality of coecients accept the null of no signicant
dierences for all coecients, with a z-score of 0.02 for P ; -0.02 for I
LF
; S
LF
for
-0.06; and -0.103 for the Constant.
Given that the replacement of Alsace-Lorraine did not change the regres-
sion results, it is unsurprising that the predicted GDP estimates (after a linear
transformation) are highly correlated. The Pearson correlation between the two
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Table A.2: Regional GDP estimation model: with alternative Alsace-Lorraine
Own Wolf-Roses
P 1.038*** 1.034***
(0.026) (0.044)
I
LF 0.527*** 0.534***
((0.057) (0.094)
S
LF 0.156** 0.179*
(0.067) (0.101)
Constant 6.662*** 6.766***
(0.387) (0.638)
R^2 0.98 0.97
F-Stat. 672.6 246.3
N 23 23
Notes: Own column contains the original estimates; Wolf-Roses column contains the esti-
mates with the new Alsace-Lorraine number. Statistical signicance: *** 1 per cent, ** 5
per cent. Standard errors in brackets.
predicted GDP series is 0.99, and the Spearman correlation is also 0.99. Regress-
ing the Wolf-Roses predicted series on the original predicted series, with a sample
size of 92, I get an R2 of 0.99, a coecient of 0.996 that is signicant at one
per cent, a constant of 0.108 that is also signicant at one per cent, and a root
mean-square error of 0.008.
As far as these tests go, the income estimation method presented here produces
similar results to the Geary and Stark (2002) method.
A.2 Re-Aggregation of French Regions
I aggregated all 85 French departments into their 19 NUTS-2 groupings, and re-
ran the empirical analysis in Chapter 3 to see whether this re-aggregation aects
results.
First, as can be seen in A.3, while the Theil index for the new aggregation
shows lower absolute levels of within inequality in GDP per capita (Tw), which
is what we would expect from broader aggregations, the gap between the within
and between components (Tb), and the trend in the gap, remains comparable
from the new to the old sample.
Second, as can be seen in table A.6, the aggregation has not changed Frances
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Table A.3: France NUTS-2: Theil Indices.
Sample 1870 1900 1910
New
Tw 0.03148 0.0338 0.03346
Tb 0.02662 0.02802 0.03102
Old
Tw 0.0375 0.0406 0.0412
Tb 0.0330 0.0278 0.0298
Notes: All per capita income data are in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars. Tw refers to inequality
in regional GDP per capita within countries. Tb refers to inequalities between countries.
country-year coecients of variation in a meaningful way. In the unweighted
results, the new sample shows lower absolute levels of dispersion, but similar trend
growth from one cross-section to the next (Pearson correlation of 0.96). The same
goes for the population-weighted results, which are yet more comparable (Pearson
correlation of 0.99).
Table A.4: France NUTS-2: Coecients of Variation.
Sample 1870 1900 1910
Unweighted
New 0.191 0.233 0.265
Old 0.302 0.314 0.344
Weighted
New 0.480 0.601 0.636
Old 0.961 1.243 1.304
Notes: Panel A contains the unweighted data; Panel B contains the population-weighted
data. All per capita income data are in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars. Coecient of variation
is the standard deviation over the mean for each country at each year. A value of zero
indicates perfect equality.
Third, as can be seen in gure A.2, the new-sample boxplot shows no change
beyond London appearing as an outlier in 1870 and 1910. This is the result of
Frances richer regions forming part of larger, poorer regions, smoothing out the
distribution, and making London more exceptional than it originally was.
Fourth, as can be seen in table ??, the -convergence regression results are
close to identical for the new and old population-weighted samples, showing diver-
gence in both cases, and showing highly signicant convergence for the unweighted
samples. Here again the point estimates are similar.
Fifth, as can be seen gure ??, the Kernel density distribution of log GDP
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Figure A.1: Box plot of regional income with French NUTS2 regions
Notes: Per capita income in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars: 1870 (left), 1900 (middle), and
1910 (right). See text for underlying sources.
Table A.5: France NUTS-2: -convergence.
Weighted Unweighted
New Old New Old
 0.232 0.216 -0.012 -0.014
T-stat. 11.01 6.66 -4.13 -16.55
R2 0.349 0.371 0.701 0.582
N 228 398 228 398
Notes: Dependent variable is rst dierence in GDP per capita. Independent variable is
initial level of GDP per capita. Weights are population shares. All per capita income data
are in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars.
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per capita levels follows the same pattern over the period: a normal distribution
in 1870, and the emergence of a bi-modal distribution by 1910. This is reected
in the similarity of the Kernel bandwidths for the new and old samples: 0.1145
versus 0.1224.
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Figure A.2: France NUTS-2: Kernel denstiy distributions.
Notes: Per capita income in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars.See text for underlying data. Es-
timated using Epanechnikov kernels.
Sixth, as can be seen in table ??, I have re-calculated Morans I statistics for
the new and old samples. These statistics were used to plot the original map,
so any dierence in the numbers presented here would result in a dierent map.
As can be seen, however, the Morans I statistics are very similar in size and
statistical signicance. This implies that the re-aggregation of French regions
does not change the broad clustering of income: a look back at gure 3.6 shows
that rich cluster in the northwest of France maps perfectly onto Nord-Pas de
Calais.
Table A.6: France NUTS-2: Moran's I statistic.
Statistic Z-score p-value
New 0.125 35.01 0.000
Old 0.112 43.86 0.000
Notes: All per capita income data are in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars.
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Appendix B
Literacy and institutions
B.1 Distance to coal deposit centroid versus coal-
eld border
Chapter four showed a strong correlation between the distance to coal deposit
centroid and distance to coaleld border measures. Here I test whether any of
the \coal variables" has an eect on per capita income, which is the point of the
exercise.
The results in table B.1 show the OLS correlations between log GDP per
capita and the various coal measures, controlling for year xed eects and re-
gional institutions. I cannot control for regional xed eects as the coal distance
measures are time-invariant. Backing up the results in Chapter 4, none of the
coal measures are correlated with per capita income even in these basic speci-
cations. As argued in Chapter 4, the improvements in transport technology that
this period saw rendered distance to coal irrelevant.
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Table B.1: Three measures of coal and income OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3)
lnY lnY lnY
lnCoal Transport -0.029
(0.028)
INST 0.203*** 0.524*** 0.427***
(0.046) (0.080) (0.082)
lnCoal Distance -0.017
(0.017)
lnCoal F ield -0.041
(0.032)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Region F.E. No No No
R^2 0.868 0.327 0.350
N 597 597 597
Notes: *** denotes signicance at one per cent. Robust standard errors clustered on regions,
and reported in brackets. Y is GDP per capita; INST is a measure of regional institutional
eciency; Coal Transport is transport cost to nearest coal deposit; Coal Distance is the
distance to coal deposit centroid measure; and Coal F ield is the distance to coaleld border
measure.
B.2 Testing for Ruggedness
Another rst-nature geographical variable that may aect regional income dier-
entials is terrain ruggedness. Research has shown more rugged areas are less pro-
ductive, due higher transport costs are less suitable land for production (Combes,
2010).
The baseline data to calculate this indicator was the Digital Elevation Model
of all Europe, obtained from GISCO (European Commission/Eurostat). It covers
39 member and cooperating countries, with a 3D raster dataset with elevation.1
The dataset used was made available as tiles (5x5 degree), and georeferenced
in ETRS89 coordinates system. Using this source, I calculated the Riley et al.
(1999) ruggedness index to quantify topographic heterogeneity.
More specically, I implemented a GIS model to do the following operations.
First, extract the elevation information of every raster cell, obtaining a grid of
points that covers all the studied countries. Second, create meshes of 3x3 ele-
ments.Third, calculate the elevation's dierence between neighbour nodes follow-
1Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gisco/geodata/reference-data/digital-
elevation-model
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ing the index formulation in Riley et al. (1999). Finally, calculate the average
value between all values within each region.
Regressing log GDP per capita on this index, as can be seen in the table B.2,
yields a signicant negative coecient, but this eect washes out with the cost
to coal deposit and regional institution variables, even before introducing region
or/and year xed eects.
Table B.2: Ruggedness, Coal and Institutions OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3)
lnY lnY lnY
Rugg: -0.0003** -0.0002
(0.000) (0.000)
lnCoal Transport -0.187*** -0.189
(0.034) (0.034)
INST 0.818*** 0.817***
(0.053) (0.053)
Constant 7.733*** 7.785*** 7.769**
(0.027) (0.157) (0.154)
Year F.E. No No No
Region F.E. No No No
R^2 0.014 0.392 0.393
N 597 597 597
Notes: *** denotes signicance at one per cent and ** at ve per cent. Robust standard
errors clustered on regions, and reported in brackets. Y is GDP per capita; INST is a
measure of regional institutional eciency; Coal Transport is transport cost to nearest coal
deposit; and Rugg: is the ruggedness index.
B.3 Literacy data sources
Literacy data come from a number of primary and secondary sources. It is well-
known that historical literacy data are dicult to work with. What I have done
here is use primary ocial sources wherever possible; use general (rather than, say,
military) rates when they are available; and use standard, very straightforward
and transparent extrapolation for missing regions or years. The goal was not
to arrive at a precise gure, but at an approximate level, which allows us to
understand the way resources are distributed. There is no reason to think that
a persistent bias, that for example literacy measured in one particular country is
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correlated with the empirical model's error term, exists in this dataset. Chapter
6 provides a series of robustness checks of these literacy data. In biref, I nd
that these data are correlated with school enrolment rates from the literature,
and with alternative primary sources of literacy data.
Austria-Hungary. Regional indices (ratios relative to national rate) are from
Good (1984, p. 156). I converted these into real rates, using the national rates
in Cipolla (1969, pp. 127, 118).
Britain. Rates for England and Wales are from volumes 33, 63, and 73 of
Registrar-General of Births, Deaths, and Marriages in England and Wales (1910).
These gures refer to the rate of people who are unable to sign their own marriage
register. Rates for Ireland are from Irish Census (1911) and Irish Census (1910).
Scottish rates come from Cipolla (1969, p. 127).The Scottish gure for 1910 is
an average for Wales, England, and Ireland.
France. Rates are from the census books. For 1870, Statistique de la France
(1872). For 1886, Statistique de la France (1886). For 1901, Statistique de la
France (1901). For 1911, Statistique de la France (1911).
Germany. Rates for Prussian regions are from Cipolla (1969, p. 91). I
then took the rates of illiterate military recruits from the yearbooks Deutsch
Statistischen Bureau (1882) and Deutsch Statistischen Bureau (1910), and used
these values to linearly extrapolate the values for 1900 and 1910, as well as the
non-Prussian regions in 1870. It is worthwhile pointing out that Cipolla (1969)
also used illiterate military recuits as his measure.
Italy. Rates come from Felice (2012). The rates for 1910 are from Cipolla
(1969, p. 19).
Spain. Nunez (1990), provides provincial literacy rates, split by gender. I took
the average of this split to indicate overall literacy. Some provinces are missing
from my list due to dierences in aggregation. Missing regional rates are proxied
with those of neighbours.
Sweden. Regional rates for 1930 are from Statistiska Centralbyran (1935)
These are the earliest we know of. To extrapolate back in time, I used the annual
growth rate of 0.25 per cent presented in Sandberry and Steckel (1997).
Table B.3 shows country's mean level and standard deviation of literacy by
year. The statistics t expectations of high German and Swedish literacy, as
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Table B.3: Summary of literacy rates
1870 1900 1910
Austria-Hungary 63.36 75.16 82.55
(16.685) (10.544) (4.563)
Germany 89.77 99.26 99.39
(9.175) (1.129) (1.261)
Spain 28.94 49.09 56.18
(10.641) (16.333) (17.657)
France 65.29 95.79 97.31
(15.815) (3.511) (2.016)
Britain 57.21 93.58 97.12
(15.133) (2.966) (2.045)
Italy 26.81 47.37 56.83
(14.757) (19.859) (19.093)
Sweden 85.17 92.35 94.74
(0.037) (0.040) (0.041)
Notes: Literacy rates are in percentage form. Standard deviations are in brackets. See this
appendix for details on sources. AH is Austria-Hungary; DE is Germany; ES is Spain; FR
is France; GB is Britain; IT is Italy; and SE is Sweden.
examined in Becker and Woessmann (2009) and Sandberg (1979) and Ljunberg
and Nilsson (2009), and of low initial levels of British literacy, but fast catch-
up growth, as discussed in Vincent (2000). The table also shows that regional
variation in literacy, as measured by the standard deviation, was highest were
literacy levels were lowest: Italy, Spain, and Austria-Hungary. Regional variation
in literacy is analysed in Chapter 6.
B.4 Iron ore and regional income
In Chapter 4, in the discussion around gure 4.9 I highlighted the correlation be-
tween regional per capita income levels and the distance to iron ore deposits. This
correlation, in simple OLS form, is stronger than the coal and income correlation,
raising the possibility that using iron instead of coal would aect my empirical
results. Bearing in mind that here I am using distance to iron ore deposits, rather
than the cost of transport, I run the same IV exercise as in Chapter 4 's table 4.7.
The results are in table B.4.
In the reduced form estimaiton in column (1), we can see that the farther
regions were from iron ore deposits, the lower their income levels. The eect is
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Table B.4: Iron and institutions IV estimates
(3) (4)
OLS IV-2
lnY lnY
INST 0.643*** 0.618***
(0.085) (0.086)
ln Iron Distance -0.142* -0.081
(0.071) (0.052)
Constant 7.855*** 7.041**
(0.129) (0.493)
Year F.E. Yes Yes
Country F.E. Yes Yes
R^2 0.650 0.604
N 597 597
Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-test 16.78***
Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic 16.62***
(1) (2)
RF IV-1
lnY INST
SH -0.274*** -0.145***
(0.038) (0.012)
ln Iron Distance -0.189*** -0.064**
(0.022) (0.022)
Constant 8.297*** 0.972***
(0.097) (0.061)
Year F.E. Yes Yes
Country F.E. Yes Yes
R^2 0.465 0.534
N 597 597
Notes: *** denotes signicance at one per cent and ** at ve per cent. Robust standard
errors clustered on countries, and reported in brackets. Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-test
is on the excluded instrument, SH (Spanish Habsburg Regions). Anderson canon. corr. LM
statistic is for under-identication. Y is GDP per capita; INST is a measure of regional
institutional eciency; and and Iron Distance is distance to nearest iron deposit. Column
(1) is the reduced form estimation; (2) is the rst stage; (3) is the OLS estimation; and([4)
is the second stage. Mark Schaer at Heriot-Watt University supplied the Stata code for
this estimation.
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large and signicant. It does not come at the cost of a change in magnitude or
signicance of the Spanish Habsburg IV (SH) for regional institutional eciency
(INST ). The same holds for the rst stage estimation in column (2), where
SH retains is strength. In the second stage in column (4), however, while the
coecient on distance to iron ore deposits (Iron Distance) grows in magnitude
from -0.064 to -0.81, its error also increased, making it statistically insignicant.
This contrasts to its signicance in the OLS estimation in column (3), and to the
relationship I highlighted in 4.9. Instrumented INST , on the other hand, has
retained its magnitude and signicance, showing similar results to those reported
in table 4.7. That Iron Distance is negatively and signicantly correlated with
INST in column (2), the rst stage, implies that the simple iron-income corre-
lation was perhaps spurious, and was working through the variation in INST .
A full econometric investigation is beyond the scope of what I am trying to do
here, but the point remains that when controlling for institutional eciency in an
appropriate IV framework, access to either coal or iron do not exert a signicant
inuence on regional per capita income levels.
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Appendix C
Market potential
C.1 Estimating market potential
Bilateral trade data are from Jacks et al. (2011), which provides ows for all
countries starting in 1870. The section I take is 1870 to 1920. There are no
data prior to 1870, which is why the nal window must extend slightly beyond
my precise period. The length of the window is, roughly, the length of the entire
period, divided by three. I experimented with dierent windows, nding the same
results.
My GDP data are the same as those underlying Chapter 3, and are detailed in
the appendix. Great circle distances from regional nodes (regional or provincial
capitals) to one another were calculated using a geographical information system;
and language and border data were taken and cross-checked using the 1912 Cam-
bridge Modern History Atlas (William Ward et al., 1912). Following ?, I adjusted
for internal (within-regional) distances as distii = 0:66 
 
areai

0:5
where areai
is region i's area in square-kilometres. This formula, or variants of it (for ex-
ample, Crafts (2005b); Schulze (2007b)) is often used in the literature, and gives
the average distance in a circular location under the assumption that economic
activity occurs in the centre and consumers are spread evenly across space. As in
?, equation 5.4 assumes that price indices are identical across regions within the
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same country. There is no way around this since the trade model yields only one
estimate jt per year per country. It is an inevitable part of using national-level
trade data to derive regional level market potential values.
Table C.1: Results of bilateral trade model.
1870-1883 1900-1906 1907-20
dist -0.845 -0.726 -0.51
(0.386)** (0.444)* (0.302)*
border 0.541 0.629 0.782
(0.426) (0.331)* (0.254)**
language 3.202 2.268 2.334
(0.527)*** (0.471)*** (0.389)***
Importer F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Exporter F.E. Yes Yes YescR2 0.74 0.65 0.67
N 1284 1295 1079
Notes: robust standard errors clustered at trading-pair level reported in brackets. *** denotes
statistical signicance at one per cent; ** at ve per cent; and * at 10 per cent. Sample
restricted to exports within my sample of countries, and from my sample countries to the
rest of the world.
The econometric results are displayed in table C.1. Each period provides a
sizeable number of observations, and the adjusted-R2 values lie between 0.74 and
0.65. This simple specication explains a considerable proportion of variation in
bilateral trade ows. Look more specically at the variables, sharing a common
language has a strong positive eect on bilateral trade ows, as in ?. Except for
the initial period, sharing a national border also has a strong positive eect on
trade ows. These results nd much in common with the Schulze and Wolf (2012)
ndings that political borders and ethno-linguistic networks matter for economic
integration. Unlike Schulze and Wolf (2012), however, I am not interested in
uncovering the precise underlying mechanisms. The literature on this is vibrant
enough, and I am both ill equipped to enter it and content with using these implied
eects to estimate market potential as in ?. As in all gravity models, distance is
highly signicant and negative - in all periods. This captures the high trade costs
(mainly transport) that come with increasing distance. It is interesting to see
that the size of the coecient on distance is declining over time, in line with the
late-nineteenth century's transport revolution. Jacks et al. (2011) see the same
decline in the size of distance coecient over the 1870 to 1939 period for similar
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reasons.
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